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Abstract
The work reported in this thesis involved the exploration of 
12 year old children's conceptions of inheritance. Results derived 
from interviews and from videotaped recordings of small group 
discussions, indicate that children's conceptions of inheritance are 
well developed before they are formally taught these notions in 
school. A series of open-ended problem solving tasks were designed 
to elicit student's conceptions and to facilitate group discussion. 
Results suggest that children’s conceptions of inherited 
characteristics are heterogeneous and 'organized' in a highly 
flexible way. A research model, based on the notion of conceptual 
ecosystems, was developed to provide a framework for data analysis. 
Features of conceptual ecosystems are described. It is suggested 
that such systems are characterised by their 'openness', 
adaptiveness and resilience. Results suggest that the heterogeneity, 
flexibility and fluctuating character of such ecosystems confer on 
conceptions the ability both to transform well and to resist change 
well. The study describes how these characteristics of resilience 
and adaptiveness are displayed in the cognitive and social 
interactions of individual students. A theory of conceptual change 
is advanced which considers learning as a series of continuous 
qualitative changes made by the learner to existing personal 
conceptions. The significance of these ’metatransitions' is 
discussed in the light of existing teaching and learning 
strategies. It is suggested that conceptual change can be 
facilitated by helping students to make their existing conceptions
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explicit, co-active and interactive within conceptual ecosystems. 
The social and cognitive consequences of conceptual conflict, 
disagreement and consensus are described, It is proposed that an 
ecosystemic view of children's conceptions may help explain and 
overcome the difficulties experienced by students when they try to 
reconcile scientific concepts with their existing conceptions.
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Chapter 1
Literature Review
1.0 Introduction
The following discussion will review our present understanding 
of children’s beliefs about inheritance and will examine the ways 
in which it is thought that student’s conceptions might change 
under the impact of teaching and learning.
The initial discussion will focus on the specific difficulties 
associated with teaching and learning genetics. What emerges from 
this initial rev lev/ is that children’s conceptions play a 
significant part in the problem. However, research into children’s 
beliefs about inheritance and investigations into the nature of 
conceptual change must be located in a multi-dimensional 'space* 
occupied by numerous constellations of interactive ideas about the 
nature of scientific concepts, learning, conceptual change and 
cognitive research. What I have tried to do in this review is to 
follow a route through this matrix, using three different notions 
of what constitutes a ’concept*. I will discuss these three concepts 
of a ’concept’ in terms of their epistemological underpinnings, the 
cognitive psychologies which have informed them, the notions of 
conceptual change that they convey and the teaching and learning 
strategies which they are associated.
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1.1 Genetics - Pedagogic Problems and Perspectives.
There is a general consensus of feeling amongst biology 
teachers and their students that genetics is a ‘difficult’ topic. 
Research studies have supported this impression whilst illuminating 
the teaching and learning problems which underpin it.
Johnstone and Mahoud (1980) carried out a survey of topic 
areas within the Scottish Certificate of Education Higher Biology 
syllabus. Senior students, teachers and first year university 
students were asked to score fifteen biology topics in terms of 
their perceived difficulty. Both teachers and students placed 
genetics high on their list, In a similar study by Finley et al. 
(1982), genetics concepts were described by teachers as being 
difficult but important elements of school biology. These findings 
provide an interesting counterpoint to the work of Shayer (1974) 
which suggested that the genetics content of the Nuffield '0* level 
Biology syllabus was inappropriate for students at that stage of 
cognitive development, ie. the conceptual demand, in Piagetian 
terms, was too high for students of *0’ level age. Shayer (1980) 
recommended that the genetics component of the ’O’ level syllabus 
should be abandoned. This proposed ’solution’ to the difficulties 
associated with genetics concepts fails to recognise and consider 
the curricular significance of genetics. In a society increasingly 
preoccupied with prenatal diagnosis, genetic counselling, 
biotechnology and molecular genetics, it seems at the very least 
short-sighted to consider genetics as an expendable part of the 
biology syllabus at any level. If we are to have ’science for all*
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(A.S.E. 1981) then there is a powerful argument for the retention of 
genetics concepts within the syllabus and more research into the 
difficulties associated with the topic.
1.2 Research Perspectives on the Difficulties Associated with 
Genetics.
The character of school genetics, particularly Mendelian 
inheritance, is largely based on problem solving and the assumption 
that students learn genetics concepts during problem solving 
activities, Stewart (1983) examined the strategies used by American 
college students when they attempted to solve genetics problems, 
This study revealed that many students solve inheritance problems 
successfully, but use ritualised problem solving algorithms, rather 
than genetics concepts and processes. In a related study, Stewart 
(1982) concluded that problem solving in genetics required two 
types of knowledge; procedural knowledge (skill) and conceptual 
knowledge derived from the theory of inheritance. Stewart (1983) 
comments that if problem solving is to be meaningful to the 
student, procedural skills must be grounded in conceptual 
knowledge. On the basis of this research, Stewart (1982) has 
developed a model of meaningful learning in relation to problems 
involving phenotype/genotype, dominant/recessive and allelic 
information. This model actively accommodates procedural and 
conceptual knowledge, and is designed to ’diagnose1 student 
difficulties. The technique used is to compare the actual 'route* 
taken by a student through the genetics problem with an ideal 'map'
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derived from expert knowledge. In situations where students take 
the ’wrong’ path the model is designed to help teachers anticipate 
and correct the consequences of these 'mistakes’ in terms of 
procedural and conceptual knowledge.
An alternative model of genetics problem solving, based on 
Piagetian doctrine, has been put forward by Lawson (1979) and 
Walker et al, (1980), These workers argue that meaningful solutions 
to genetics problems, based on conceptual knowledge, require the 
student to have attained the stage of ’formal operations’. Walker et 
al, (1980) contend that there is a relationship between the 
student’s performance in Piagetian tests and their ability to solve 
genetics problems. This research would tend to align itself with 
Shayer’s (1974) findings about the cognitive demand of genetics 
concepts. Formal thinking may indeed be a factor in problem 
solving. In most genetics problems the student is asked to work 
with multiple hypotheses regarding the possible outcomes of 
parental crosses and to relate these to notions of phenotypic and 
geneotypic probability. These sorts of operations are 
characteristic of formal thinking, however, the lack of formal 
operations seems in no way to negate the student’s ability to 
relate to genetics concepts in a meaningful fashion, Non formal 
thinkers and unsuccessful problem solvers may have an entirely 
adequate framework of concepts on which to base their 
understanding of genetics. These idiosync .ratio conceptual 
frameworks may or may not be biologically correct, however for the 
individual they represent the foundations of understanding.
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1.3 Students Prior Knowledge of Genetics.
Deadman and Kelly (1978) carried out research to investigate 
what students understood about evolution and heredity before they 
were formally introduced to the topic in school. This research was 
based on the Ausubelian dictum that if we know more about the 
quality and character of these understandings, then we can, in some 
way, increase the effectiveness of teaching and learning strategies. 
Deadman and Kelly (1978) confirmed in their study that students 
have a set of definite ideas about inheritance before formal 
teaching begins, although when viewed from a strictly biological 
perspective these ideas may seem superficial and underdeveloped.
Kargbo et al, (1980) also investigated children’s prior 
knowledge of inheritance concepts. Their findings suggested that 
children in the age range 7-13 years have a number of novel ideas 
about the nature and mechanisms of inheritance. Kargbo et al.
(1980) categorised these intuitive ideas into ’environmental', 
'somatic1, ’naturalistic’, and ’genetic’ explanations. ’Environmental' 
explanations given by the children focused on how factors such as 
water, sunlight, food and parental care might influence the genetic 
traits of the offspring. ’Somatic’ explanations invoked structures 
such as brain, blood and nerves as systems which would influence 
inherited traits. 'Naturalistic1 explanations centred on motherhood, 
sex resemblance with parents, nature and life cycles as important 
determinants of inherited characteristics. Some of the students in 
the study did use 'genetic' explanations in relation to parental 
input and dominance characteristics. This study commented on the
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age related character of children’s ideas of inheritance, indicating 
that younger students <6-10 years) favoured environmental, somatic 
and naturalistic explanations whilst genetic explanations were used 
only by the older children. Despite the Piagetian overtones of this 
part of the study, there is a clear indication from this work that 
children have a diverse set of explanations relating to inheritance 
well before they are formally introduced to the topic in school.
These studies of children's ideas about inheritance prior to 
formal instruction are an interesting backdrop to research work 
carried out into children’s understandings after teaching. Hackling 
(1982) investigated a range of concepts related to inheritance and 
identified what he refers to as "common misconceptions" in 
student's understandings immediately after units of instruction.
"The notion of dominance as a process which determines which 
of two alleles is expressed in the phenotype has been confused 
by the student’s preconceptions about dominance refering to 
power and authority. Many students describe blending in terms 
of a mixing of genes, a view popular in the nineteenth century 
prior to Mendel's demonstration that genes are discrete units 
that are reassorted in each generation."
In a similar study using structured interviews, Hackling and 
Treagust (1984), working with students who had just completed a 
genetics course, concluded that many students did understand the 
relationship between reproduction and inheritance. This research 
suggested that children know that their features came from their 
parents and that as offspring they can get a mixture of features 
from both parents. Hackling and Treagust (1984) comment that this 
understanding is probably developed in the context of concrete 
experiences with their own families and that this may explain why
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these ideas are more frequently understood than ideas of a more 
abstract kind, such as dominance. Even after instruction, this 
study found that most students experienced difficulties in giving 
an explanation of terms such as dominance, recessiveness and 
blending inheritance; most student explanations focusing on 
everyday meanings of dominance and blending.
1.4 Intuitive Knowledge and Learning.
In a case study of adult learning in genetics, Baird and White 
(1982) found two distinct learning strategies. These researchers 
describe a learning style which involves the active integration of 
prior knowledge with scientific knowledge. Understandings based on 
this style of learning, according to these workers, may have more 
utility in everyday situations and be more accessible to the 
learner. An alternative style of learning identified in this 
research was characterised by learners who used a task orientated 
approach, which was limited to responding appropriately to received 
stimuli in order to obtain correct answers. This style was less 
related to prior knowledge of the topic and potentially at least, 
was considered to be less useful in everyday situations.
Research into the problems of teaching and learning genetics 
is associated with a number of epistemological viewpoints, each one 
informed by a variety of psychologies, theories of learning, and 
philosophies of science. Depending on the nature of these 
epistemologies, a number of interpretations can be placed on 
problems associated with the teaching and learning of inheritance.
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For example, if researchers adopt a Realist perspective which 
emphasises knowledge as being independent of the learner’s 
subjective contributions, the prior knowledge of the student will be 
measured against the ’correctness' of the received scientific view.
If the student’s ideas are at odds with the scientific view they 
may be deemed to be errors or ’misconceptions’ which require 
teaching strategies designed to erase or overwrite the learner's 
original conceptual framework.
An alternative view of these ’misconceptions’ has been proposed 
by Driver and Easley (1978) and Gilbert et al. (1982). Gilbert et 
al. describe children’s alternative conceptions as
’’conceptual structures which provide a sensible and coherent 
understanding of the world from the child’s point of view."
This research suggests that when viewed from a constructivist 
epistemological position, these alternative conceptions may play a 
critical and important role in student learning.
It is clear from this review that research into the teaching 
and learning of genetics draws on various epistemologies, and these 
in turn encapsulate a number of different ideas about such 
fundamental notions as, how children learn, the nature of scientific 
concepts, the status of children's prior knowledge and which 
teaching strategies bring about conceptual change. The following 
discussion will review same of the theories of learning, pedagogic 
practices and cognitive psychologies which have informed the 
epistemologies of researchers and teachers. This review will 
illuminate a number of viewpoints adopted by educationists in their 
efforts to develop an understanding of the activities of the
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learner, and will examine how researchers and teachers visualise 
the student's use of scientific concepts and individual conceptions 
during the learning/conceptual change process. This discussion will 
introduce the epistemological and personal commitments which 
determine my research posture and the nature of my investigations 
into children’s conceptions of inheritance and the process of 
conceptual change.
1.5 Piaget ian Theory and the Structure of Knowledge.
Jean Piaget (1896-1980) has been one of the most influential 
international figures in cognitive psychology and education. 
Piagetian theory relating to conceptual change has influenced 
pedagogic practice, curriculum design and how teachers 'see* the 
world of the child.
According to Piaget's theory of learning, cognitive development 
consists of the individual child* coming to terms with the physical 
environment around him in increasingly abstract ways. This 
transition from reflexive to abstract mental processing is seen to 
be controlled by four main stages in cognitive development; 
sensori-motor, pre-operational, concrete and formal stages. Piaget 
(1964) describes how the child progresses through these stages 
under the influence of several factors.
" What factors can be called upon to explain the development 
from one set of structures to another? It seems to me that 
there are four main factors: First of all maturation in the 
sense of Gessel, since this development is a continuation of 
the embryogenesis; second, the role of experience of the 
effects of the physical environment and the structure of 
intelligence, third, social transmission in the broad sense
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(linguistic transmission, education etc.) and fourth, a factor which 
is too often neglected but one which seems to me fundamental and 
even the principal factor. I shall call this the factor of 
equilibrium or if you prefer it self-regulation.”
Piagetian equilibration is central to his proposed mechanism of 
conceptual change and cognitive development; indeed, the nation of 
equilibration is unique to Piaget's epistemology. Equilibration 
represents a process which operates when the child's knowledge of 
the world grows and when he begins to recognise the problems and 
errors associated with previous judgements about natural phenomena. 
These problems and reservations about the nature of the world 
disturb the child's cognitive structures, and according to Piaget, 
motivate him to utilise appropriate cognitive operations in order 
to achieve a new equilibrium. Reaching this new equilibrium state 
involves the learner in a series of accommodations which adapt his 
knowledge structures to the assimilations derived from ongoing 
experiences. Bolton (1977) gives this classic example of 
equilibration in the context of a 'conservation task'
"...so that eventually the child oscillates between, say, 
asserting that there is 'more liquid' in the comparison beaker 
because it is taller and asserting that there is less because 
it is narrower. The child is thus led to recognise the problem 
and the error of his previous judgements, he is now motivated 
to use logical operations of reversibility and compensation to 
justify a consoryation judgement.”
Piaget’s notion of change through equilibration owes much to the
cybernetician’s ideas of ’ultrastability1 which Jantsch (1976)
describes as a system that
’’..adapts stepwise via different structural states to an 
ultimate equilibrium, its evolution foreclosed by the 
equilibrium telos.”
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Thus the learner’s ’compensations' far new experiences drives the 
process of equilibration in a spiral of progressive and successive 
accommodations and assimilations. This view of cognitive 
development is said to betray Piaget's 'closed' perception of 
learning in which the learner is seen as being isolated from 
interpersonal and contextual influences by his cognitive structures. 
Vilden (1980) comments
”In Piaget, however, in everything he has to say about 
’frontiers’, ’boundaries’, and 'bounded structures', we find an 
entirely different and atomistic relation, which is clearly 
connected with his Cartesian or Husserlian conceptions of the 
individual. For Piaget, these frontiers are not only conceived 
of as real they are also obviously conceived as belonging to 
the structure. (In other words he does, in his theory, what we 
all do in our daily practice: we separate figure from ground, 
and then attribute the boundary between them to the figure). 
Thus, whereas for the ecosystemic perspective, the boundary is 
the locus of communication and interaction, the paradoxical 
distinction upon which the whole ecosystemic relation depends 
- and without which we would all be Kantian rubber balls - for 
the bioenergetic perspective, and Piaget, it is the barrier to 
communication. What we see as a Common Market, he sees as a 
tariff wall, in the terms of a kind of isolationist 
protectionism. It follows, therefore that what is a barrier to 
communication will also be a barrier to certain kinds of 
change, and that it is this epistemological attribution of 
frontiers to a privileged set of entities, called structures, 
that makes Piaget’s conception of the ’genetic’ or diachronic 
relation of one structure to another in child development so 
dubious.”
In this way the structural logic of stage theory takes precedence 
over the aims and goals of the learner, and denies the individual 
freedom of deliberate action on, and in response to, the learning 
environment that he experiences. The negative feedback activities 
or ’compensations' of the learner are in fact used to suppress the 
’noise’ (environmental variations perceived by the learner) from the 
cognitive environment and reinforce the stability of schemata and
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cognitive structures. In a truly evolutionary model of cognitive 
change (Piagetian theory is more developmental than evolutionary) 
individual learners do not seek to damp out the effects of 
experience, but seek to be sensitive to ‘noise’ and adapt to changes 
in the cognitive environment by positive feedback strategies which 
retain an inherent flexibility of response to learning situations.
In contrast to Piagetian theory, non-equilibrium theories of change 
stress the ’openness* and flexibility of the learner’s cognitive 
frameworks and the emergence of learning strategies, Individual 
learners are thus seen to be involved in a symbiotic interaction 
with their environment out of which they construct learning 
experiences and live out the consequences of these constructions in 
a particular context.
1.6 Piagetian Teaching Strategies and Conceptual Change.
In addition to theoretical reservations, educational researchers 
have voiced concern as to the utility and fruitfulness of adopting 
a Piagetian perspective. Hoy (1974) investigating the influence of 
contextual information on the ability of six year olds to predict 
the point of view of another person, found that stage development 
may depend largely on the type and number of characteristics of 
the subject matter as well as the elicitation procedure used to 
interview the children. Indeed Piaget (1974) has given support to 
the notion that stage development may be context linked. This 
implies that there is a greater reciprocity between the schema of 
the learner and the quality of the conceptual environment
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surrounding her. The researcher or teacher seeking to implement 
Piagetian theory whilst recognising conceptual influences, must 
consider that at a practical level this requires an increased 
awareness of the learner’s existing cognitive status, and the 
cognitive demand of specific subject areas. Before selecting 
'appropriate' learning materials and subject content, teachers must 
know the student’s level of cognitive development. Much of the 
Piagetian ’technology’ developed over the years has been aimed at 
designing diagnostic tests to facilitate just such an understanding 
of the learner's cognitive status (Shayer and Adey 1981), 
Underpinning this ’technology’ is the assumption that by matching 
the cognitive demand of the content to the student's cognitive 
status, teachers can better facilitate the accommodations and 
assimilations of the learner. Jantsch (1976) comments on this 
strategy and refers to a "spirit of Utopian engineering’’ which he 
sees as indicative of this type of normative forecasting which 
seems to negate the variety and complexity of learning contexts. 
Driver (1983) comments that
” This approach can give some guidance in general planning of 
science courses over the years 5-16, However, there are 
problems in applying it to particular classes and individual 
children. Some problems are organizational and raise questions 
of how instruction can be successfully individualised to match 
the requirements of all people in the class."
The adequacy of Piagetian analyses designed to assess
cognitive demand within specific areas of the curriculum has been
questioned by teachers and researchers. Depending on the style of
teaching and the learning strategies used to introduce topics, the
level of cognitive demand may be modified in such a way as to
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heighten or diminish that level. Topics deemed to be inappropriate 
for a particular group of children may in fact be meaningfully 
taught by the imaginative teacher aware of, and sympathetic to, the 
child’s previous experiences and prior knowledge (Driver 1983).
The 'technology* associated with assessing cognitive demand and 
'match-mismatch' information is derived from Piaget’s notion of 
cognitive change through successive equilibrations. Translation of 
this theory into classroom practice has led to an interest in 
cognitive conflict /dissonance strategies aimed at facilitating 
conceptual development. Rowell (1983) has articulated a formal 
model of conceptual change based on the work of Piaget (1977) and 
Inhelder et al.(1974). Rowell’s theory stresses the "cycles of 
heightening equilibration" associated with cognitive imbalance 
(situations where the dynamic equilibrium of the learner’s 
cognitive apparatus has been disturbed). These workers suggest that 
teachers should seek to promote conceptual change by disturbing 
the learner’s equilibrium by inducing cognitive imbalance and then 
facilitating the student's return to a new, temporary equilibrium 
state. Case (1978) describes four factors which may influence this 
strategy
"1. Exposure to situations which could be interpreted as 
problematic
2. Exposure to situations in which there is a clear indication 
that the current basis for prediction is inadequate
3. Exposure to situations where the unattended feature is 
highlighted in some fashion
4. Exposure to models of haw to incorporate the additional 
feature"
This type of conceptual change pedagogy puts great emphasis on 
teacher influence and expertise, and assumes a perfect
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understanding of the learner’s cognitive status and prior 
experiences. This type of ’cognitive profile’ is difficult to 
construct with any sort of accuracy; the task being made more 
daunting by the incomplete coverage of measures designed to assess 
cognitive demand in various topic areas and the inevitable 
generalisations which attempt to fill these gaps.
Case’s strategies for inducing cognitive imbalance can be 
refined, in Piagetian terms, by exposing the learner to a stage of 
cognitive development one step beyond his present capabilities. The 
assumption in this procedure being that a '+1 optimal mismatch’ 
will promote cognitive imbalance and drive the developmental 
processes of the learner to the next equilibrium state. Kuhn (1979) 
is critical of this strategy in that its mode of action remains 
’’vague” and ’’incomplete”; indeed, it is as much an act of faith in 
stage theory as anything relating to good pedagogic practice. At a 
practical level the effectiveness of these strategies are difficult 
to assess as they require the ’experimenter’ to discriminate 
between conceptual development resulting from exposure to 
’superior’ processing and imitation. Rosenthal and Zimmerman (1972) 
found that children imitated ’correct’ procedures and made fewer 
'errors’ in post tests, after exposure to +1 strategies.
Participants in these sorts of studies are often covertly invited 
by the methodology to change their conceptualisations. In reality 
there can be no certainty that they have modified their actual
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belief systems. In theoretical terms, imitation by the learner can 
be progressive or regressive. There is no evidence to suggest that 
the learner, drawn by the upward spiral of equilibration, will 
selectively choose models of a cognitively superior behaviour to 
those which are seen to be inferior. Work by Perret-Clermont (1980) 
using small groups of children selected to optimise cognitive 
conflict within the group (eg. groups composed of children, some of 
wham were volume conservers and others who were not) has shown 
that in a social situation where superior models of cognitive 
processing are available for inspection, children tend to adopt the 
cognitive strategies associated with superior models - non 
conservers tend to become conservers and not vice versa, Kuhn 
(1972) has tried to induce disequilibrium in the classroom setting 
by presenting the child with advanced models of cognition. 
Unfortunately, Kuhn’s methods neglect the importance of the 
interaction between behavioural models and the learner’s individual 
constructions of events.
Rowell and Dawson (1982) acknowledge these various Piagetian 
strategies in their studies of instructional difficulties associated 
with such topics as dynamics and volume. They found that children’s 
schemata were difficult to dislodge, even when they were presented 
with conflicting expectations and concrete examples of the 
limitations of their present theories. The only change that these 
workers observed was when the child's existing theory was combined 
with a new theory to form a hybrid concept. In the light of these 
findings Rowell and Dawson (1985) developed a strategy to
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circumvent this cognitive inertia. Before describing this procedure 
it is very interesting to note that the hybridisation of ideas is 
seen as problematic, given that from the learner's point of view, it 
may be highly significant for him to retain old and new theories 
as part of an effective long term learning strategy. If it is not 
necessary to destroy old ideas before accepting new ones, why 
should the learner reduce the flexibility of his conceptual 
frameworks and the adaptive potential of his knowledge base?
The 'Framework Replacement' strategy of Rowell and Dawson 
(1985) is a sequence of steps designed to promote cognitive change 
through controlled conflict, whilst getting over the 'problem' of 
children adding on or retaining current knowledge. Rowell and 
Dawson (1985) describe the procedure in the following way
"1. Students were made consciously aware of their existing 
ideas
2. Different ideas were not discussed in detail or brought 
into conflict
3. Students were asked to retain their ideas, but were told 
that one possibility would be taught and that their help would 
be needed later for its evaluation
4. The idea was taught linking it where possible to existing 
knowledge
5. Once students could use the new idea, the old ones were 
recalled for a comparison and both compared with reality.”
In this way Rowell and Dawson seek to encourage children to 
construct an alternative theory based on new experience which 
conflict with their present schemata. The conflict is not 
introduced until the children are aware of the new idea. In this 
way the idea which is subjected to explanation by the teacher is 
kept separate from old ideas until it is ready for competition. The
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methodological rationale for this procedure being derived from 
Kuhn's (1962) philosophy of science.
"Once it has achieved the status of a paradigm a scientific
theory is declared invalid only if an alternative candidate is
available to take its place."
Dawson and Rowell (1984) have conducted classroom trials of the 
Framework Replacement strategy, however, they report inconclusive 
results from these studies, Perhaps this outcome of their research 
indicates that we have to consider a more complex or extended type 
of interaction between new and existing concepts. Rather than 
conceptual change being a process of awareness raising and 
exposure to superior models of cognitive processing, we may have 
to consider the nature of the conceptual ecosystem in which new 
ideas become established.
The Framework Replacement strategy contrasts with the research 
of Nussbaum and Novick (1981) which has used a technique based on 
Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory. In their studies of 
students’ understanding of the particulate nature of matter, they 
encouraged students to brainstorm ideas in the classroom, thus 
making a range of conceptions overt and open to inspection. Various 
responses from the students, from a number of viewpoints, created 
much discussion. In this climate of critical appraisal, students 
were expected to restructure their conceptual frameworks in order 
to accommodate cognitive discrepancies resulting from the ’failure’ 
of their existing ideas to predict events. With this strategy, 
Nussbaum and Novick (1981) place great emphasis on the teacher as
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co-ordinator and facilitator, helping the class to manage their 
debates and deliberations. This role is defined by these workers in 
the following terms
1. The teacher creates a situation which requires students to 
invoke their frameworks
2 Teacher encourages verbal and pictorial descriptions of 
these ideas
3. Teacher facilitates their expression of ideas
4. Students debate the pros and cons of different ideas. 
Creation of cognitive conflict within many of those 
participating
5. Teacher supports the search for the best solution (most 
generalizable) and encourages signs of student accommodation,
The strategy of Nussbaum and Novick involves intense activity on 
the part of the teacher, and assumes that her understanding of the 
student’s existing knowledge is in a state of heightened 
sensitivity, ready to capitalise on the conceptual environment 
created during class discussions. This perception of the teacher’s 
role, although interesting, seems to view the teacher as being one 
step removed from the activities going on in her classroom; ie. the 
teacher is less of a co-participant in the construction of 
understanding and more of a manager of a learning situation.
Minstrell (1982) has described attempts to have students 
’’reconstruct a better conceptual framework" through the use of 
learning materials and experiences designed to point out 
inadequacies in existing concepts. Minstrell claims that there must 
be a high degree of engagement with the tasks presented, requiring 
that students organize their observations as well as clarify and 
justify their conceptions. If children have recourse to the teacher, 
textbook or any other resource before this process is complete,
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Minstrell (1982) contends that this may diminish the student's 
ability to bring about a change of concept. Stavey and Berkovitz
(1980) have also designed materials which encompass a conflict 
strategy, their idea being to bring children’s qualitative-verbal 
representations into conflict with their quantitative-numerical 
representation systems. In this way the power of conflict and 
heightened awareness is embodied in the materials used by the 
students whilst reducing the work load on the teacher. Champagne, 
Klopfer and Gunstane (1982) have also utilised an instructional 
design model in an effort to bring about conceptual change in a 
classroom context, The first element of their model is a 
comparative analysis of 'cognitive states' (problem solving 
strategies are used as a basis for this analysis) of naive 
students, novices and experts. These cognitive states are then 
transformed into instructional objectives relating to specific 
scientific topics. Problem based teaching strategies are 
subsequently deployed as a way of helping students externalise 
their ideas. Finally the teacher is encouraged to provide expert 
analysis of the problems and ask students to assess and to 
comment on these solutions in the light of alternative 
explanations. Reports on the success of this modified Socratic 
method are inconclusive (Rowell and Dawson 1985). As the emphasis 
moves away from teacher direction towards forms of individualised 
conflict arousal, teaching materials must have the potential to 
bring about conflict in individual students. Student engagement 
with a learning task must not only be measured in terms of 
motivational factors but also with regard to the effectiveness of
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the material in generating anomalies within the conceptual 
frameworks of novice learners.
1.7 Piaget's E p is t e ^ c io g Y  its* te c ic h iv ig.
Operationalising Piaget's epistemology makes heavy demands on 
teacher skills, In order to facilitate conceptual change and 
development, Piagetian pedagogies require the teacher to deploy a 
range of strategies aimed at teaching 'suitable' concepts at the 
'right' time. Trying to,apply Piaget in the classroom has often 
resulted in mixed success, and has exposed the gap between one 
man’s epistemology and another teachers practice. The work of Gagne 
(1977) has tried to bridge this gap between learning theory and 
its classroom implementation. Gagne, like Piaget, was interested in 
mathematical and physical learning tasks, and his theory of 
learning is underpinned by a logical framework in which concepts 
are seen as elemental components of a knowledge hierarchy. Gilbert 
and Watts (1983) have described this notion of concept and 
conceptualisation as 'classical*
” An all or nothing, syllogistic concept bears little 
resemblance to the rather messy actuality of conceptual 
activity in either science subject-orientated terms or in 
everyday life. As Pines and Leith (1981) suggest, it is 
inappropriate to see concept development in terms of single, 
bound entities acquired in ’all or none integral steps. It is as 
Markova (1982) describes, a Cartesian perspective. She 
charaterises it as conceiving of concepts as 'logical atoms', a 
hierarchical subdivision of knowledge which Kelly (1963) has 
called an 'accumulative fragmentalist’ view. An underlying 
assumption is that knowledge is stored in the mind in 
hierarchical layers which can be decomposed into smaller parts 
and studied independently. Transferred to the area of 
educational instruction these assumptions imply that the 
process of acquisition of knowledge is decomposable into
- 30 -
elementary steps that can be represented by hierarchical 
decision trees, so that progress in knowledge is dependent on 
whether the previous step is mastered in its entirety: whether 
it is right or wrong. Such a model is that used by Ausubel 
(1968), Gagne(1970) Shayer and Adey (1981) far example."
(Gilbert and Watts 1983)
The ’classical’ view of concept described above is more overt 
in the work of Gagne than that of Piaget. This may be a 
consequence of Gagne’s emphasis on the logical structure of the 
material to be learned (mathematical/physical), and his commitment 
to an ’accumulative fragmentalist’ view of concept. Gagne’s theory 
of learning tends to distill out the constructivist components of 
Piagetian theory and leaves a residue of pure logic. An insight 
into this process can be gleaned by looking at its effects on 
subject content. Typically, a concept will be placed at the apex of 
a ’pyramid of understanding’; from this position the concept will 
be reduced to its pre-requisite intellectual elements by ’expert’ 
insights into the nature of the learning process. Running 
concurrently with this analysis will be a consideration of the 
cognitive abilities needed to move the learner from the base to the
apex of the pyramid; from specific levels of understanding to more
general understanding. On the basis of this type of content
analysis science teachers are encouraged to develop learning
strategies and monitor student performance using the concept 
hierarchy as a template for lesson organization, evaluation and 
planning. Thus the concept hierarchy created at the analysis stage 
can dictate the nature of the learning experiences to which the 
student is exposed. Student ’errors* and ’misconceptions’ are deemed 
to be deviant behaviours which threaten the learner’s path toward
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understanding, and as such require erasure from his conceptual 
framework. In complex conceptual domains such as biology, where no 
single hierarchy of concepts can take account of the multiplicity 
of interactions between concepts, student 'errors' are not uncommon. 
These 'bugs’ in the system (Brown and Vanlehw 1980) are perhaps 
less to do with student inadequacies and more a reflection of the 
emphasis placed on logico-mathematical tasks by Gagne’s theory of 
learning.
Gagne’s theories have been used successfully in the 
organization of curricula such as the Schools Council Integrated 
Science Project (SCISP). However, at the level of the individual 
student it fails to capture the complex, idiosynchratic, 
unpredictable and often illogical nature of conceptual 
understanding.
1,8 Ausubelian Views of Concept Development,
Compared to Gagne’s ’logical’ analysis of concept attainment, 
the work of Ausubel (1968) represents an attempt to bring more 
fluidity and realism to our understanding of children’s conceptual 
development, Ausubel contends that concept understanding may take 
a unique and entirely idiosync. ratic pathway depending on the 
individual student's previous and personal experience. His theory of 
learning describes conceptual development as a continuous series of 
reorganizations in which existing concepts are modified as they
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interact with new perceptions, ideas and beliefs. This viewpoint 
recognises that young learners can relate complex ideas to 
’relevant' background knowledge derived from their existing range 
of concepts. Thus, in an Ausubelian framework, children can be 
expected to possess even abstract concepts, and have the ability to 
handle inter-relationships between concepts. This perspective on 
learning represents an alternative to the age/stage aspects of 
Piagetian theory.
In essence, Ausubelian theory holds that new ideas are linked 
to relevant existing concepts; the term relevant denoting what 
Ausubel sees as the logical relationship between new and existing 
concepts, This relationship between old and new ideas can be 
represented in a concept development context as an hierarchically 
ordered framework of existing concepts with which new concepts may 
interact. The nature of this interaction is seen as ’meaningful’ 
when the learner finds the relationship between the old and the 
new significant for future learning. From this perspective, young 
children can relate to abstract concepts by finding points of 
attachment between their existing knowledge and new concepts.
Where the learner lacks the ’relevant’ prior experiences and correct 
'subsumers’, Ausubelian theory anticipates that ’misconceptions* will 
fill the gap in the students conceptual framework. Such 
’misconceptions’ although often viewed as errors are not wrong when 
viewed from the learner’s standpoint, for they have functional 
utility and meaning in the context of their personal conceptual 
framework. The resilience of misconceptions in the face of formal 
teaching designed to modify or erase them, may reflect the personal
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viability of these ’misconceptions’. Ausubelian theory suggests that 
the teacher seeking to ’correct’ the student’s ’misconceptions’, must 
provide her with the missing concepts or subsuming experiences 
which will allow her to integrate the correct ideas and displace 
improvised misconceptions. This process of reorganization and 
subsumption can be anchored and facilitated by what Ausubel calls 
’advanced organizers’. This notion tends to betray a view of 
concepts which fails to consider the inherently idiosyncl iratic 
character of the learner’s rationality and reasoning, and tends to 
portray an image of learning as a task determined by the logic of 
the conceptual content. Vest and Fensham (1974) have reservations 
about Ausubel's over-reliance on conceptual hierarchies derived 
form this sort of task analysis.
’’..the facts, concepts and principles that the learner uses for 
subsumption may not be obtained by logical task analysis 
undertaken by someone who has mastered the learning. They may 
not be the same for all learners.”
The critical question for teachers is what are the subsumers 
and advanced organizers in a particular knowledge domain, and how 
do they interact with the learner’s existing knowledge: are they 
the logical elements and precursors of a concept hierarchy, or the 
intuitive meaning structures of naive learners ? Research into 
these questions has been carried out by a small number of workers. 
Ring and Novak (1971) examined the effects of subsumers on new 
learning by testing college chemistry students before the start of 
their chemistry course and after its completion. They report that
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"the presence of subsumers without facts increased achievement, 
but having facts without subsumers did not."
However, Vest and Fensham (1974) suggest that the evidence for the 
beneficial effects of subsumers (Gudrub and Novak 1973) has 
possible alternative interpretations.
"Research into ways of providing for these potential low 
achievers, either by remedial teaching to provide relevant 
subsumers or in providing external organizational aids is 
clearly dependent on our ability to produce valid measures of 
the existence of subsumers.."
and
"The problem of deciding which prior knowledge 'bits' are 
needed to act as subsumers is made difficult by the fact that 
the learner may use concepts and facts as subsumers which bear 
no relationship to those obtained by logical task analysis by 
a person who has already mastered the task,."
and
"A learner may not have in his cognitive structure the relevant 
subsumers for a given piece of new learning....the existence of 
relevant subsumers does not per se guarantee that they will be 
called into play to produce meaningful learning ...there is a 
chance that the learner will in fact, embark on a process of 
subsuming new learning but using concepts form his prior 
knowledge that are not 'relevant'."
Fensham (1972) has shown that students commonly associate a
number of concepts, which if used as subsumers, would be quite
misleading in the context of learning a new topic.
As well as subsumers, Ausubel's notion of advanced organizers
has also been the focus for a number of studies aimed at
determining the latter's role in the learning process. Kuhn and
Novak (1971) using advanced organizers far two biological concepts
(levels of biological organization and homeostasis) claimed that
the retention of 'meaningful' material by the students was enhanced
by the introduction, prior to learning, of what these workers
deemed to be relevant advanced organizers. This type of research
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tends ta emphasise the quantity of learning rather that its 
quality; indeed the pre/post test, multiple choice questions used in 
their research are characteristic of this approach. Lawson (1975) 
using the theme ’change over time’ suggests that, as an advanced 
organizer, this idea has utility as a superordinate concept in the 
teaching of evolution, Lawson (1975) claims that by using problem 
solving learning strategies it is possible to differentiate the idea 
of ’change' into various subordinate biological concepts.
Research into the effects of advanced organizers has produced 
some very mixed results. Bauman et al. (1969) and Veisberg (1970) 
show that advanced organizers are not effective, whilst the studies 
of Kuhn and Novak (1970, 1971) show that they have a significant 
effect on learning. These conflicting results may be symptomatic of 
such studies, for they are largely based on comparisons of learning 
effectiveness between ’treatment’ and ’control’ groups of students. 
The style of this research methodolgy may impose considerable 
constraints on the nature of its findings.
At an even more fundamental level of criticism, the problem 
with research into advanced organizers is that there is nothing to 
prevent the learner from ignoring the advanced organizers 
presented to him and, as an alternative, using what he sees as 
appropriate prior knowledge. This pasibility takes us in the 
direction of accepting that most imaginative learners will possess 
'relevant' and ’irrelevant’ subsumers either of which will allow 
them to operate on a given learning task. Researchers have pre­
tested students to acertain their level of prior knowledge in areas 
which the researcher sees as being related to the learning task.
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Unfortunately, they have often failed to examine the range of 
subsumers that could be used, including those irrelevant prior 
knowledge subsumers which from the learner's viewpoint are just as 
effective and equally viable as those provided by the 
teacher/researcher.
1.9 Ausubelian Pedagogy.
Ausubel’s learning theory has been translated into practical 
teaching strategies for the classroom by Novak and Gowin (1984). 
These workers have focused on the importance of prior knowledge 
and its relationship with conceptual hierarchies of subsuming 
ideas. The emergent outcome of this research in terms of pedagogic 
strategy has been the development of concept mapping. In its 
simplest form a concept map can be two concepts joined by a 
linking word in the form of a proposition, Novak and Gowin (1984) 
describe the concept map as providing
Ha visual road map for a 'journey* we are about to begin and 
some of the pathways we may take to connect meanings of concepts 
in propositions."
This description of a concept map using a road map analogy is 
interesting when one considers the notion of concept which 
underpins Ausubelian theory and the concept mapping technique. 
Concepts in the latter context seem to be an uncomfortable mixture 
of absolutism and relativism based on two other possible 
Ausubelian interpretations of the road map analogy - a) given the a
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priori derivation of logical, relevant hierarchical structures, there 
will be a straight line route through the concept hierarchy- 
representing the 'shortest distance between two levels of 
understanding; or alternatively b) given two levels of 
understanding there will be a 'correct' route between them even 
before the learner begins his journey along the learning path.
Concept mapping is designed to allow teachers and students to 
externalise concepts and propositions. It is suggested by Novak 
that this is a creative act which allows the student to develop new 
concepts
"Undoubtedly we may develop 'new' concept relationships in the 
process of drawing concept maps, especially if we seek actively 
to construct propositional relationships between concepts that 
were not previously recognised as related."
(Novak and Gowin 1984)
This creative aspect of concept mapping is closely aligned with the 
Ausubelian notion of 'integrative reconciliation'.
Working with small groups of children, Novak and Gowin invited 
the students to negotiate the meaning of a passage from a textbook 
and to use their concept maps as a focus for discussion. The 
construction of the maps was seen by Novak and Gowin as a way of 
mirroring the negotiation of meaning between group members.
"At first blush one may say that the teacher (or textbook) is 
supposed to know what is right; how can we suggest there 
should be negotiation with the learner. The point is, we are 
speaking about cognitive meanings and these cannot be 
transfused into a student as blood is pumped into veins. 
Learning the meaning of a piece of knowledge requires dialog, 
exchange, sharing, sometimes compromise and so on. In a manner 
analagous to the professional negotiator who may help bring 
labor and management together on a contract, concept maps are 
useful tools to help students negotiate with their mentors."
Thus, it is suggested that in an environment of mutual negotiation, 
concept maps produced by students can be used to suggest linkages 
between new ideas and concept propositions which are an existing 
part of the learner’s conceptual framework. This meta-learning 
aspect of concept mapping strategies is a point of departure from 
strict Ausubelian notions of concept hierarchies, and moves mapping 
closer to the notion of concept development.
"the more closely any study approaches an actional view of 
concept, the more likely it is to contribute to a notion of 
conceptual development. By this we mean proposals that accept 
the existence, and value to their users, of alternative 
frameworks, or seek to modify them towards the consensus view 
of formal science.”
(Gilbert and Watts 1983)
This viewpoint, and the practical outcomes of trying to implement 
Ausubel's theory in classroom situations, highlights the 
modifications and compensations that result when practitioners try 
to apply epistemologies. The closer the teacher/researcher moves 
toward the notion of ’logical, hierarchical concept maps’, ’relevant 
subsumers’, and 'good* maps, the more the learner seems to find 
these strategies irrelevant and distant from the realities of 
learning.
Johnstone and Mahmoud (1981) studying student's understanding of 
water transport and osmosis, used a concept hierarchy approach to 
monitor the effects of a learning programme devised by their 
research group. Their comments on the relationship between 
children’s learning strategies and their paths through the ’correct' 
hierarchy of concepts underline the differences between the expert 
and the learner's perspective.
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"Success with ideas 5 and 6 did not seem to depend on success 
with ideas 2, 3 and 4. [numbers refer to levels in the
hierarchy] Either our hierarchy was faulty or pupils had
found their own self-consistent and sufficient hierarchy in 
which ideas in the discontinuities were not of any great 
consequence. In other work in chemistry (Howe 1975, Johnstone 
1980) we have came across this phenomenon before. The reasoned 
adult hierarchy may not coincide with the route taken by an 
immature learner."
Failure to capture the idiosyna iratic and dynamic aspects of
conceptual development, through an aver reliance on concept
hierarchies and expert models of learning, places limitations on
the role of the teacher and denigrates the learner's activities as
she comes to terms with new concepts.
1.10 Conceptualising and Classifying - A Relational Viewpoint of 
Concepts.
Whether one accepts or disagrees with Ausubelian learning 
theory and its related 'technologies’, one significant outcome of 
this work is the way that it has focused attention on the 
importance of what the learner already knows. One approach to 
concept development firmly based on this belief, but which has 
tried to distance itself from the theoretical contraints of 
"classical" notions of concept, is that associated with the idea of 
concept formation. From this standpoint, the most important 
consideration is to help the learner identify the criterial 
attributes of the concept and to locate these within his existing 
conceptual framework. Tennyson and Park (1980) have suggested that 
teaching sequences can facilitate this process by presenting
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exemplars of the concept in which the criterial attributes are more 
prominent than non-criterial attributes. Concept membership is thus 
understood by way of exemplars, descriptors and inter-concept 
relationships. Concept formation is thus inherently probabilistic 
and requires the student to put together through his own activities 
the membership parameters of a particular concept. Fleshner (1963) 
stresses the importance of the learner’s engagement in concept 
formation in his description of a teaching strategy which 
juxtaposes exemplars and non-exemplars of a concept in order to 
draw the student's attention to the probabilistic nature of concept 
membership. Gilbert and Watts (1983) suggest that this view of 
concept and concept formation is best thought of as being 
"relational” in character.
"That is to say that instances can be judged in terms of their 
degree of membership to a particular concept (their probability 
of membership) and the concept judged in terms of its 
relationship to other concepts. It is the kind of work 
associated with the semantic networkers...."
Thus learning a concept from a "relational" perspective is more 
than just using a word label, it is also related to the learner’s 
ability to classify instances and non-instances of a concept. These 
classifications could be based on criterial attributes, for example, 
in the case of the concept ’mammal’, the learner may discriminate 
between a goldfish and a cat on the basis that one is a mammal and 
one is not. This classification may be achieved on the basis that 
the student knows that a cat is an example of a mammal; 
alternatively, such criterial attributes as warm blood and the 
suckling of young could be used. This is not to say that the
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learner may in fact use her own idiosync. ratic meaning for the 
concept mammal as the basis for classification and concept 
membership, for example, everything with four legs and fur is a 
mammal !
Smith and Med-.in (1981) have considered this* interaction 
between probabilistic and exemplar components of concepts.
"We cannot ignore the possibility that the representation of a 
single concept can contain both probabilistic and exemplar 
components, that is, both a summary representation and 
exemplars. Earlier we suggested that such mixed representations 
might be needed for superordinate concepts such as furniture. 
Now we wish to point out that there is goad reason to think 
that mixed representations may be needed with other kinds of 
concepts as well. Specifically, recall the developmental 
hypothesis that as one matures, one is more likely to represent 
a concept in probabilistic rather than exemplar form. This 
suggests that children may initially represent concepts in 
terms of exemplars and then later apply abstraction processes 
to these exemplars to yield summary representations.... It is 
even possible that this developmental sequence occurs to some 
degree whenever adults learn a new concept,"
The work of Schaefer (1979) exemplifies the relational view of 
concept and concept development, both in terms of its theoretical 
posture and the word association methods used in his research 
design. Schaefer (1979) describes a 'bur model’ concept of a 
concept in which a 'logic core' of general definitions, 
representative of a class of things, is defined by a word/concept 
label. Surrounding this ’logic core’ Schaefer (1979) contends that 
there is an 'associative framework' of personal meanings relating 
to the concept word. He argues that additions to this associative
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framework represent a development of the concept from the learner's 
viewpoint.
"For example, just the name growth may lead us to remember and 
to use the concept, as may some phenomenon involving positive 
feedback (which belong to the logic core of growth) or even 
the association police (which has been used during a 
demonstration against atomic power stations which have to do 
with the energy crisis and this in turn with industrial 
growth)
Schaefer's (1979) model allows for the development of concepts by 
the expansion of the personal realms of meaning which surround the 
concept core. The conceptual development mechanism suggested by 
this "relational" perspective is intimately linked with the 
consequences of the learner's everyday experience which in turn 
become part of his ’associative framework*. This view of conceptual 
development assumes that by adding exemplars and changing their 
degree of membership, the student modifies his existing conceptual 
framework. Gilbert and Watts (1983) argue that this view is a 
less than adequate explanation of the process.
"...it is not an adequate description of individual conceptual 
development simply to describe the process by which the person 
adds new attributes of a concept, or new semantic members to 
those that he or she has already acquired. Changing some 
elements whilst others remain untouched does not account for 
the often radical or inconsistent changes in knowledge 
structure."
Smith and Medin (1981) have also considered some of the problems 
of conceptual change and development within a "relational" 
perspective.
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" consider a child who has both summary and exemplar
information about birds, with summary containing the property 
'flies'. How should the child update his summary when 
, confronted with one or two species of bird that do not fly? 
Clearly the new summary should be some combination of the old 
one and the new experiences, but the child needs some 
procedure for determining how much weight to attach to the new 
evidence.”
Essentially, the problem with the ''relational'' view of concept in 
the context of conceptual change, is the need to consider complex 
concepts as part of an already defined constituent group of related 
concepts. Research on conceptual combination highlights the nature 
of this problem. Zadeh (1965) has used 'fuzzy set’ theory to 
represent concepts with degrees of membership. This development of 
set theory indicates which entity is a member of a particular class 
or group of entities. However, as is often the case in considering 
concepts, the degree of membership of a concept can be counter 
intuitive to the extent that the conjunct is more representative of 
the conjunction than either of its constituent concepts.
The "relational” view of concept moves closer to a research and 
pedagogic posture which recognises and values the complex 
idiosync. iratic interdependencies which link concepts. Even though 
word association tests may artificially enhance the verbal 
interrelationships between concepts, it seems likely that the 
closer we move towards the learner's view of natural phenomena, the 
more teachers and researchers will have to come to terms with the 
interconnectedness, complexity and diversity of the everyday and 
scientific meanings which surround concepts. These constellations 
of meaning cannot be seen as peripheral to the correct 'scientific' 
concept, nor immature ideas in search of an existing conceptual
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pigeon-hole; from a learner's perspective, his own personal 
meanings, experiences and conceptual associations along with their 
apparent inconsistencies and paradoxes are the concept.
1.11 Conceptions - An 'Actional* View of Concept.
Recent research in science education has confirmed that many 
children come to science lessons with definite ideas about how 
things happen in the world around them (Driver and Easley 1978). 
Gilbert et al. (1983) describe these ideas as
"conceptual structures which provide a sensible understanding 
of the world from the child's point of view,"
This view of concepts emphasises the active and continuous process
of making sense of the world; the term conception being used to
denote the potential individuality of these concepts and their
origin in personal theories about natural phenomena. This outlook
is supported by the Personal Construct Psychology of George Kelly
(1955) which contends that individuals, as an essential,
unavoidable and desirable consequence of personal experience,
generate their own varied conceptions. In an educational context it
is possible to view these personal theories as naive and simplistic
artefacts of a particular research methodology (McClelland 1982),
or the outcomes of bad teaching and cognitive confusions. However,
there is growing evidence that alternative conceptions are
fundamental to the learning process and should be recognised and
valued by science educators (Pope and Gilbert 1983; Claxton 1984).
Indeed Gilbert and Watts (1983) argue that this view of concept
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has an effect on the way that we visualise the process of 
conceptualising.
" Rather than search for invariants (or universals) in either 
conceptual content or development, it becomes one of mapping 
the 'topography' of local domains of understanding, or mini­
theories (Claxton 1982) and of charting changes in frames of 
reference so that the durability, stability, coherence and 
consistency become the point of departure."
Pope and Gilbert (1983) and Claxton (1984) have used a Kellyian 
perspective to illuminate the activities of the learner when 
dealing with new experiences. Within Kelly's metaphor of learning, 
'man-the scientist’, the alternative conceptions of the students are 
seen as the productive and desirable outcomes of 'scientist-like' 
activities.
”.,to a large degree - though not entirely - the blueprint of 
human progress has been given the label 'science'. Let us then, 
instead of occupying ourselves with man-the-biological 
organism or man-the-lucky-guy, have a look at man-the­
se ientist When we speak of man-the-scientist we are speaking
of all mankind and not merely a particular class of men who 
have publicly attained the stature of 'scientist'. We are 
speaking of all mankind in its scientist-like aspects, rather 
than all mankind in its appetitive aspects....might not the 
individual man, each in his own personal way, assume more of 
the stature of a scientist, ever seeking to predict and control 
the course of events with which he is involved? Would he not 
have his theories, test his hypotheses and weigh his 
experimental evidence? And, if so, might not the differences 
between the personal viewpoints of different men correspond to 
the differences between theoretical points of view of different 
scientists?"
(Kelly, 1955)
Claxton (1984), using the Kellyian notion of constructs, suggests 
that the products of the learner's actions, theories and 
expectations, can be seen as a set of mini-theories.
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" Each ’mini-theory’ is born out of the need to make sense of, 
and act effectively within, a new type of situation (the focus 
of convenience of the theory). Once a successful way of 
constructing is found, then the same framework or point of 
view can be applied to other novel but similar events. If the 
theory copes successfully with such an event, then the 
specification of its domain of experience is altered to include 
it."
Thus 'mini-theories' are born out of learning needs, and tend to be 
context specific. Their translation into other contexts are seen as 
part of the child's learning processes through which he broadens 
his theories to take account of novel situations, or discovers the 
limitations of his existing 'mini-theories'. Claxton contends that 
each individual may have a wide range of 'mini-theories’ for 
different situations and knowing when to use a particular mini­
theory is a significant part of the learning process.
" There is a deep problem here that is important for educators 
to overcome. Because we talk about "concepts" and "skills" it is 
easy to think that they exist in the same way as books and 
tool kits exist - as independent bits of knowledge that one 
can "acquire" exactly as one acquires a newspaper or a 
paintbrush. What we forget is that in both cases possession is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective use. I 
have also to acquire knowledge about how to wield my new paint 
brush, and to what sort of job it is suited for. Just so, know­
how and know-that are useless without know-when, and it is for 
this reason that mini-theories always combine both sorts of 
information."
(Claxton 1984)
1.12 Conceptions and Conceptual Change,
It is perhaps difficult to conceive of learning without considering 
conceptual change. However, perhaps as a consequence of a 'cultural 
transmission* approach to teaching, or perhaps because we still 
have a largely inadequate understanding of the learning process, an
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appreciation of the nature of conceptual change in the context of 
actual teaching and learning remains underdeveloped. The ’cultural 
transmission’ approach to teaching science can be viewed as one 
where scientific values, rules and 'truths’ are independent of the 
learner's awn subjective constructions of natural phenomena. This 
scientific knowledge represents a true representation of the world 
as it is, therefore there is little need for the Realist teacher to 
consider alternative conceptions which may be held by the student. 
One direct effect of an 'actional' view of concepts is that it poses 
afresh the question of how students compare and acquire new 
conceptions. Concommitently, from a pedagogic standpoint there must 
be a reorientation of objectives toward a conceptual change view of 
learning.
" If children are encouraged to make their theories more 
explicit, these can be open for inspection and testing in the 
classroom. Childrens’ own ideas in fact can provide the 
necessary raw material to exemplify the plural nature of 
scientific theory, and act as a starting point far pupils to 
design critical tests to distinguish between different 
interpretations
(Driver 1983)
West (1982) contends that given the centrality of conceptual change 
in effective learning, two responses are possible when an effort is 
made to change the learner's existing conceptions. According to 
Vest (1982) these outcomes can be either evolutionary or 
revolutionary. West (1982) uses the term evolutionary to denote the 
continuity between aid and new conceptions; the progressive 
adaptation by the learner of her existing conceptions to meet the 
demands of new experiences. This type of adaptation will involve
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the teacher and the student in the extension of alternative 
conceptions in a direction determined by the consensus viewpoint, 
Alternatively, revolutionary change is associated with large scale 
and radical modifications of the student's conceptual framework, a 
well used exemplar of this being the change in a student's 
understanding as she goes from an Aristotelian to a Newtonian 
understanding of motion.
Although this dichotomy of change dynamics has been used as a 
descriptive categorisation of different research postures and 
philosophical positions, in terms of the general phenomenon of 
conceptual change, it is quite possible that evolutionary and 
revolutionary change are part of the same process and not 
necessarily at opposite poles.
1.13 Theories of Conceptual Change - A Constructivist Perspective.
The work of Donald Schon (1963) provides an interesting exemplar 
of conceptual change viewed from an evolutionary perspective. Schon 
(1963) has developed the notion that there is an evolutionary 
relationship between old and new ideas.
" New concepts grow out of what has gone before and can be 
seen as changes in the old. But these changes are matters of 
degree. In some cases the new concept is recognisable as a 
minor variation of an old one, as in the case of the derivation 
of 'superjet' from 'jet'.
Schon (1963) also makes the point that this relationship between
old and new may be related to their temporal and spatial proximity.
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" The concepts that strike us least like the old are by and
large those which require greatest change in the old. Our
conceptual structure can be seen as a kind of amoeba. In the 
centre are the concepts most crucial, most intimately tied to 
others, least willing to let go. Nearer the periphery are 
concepts less intimately tied to others, less crucial to the
whole system, less jealously guarded The more central the
changing concept, the newer in this sense it is."
Schon (1963) recognises that there are difficulties with this 
evolutionary perspective and that these may originate in the a 
p o s t e r i o r i nature of our concept classifications.
" My chief difficulty is in our tendency to understand the 
business of forming new concepts in a vocabulary that is 
appropriate only to their justification after the fact. We are 
used to thinking about fully formulated concepts, their 
relation to one another and their instances. As long as we 
focus on the concept instance relation, we will be at a loss to 
understand the formation of new concepts. It is as though we 
tried to understand the emergence of new species in terms of
our concepts of existing species, their relations to one
another and to their members."
Schon's solution to this problem is his theory of concept 
displacement, in which the learner’s personal experiences 
continually cause old concepts to evolve through the inclusion of 
new experiences and exemplars.
" ..when a child discovers that ice melts to form water, and 
that water can be frozen to make ice, not only has he 
discovered something new (for him) about the world, but his 
concept of ‘water’ has changed as well. His criteria have 
changed, and there has been an important change in the kind of 
instances to which he applies the concept."
The inference here is that all changes in existing concepts involve 
new ways of conceptualising, and that they are the products of 
active learning in which the student exposes existing ideas to new 
situations. New conceptions are derived from the child's current
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’theoretical tools' which in turn form the basis of his 
conceptions. Schon's root metaphor for his displacement theory is 
drawn from biological evolution which he describes as being related 
to concept development in the following way
" Prior to the development and acceptance of evolutionary 
theory, the emergence of new biological forms was explained by 
denying their novelty or tracing them to essentially 
mysterious spontaneous generation. The function of the notion 
of the displacement of concepts is to approach an evolutionary 
theory of new conceptual forms.”
Schon’s emphasis an the activities of the learner in constructing 
new concepts, and the primacy of analogy and metaphor as 
indicators and vehicles of conceptual adaptation, bring his 
displacement theory within the bounds of personal constructivism 
and the 'actional' notion of concepts, In this respect much of 
Schon's (1963) theory can be subsumed by the Kellyian nation of 
construct permeability and the extension of the 'range of 
convenience’ of a construct. Therefore, it has much bearing on the 
importance of recognising children’s alternative conceptions and 
their role in the development of scientific concepts.
Continuing this theme of conceptual adaptation and change, 
Claxton (1984) describes how the 'range of convenience’ of 
children’s alternative conceptions or 'mini-theories’ can be 
extended in the light of experience.
” ...when the theory fails and failure may be of three sorts, 
Qverr.extensiQn, under-extension and conflict. Over-extension is 
often what we are aware of first, we apply a mini-theory to a 
new situation, it lets us down. Ve assume that this use of the 
word 'force' is the same as the previous ones, but find that 
the everyday connotations are out of place in the physics lab.
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Under-extension may fallow over-extension or occur on its own: it 
occurs when we find a gap or a hole in our theories, so that 
experiences occur which we do not know how to deal with... Finally, 
conflict occurs when we suffer not from a lack of suggestions but 
an excess of them. Two or more mini-theories are triggered by the 
same event, and they give rise to incompatible predictions and 
interpretations
Gilbert, Osborne and Fensham <1982) have drawn attention to 
the various outcomes of traditional teaching in environments rich 
in children’s alternative conceptions. These workers describe a 
continuum of outcomes from the "undisturbed outcome", where the 
child's intuitive theories persist in spite of teaching, through a 
"mixed outcome", to a "unified outcome" in which the child achieves 
a 'true* scientific perspective. It is possible to speculate that 
these outcomes may be the outward manifestations of 'successful' 
and 'unsuccessful' attempts by the child to test the adaptiveness 
of his mini-theories.
Claxton (1984) has elaborated a model of conceptual change 
focused on the character and dynamics of children’s 'mini-theories’. 
He identifies 'clusters’ of mini-theories which he characterises as 
'gut-science', 'lay science’ and 'school science’. Gut and lay science 
are seen as facets of children's mini-theories which relate to the 
individual’s experiences of natural phenomena in a social context.
" Much of gut science is incoherent: that is, it consists of 
many local theories, each with its own domain, with very little 
concern for integration and consistency between domains. And 
much too is inarticulate. It is not available to consciousness, 
and incapable of being expressed...,The descriptions and 
explanations of gut science are closely tied to a person’s 
direct experience. Authentic gut explanations often boil down 
to "because I know it" - not intellectually but experientially."
(Claxton,1984)
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Claxton acknowledges that the private world of gut science must 
often operate within a social context where the form and content of 
descriptive language is linked to a network of socially constructed 
meanings.
" ..lay science may be evaluated with respect to its utility, 
but mostly its function is to be entertaining and/or to allow 
one to converse successfully with family and friends. Much, but 
not all, lay science will therefore be available to 
consciousness, and capable of articulation, but it is, like gut 
science, piecemeal and incoherent. What children can and do 
spend a lot of time doing is improving the coherence and 
acceptability of their lay science through discussion and 
argument with each other."
(Claxton, 1984)
Although the strength of interaction between gut and lay science 
will vary, Claxton sees them as part of the same conceptual system. 
He describes the nature of this interaction in terms of the degree 
of overlap between mini-theories. When the child is able to relate 
his gut science to his lay science, that is he can map his 
intuitive expectations derived from experience onto the social 
world of conceptual consensus, the learner according to Claxton, 
has integrated his mini-theories. Alternatively, when the learner 
superimposes lay science onto gut science the degree of overlap 
may be insufficient to integrate the conceptions. In this situation, 
where mini-theories are unrelated and unconnected, lay 
understanding will be accepted but not underpinned by actual 
experience. Claxton refers to the latter scenario as laminated 
mini-theories. In some learning situations laminated mini-theories 
may result in cognitive conflict, particularly when the child tries
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to utilise gut science in a conceptual environment which has strong 
lay science explanations. Reconciliation of such conflicts by the 
child are not necessarily automatic. Claxton suggests that children 
can be highly resistant to change particularly when gut science 
offers a better explanation of scientific phenomena than the 
abstractions of curricular science. Claxton contends that other 
factors may influence the learner's reluctance to integrate 
intuitive theories with scientific ideas.
” Alternatively, if the theories that are in conflict are very 
basic to my world view, then to change might mean a radical 
upheaval of everything I believe. Relativity theory is 
notoriously difficult to get a feel for, for just this reason. 
Learning may therefore be a threat to my knowledge structure. 
Finally to give up cherished gut or lay theory may put me in 
conflict with my society, my family and friends. Learning 
becomes a threat to my-social stability. ”
(Claxton 1984)
For the science teacher the crux of the problem is when the 
student is asked to integrate gut and lay science with school 
science. Claxton suggests that juxtaposing all three perspectives 
throught the use of 'real life' examples of school science is not 
enough to turn often laminated theories into integrated wholes. He 
contends that before this level of integration can be achieved, 
mini-theories must be laminated and simultaneously active. In this 
state they must generate anomalies or conflicting explanations 
which in turn must be perceived by the learner. The child must feel 
the need to resolve this conflict and actively seek a solution 
whilst making judgements about the effects that his learning 
strategies may have an his existing conceptual framework. These 
preconditions for successful integration present the science
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teacher with considerable pedagogic problems. If the teacher seeks 
to change the intuitive theories of her students, she must raise 
their awaress of these often implicit theories, stimulate the 
students to appreciate the limitations of these theories in a 
variety of situations, and then help them integrate these ideas 
with scientific theories. Throughout this strategy the focus is on 
the learner and her activities; conflict, awareness raising, and 
conflict resolution cannot be imposed on the learner directly. The 
teacher’s efforts must be directed toward the creation of a 
conceptual environment which has the potential to facilitate these 
activities in the mind of the child.
In Claxton’s description of mini-theories, the spatial 
metaphors of degrees of overlap, lamination and integration 
capture the dynamic aspects of mini-theories. Interestingly,
Claxton introduces the idea of conceptions as 'amoeba' which in 
turn encapsulates the notion of ever-changing conceptual outlines 
within relatively well defined boundaries. This 'arganismic' 
metaphor in the context of his theory of conceptual change captures 
the idea of mini-theories responding in different ways to differing 
environments whilst retaining the potential to evolve and move 
about in a direction influenced by that environment.
The theoretical underpinnings of Claxton's description of mini- 
theories and conceptual change are derived from the personal 
construct psychology of George Kelly (1955). From this theoretical 
standpoint conceptual change is seen as a process in which 
conceptions are adapted by experience. In this way the 'range of 
convenience’ of the learner’s mini-theories can be extended and
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tested in terms of their functional utility in a number of 
contexts. As a result of these activities the learner may develop 
links between a range of mini-theories enabling her to respond to 
new experiences; at least to the point where conceptions or mini­
theories cease to be appropriate and adequate as a basis for 
making sense of the world. This process may result in the 
individual actively resisting attempts to reorganize his construct 
system, to the extent that he may ignore the need for change. 
Alternatively, his framework of interlocking mini-theories may 
undergo a radical or revolutionary change in order to accommodate 
a new system of construct organization. At a fundamental level this 
reorganization may require a revision of the individual’s ’core’ 
constructs, ie. those conceptions which provide a foundation of 
personally adequate hypotheses which provide the individual with an 
understanding of the world as he sees it. Seen from this 
perspective, revolutionary changes in the individual's conceptions 
are part of the same process of progressive adaptations which 
refine her construct system. Radical conceptual change for the 
individual is part of an adaptation process, even if for the 
observer of the learner’s activities, it may appear that 
revolutionary events have occured.
A specific model of conceptual change in a science education 
context has been elaborated by Posner et a l , (1982). This model is 
largely derived from the philosophy of science, notably the work of 
Kuhn (1970), Toulmin (1972) and Lakatos (1970), Posner et a l . have 
characterised two phases of conceptual change, likening one to the 
'normal* science described by Kuhn (1970) where world views define
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problems and determine the explanatory adequacy of solutions, and 
the other to 'revolutionary’ science where paradigms are modified 
and recast. Posner and his co-workers (1982) contend that the 
first phase is analagous to patterns of conceptual change which 
occur when students use and integrate new phenomena into existing 
conceptual structures. Strike and Posner (1982) refer to this phase 
as 'assimilation' and link it with conceptual change which does not 
require major conceptual revisions by the learner. In contrast to 
'assimilation', these workers associate radical concept changes with 
'accommodations’ where they suggest core concepts are replaced by 
new organizing principles. Much of the research of the Cornell 
Group is concerned with the latter type of change although they 
readily concede that the differences between 'assimilation' and 
'accommodation' may be a matter of degree. This difference of 
degree is not stressed by the Cornell Group and consequently in 
their work there is by default an exaggeration of the absolute 
nature of 'normal' and 'revolutionary' phases of conceptual change. 
Indeed, little emphasis is given to an appreciation of the non- 
monolithic character of assimilations and accommodations. This is 
perhaps a consequence of the historic 'after the fact' origins of 
the Kuhnian revolutionary/normal dichotomy, where the variation and 
diversity within these categories is often ignored or at best the 
continuity between them is de-emphasised.
In this philosophical context, Posner e t  a l . (1982) describe 
how the learner's current conceptions are modified as a function of 
the conditions necessary to induce conceptual accommodation. They
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describe four essential conditions before conceptual accommodations 
will occur.
1. There must be dissatisfaction with existing conceptions.
2. New conceptions must be intelligible
3. A new conception should suggest the possibility of a fruitful 
research programme.
4 New conceptions must appear plausible.
Underpinning these four tenets, is the belief that core conceptions 
will only be rejected when they themselves have failed to provide 
adequate solutions to a range of related problems. Under these 
circumstances more adequate theories, which have the power to 
resolve these problems, will replace existing organizing principles. 
This view of conceptual change draws attention to, and recognises 
the power of the learner’s existing conceptions. Indeed, 
’misconceptions' or alternative conceptions will be part of the 
conceptual framework which may 'judge' the plausibility, 
fruitfulness, and intelligibility of new ideas as well as the 
adequacy of old ones.
The Cornell Group describe the relationship between the 
learner’s existing conceptions and new experience in terms of 
'conceptual ecologies', a view of conceptual change derived from the 
scientific philosophy of Stephen Toulmin (1972). Conceptual 
ecologies are described as environments in which populations of 
ideas and current theories interact with existing ideas. The nature 
of these interactions is seen as an important factor in the 
assimilation and accommodation of new ideas, the direction of 
change, and the effects of teaching strategies on individuals.
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Strike (1982) has described these interactions in the context of a 
learning situation.
M Conceptual change theories, however, are likely to see 
misconceptions as emerging from some interaction between 
experience and other concepts the student has (perhaps 
themselves misconceptions). They are also likely to see 
misconceptions as highly problematic and as crucial phenomena 
for teaching and learning. The reason is that misconceptions 
will be seen as part of the student’s conceptual ecology which 
will thus function as part of the student's cognitive 
repertoire for understanding and judging other concepts. 
Moreover, misconceptions will be seen as fitting into a 
student’s conceptual ecology and thus not easily written over. 
As part of a conceptual network, misconceptions will be 
maintained both by their ability to distort and reject 
incompatible information and by the support that they draw 
from other concepts in the student’s arsenal. Conceptual change 
theory thus sees misconceptions as crucially important 
phenomena having both the ability to distort further learning 
and be themselves highly impervious to instruction."
(Strike, 1982)
Conceptual change in an ecological context will be seen as the 
resultant of a complex set of interactions between many conceptual 
features. Posner e t  a l , (1982) have described some of the features 
of conceptual ecologies; these include anomalies, metaphors, the 
learner’s metaphysical beliefs and epistemological commitments as 
well as knowledge obtained through personal and social experiences. 
These features may be identified as being related to a specific 
learning context or subject domain, however, they may equally be 
derived from 'irrelevant' experiences distant from the knowledge 
boundaries of the subject. Thus understanding the process of 
conceptual change through an understanding of the learner’s 
conceptual ecology requires that teachers and researchers develop 
an holistic view of the learner's conceptual system, from the
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idiasync ratic world of alternative conceptions to the communal 
beliefs of his socio-cultural environment. Hewson and Hamlyn (1984) 
have used an ecological model of conceptual change to examine 
African children's conceptions of heat. Hewson and Hamlyn (1984) 
considered that African children may hold a different set of 
'misconceptions’ from their Western counterparts as a result of 
their different cultural and linguistic background. These workers 
concluded that African children were in fact less likely to have a 
caloric conception of heat when compared with Western children's 
conceptions because of the differences in their everyday 
experiences and the prevailing social metaphors of their culture. 
Joan Solomon (1984) has also drawn attention to the importance of 
everyday experiences and socially constructed knowledge as 
determinants of the child’s view of the world. Indeed West and 
Pines (1983) have argued that another dimension, the 'non-rational', 
must also be considered part of conceptual ecologies.
” The process of conceptualization, be it intelligibility, 
plausibility etc. taken separately or together,in valves the 
learner's feelings. Does the student feel good? or proud? or 
satisfied? or alternatively, bad? demeaned? We are claiming 
that these are integral parts of what learning is, and not 
simply motivational, attitudinal, or affective antecedents upon 
which learning depends. Learning is feeling good, proud, 
satisfied, etc., as much as it is Pasner et a l .*s four 
conditions; and feelings are never rational."
Strike and Posner (1983) accept that these factors will play a part 
in conceptual change; they see the need for some measure of 
selectivity when we investigate conceptual ecologies.
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" While we recognize that there are other variables and 
intellectual tools relevant to conceptual change in science 
students, we choose to follow what appears to be a fruitful 
line of inquiry before embarking on other passible ones.”
and
” Our decision about our research has been to look at these 
relations between the evidence students have and the 
conclusions that they draw. The decision is motivated by 
several considerations; that evidence does make a difference, 
that understanding the role of reasoning in learning is 
important and that one should wade through one quagmire at a 
time.”
The power of an ecological perspective seems to be its 
potential to develop comprehensive, multidimensional understandings 
of the factors influencing conceptual change. However, when the 
researcher moves from an observational mode towards an 
investigative posture, the sheer complexity of conceptual ecologies 
mitigates against understanding. For this reason it seems 
inevitable that the researcher will be concerned with constructing 
a comprehensive picture of conceptual systems based on features 
which he believes significant in the context of his enquiries. In 
this way research into children’s changing conceptions of natural 
phenomena moves from an ecological to an ecosystemic perspective.
1.14 Conceptions in an Ecosystem.
An ecosystemic approach to children's changing conceptions 
will be selective in its account of conceptual features. However, it 
will always recognise that the individual’s conceptions can never 
be isolated from their conceptual environment. Stephen Toulmin's 
notion of concepts (1972) encapsulated a view of this relationship.
" Each of us thinks his own thoughts; our concepts we share 
with our fellow men. For what we believe we are answerable as
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individuals; but the language in which our beliefs are 
articulated is public property. To understand what concepts 
are, and how they play a part in our lives, we must come to 
terms with the central relationship between our thoughts and 
beliefs, which are personal or individual, and our linguistic 
and conceptual inheritance, which is communal.”
The personal dimension of Toulmin’s notion of concept is closely 
aligned with an 'actional' viewpoint, capturing as it does, the 
idiosync. ratic nature of concepts whilst reconciling them with the 
socio-cultural dimension.
” Concepts play their parts in the lives of individuals, and 
scarcely have any actuality apart from these roles. At the same 
time, individual concept users acquire the concepts they do 
within a social context, and the sets of concepts which they 
employ play identifiable parts also in the lives of human 
communities - whether societies, congregations or professions.”
(Toulmin, 1972)
To some extent this ongoing dialogue between the personal and the 
public has been dichotomised by 'schools’ of thought which have 
traditionally seen these conceptual dimensions as distinct and 
unrelated. In this respect Science itself has been instrumental in 
this demarcation.
” Individualism endowed man with an absolute rationality in 
which the knowing subject is detatched from his social
context This individualistic epistemology, which has
dominated psychology, and has had wide currency in sociology, 
produced in the social sciences an empirical concern for the 
objective, manifested in cross-sectional studies, with 
semantically rigid categories and quantifiable symbolic 
representations. It has become the scientific epistemolgy,”
(Esland.1981)
This schism is also apparent in the perception of children’s views 
of the natural world.
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” Do the empirical ground rules really support such an 
individual constructivist position? If informal knowledge has 
been personally assembled in such a rational way why is it 
then inconsistently applied? When the history of science itself 
has thrown up so many theories of mechanics, light, heat, and 
respiration to explain the simple happenings of our world, how 
is it that our young children hold so many ideas in common? If 
our pupils have such a valuable grasp of the hypothetica- 
deductive method, why do they then have such difficulty 
understanding the method of school science? It would seem 
simpler to abandon the whole idea of each child being his own 
scientist laboriously building up general structures out of a 
limited personal experience of events, in favour of a more 
social construction of knowledge.”
(Solomon,1984)
This degree of polarization is unnecessary and indeed difficult to 
justify. If one adopts a personally constructed or a socially 
constructed view of knowledge it is difficult to divorce one from 
the other. Berger and Luckman's theory of socially constructed 
knowledge (1979) visualises a continuum of knowledge construction
yfrom the personal world to the realities of everyday life. Berger 
and Luckman’s vision of the individual is of a communal organism , 
acting in concert with others to construct and objectify concepts 
destined to become part of the individuals perception of reality. 
Thus the culture is created and absorbed by individuals and 
emerges from the subjective meaning that they use to make sense of 
the world. As Procter and Parry (1978) contend, socio-cultural 
values are not passively received, but can be personally validated 
and authenticated by the individual. There is an ongoing dialectic 
between individual conceptions and socially constructed meanings 
producing an interactive environment in which the individual 
becomes aware of her personal constructions of social realities.
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An ecosystemic view of children’s conceptions represents a 
synthesis of personal and socially constructed knowledge. From this 
perspective, an 'actional' nation of concepts is intimately 
associated with an entailment of cultural experience, representing 
what Toulmin (1972) calls 'ail ecosystemic self-portrait’. This 
description is drawn from two viewpoints, one individual and the 
other communal; conceptions can be visualised in these separate 
dimensions but must be put together if we are concerned with 
gaining a proper perspective on conceptual change and development.
This chapter has developed a perspective on children’s 
conceptions and the processes of conceptual change. It has been 
suggested that the problems experienced by students and teachers 
when they set out to learn and teach about inheritance phenomena, 
are bound up with the child’s intuitive theories and the conceptual 
change strategies deployed by teachers. Many of these provide an 
inappropriate base on which to develop an understanding of 
children’s beliefs and the process of conceptual change. The basis 
of this weakness is that theories of learning have often failed to 
operate at the level of the individual learner and his learning 
environment. It is concluded that research into the child’s 
conceptual processes benefits from an ’actional’ view of concept 
and a conceptual change perspective on learning. This chapter also 
identifies the need to develop a research framework which 
describes the personal and social aspects of children’s beliefs and 
combines this with a model of conceptual change which resonates 
with the complexity of the child's everyday conceptual activities.
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Chapter 2 
Models of Change
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2,1 Modelling Conceptual Systems.
Increasing awareness of the importance of alternative 
conceptions of natural phenomena in our understanding of how 
children learn has presented cognitive research with a new set of 
challenges. The core of this challenge is located in the results of 
research programmes which reveal how children use their 
conceptions in learning situations. Children's conceptions are 
active at the frontiers of their experience and, for the learner, 
represent a way of 'experimenting* with conceptual organization 
whilst keeping it open to change and modification. Children's 
intuitive theories are involved in the exploration of understanding. 
At the interface between their existing knowledge and new 
experience children explore the interrelations of differing 
viewpoints. Conceptions are the active and constructive elements 
which form the basis of 'experimental* transactions between the 
learner and his or her environment. The problem for the 
teacher/researcher is how to visualise the dynamic organization of 
children’s conceptions and the processes of conceptual change.
Cognitive research guided by an ecosystemic view of children’s 
conceptions must consider that conceptual change may take place 
within a multidimensional environment of continuously evolving 
personal and communal knowledge. The dynamic created by this 
diverse, metastable environment will be inseparable from the 
reality of children’s conceptions of natural phenomena. Conceptions 
must be capable of evolving in order to have worth and utility in
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the everchanging world of experience, They must therefore be
'open* to the influences of that world if they are to have any
relevance to the learner. This ’openness* can only be achieved if
conceptions are part of a dynamic conceptual ecosystem. In
cognitive research the 'parts’ of an ecosystem cannot be viewed as
isolated and self-contained components of a conceptual ’mechanism’.
Research into children's conceptions has consistently shown the
interaction and interdependency between conceptions (Gilbert and
Pope,1982), and between conceptions and ’other knowledge’ (Posner e t
a l . , 1982), This mutualism between conceptions and their ecosystems
requires the researcher/teacher to develop an understanding of
conceptions in environments whose complexity, heterogeneity and
metastability are an integral part of those conceptions, and where
the relationship between ideas may have a significant effect on
learning. Gilbert and Pope (1982) described the existence of
'multiple frameworks’ in children's conceptions of energy, and
comment on situations where a child requires a number of
simultaneously active conceptions to formulate a satisfactory
explanation of a given situation. Conceptions are contextualised by
an ecosystem of interactive ideas and they are not pigeon-holed
nor immutably locked into specific experiences. Rather they are
interwoven in a matrix of experience which provides a coherent
pattern of understanding for the learner. Research which ignores
the nature of this relationship and seeks to isolate the
idiosync! racies of children's conceptions from ecosystemic ’noise’,
ymoves towards a reality different from the child’s everday use of 
conceptions.
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Vhen an ecosystemic view of conceptions is adapted the 
'machine' metaphors of closed systems are discarded in favour of a 
research paradigm which retains its sensitivity to the 
'fluctuations' and the openness of conceptual systems. However this 
has its problems for, given the 'chaotic' character of conceptual 
ecosystems, it is quite possible for the researcher to become lost 
in an ever-changing conceptual landscape of bewildering complexity.
Educational research has always been <ln the horns of this 
methodological dilemma. The researcher wants to capture a global 
picture of the learner’s activities but is frustrated by the limited 
resolution of this perspective and his inability to see what is 
actually going on amongst the complexity of interactions taking 
place before him. The researcher is forced to adopt a more 
restricted field of view in order to recognise at least some of the 
routes and signposts used by the learner. To enhance the 
resolution of this latter viewpoint, researchers have often 
imported and adapted theories from psychology, sociology and 
biology in order to provide model systems on which to base 
research design and educational theory. This has been an effective 
strategy but has had its problems. Vhen models and theories 
derived from base disciplines have been applied in educational 
contexts, some have tended to metamorphose from illuminative 
heuristics which guide research, into theoretical edifices which 
isolate and exaggerate elements of the learning process and distort 
the way that we think about children’s conceptions,
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"If there is any truth in the idea that modelling and 
theorizing is essentially an analogic, metaphoric activity, then 
this fact will significantly affect any kind of reflection 
about the foundations of thinking, including that in this 
paper, in particular making such ideas ultimately 
unformalizable. So it seems to me that we should in fact avoid 
looking for too strictly coherently formalized theories, which 
it would be very reasonable to expect to show up rapidly as 
seriously inconsistent with the facts, or to lead us astray in 
various crazy ways, I think, instead, that in this kind of 
research we are pretty much- for the time being-up against a 
need for cognitive generalization of a large set of ’language 
games’ aiming in the first instance at no more than ’verifying' 
such theoretical ideas," (Viennot 1985)
For the researcher interested in children's conceptions there 
has to be considerable concern regarding the appropriateness of 
some of the theories imported into educational research from ’base 
disciplines' and their relationship with the 'open' character of 
conceptual systems. If conceptual systems are open systems, then 
they can be thought of as reciprocating, symbiotic universes of 
experience, sensitive to environmental change through the exchanges 
and actions of the learner. This notion leads to a description of 
conceptualisation as an active, constructive and creative process 
which constantly adapts the existing conceptions of the learner's 
experiential base in the light of 'new' phenomena and novel 
situations. If such open systems are modelled on static theories of 
conceptual ‘stability’ and the metaphors of closed systems, then 
they will fail to resonate ie. be in harmony with, the fundamental 
character of these systems, thus enfeebling rather than enriching 
the researcher’s understanding of conceptual systems. If Man only 
goes where his models direct him, then with respect to conceptions 
and conceptual ecosystems, the research models that we adopt must 
be compatible with open systems. In this way their ability to
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interact with, and amplify the characteristics of these systems 
(resonant models) will be enhanced, thus illuminating rather than 
obscuring the complex dynamics of conceptual environments. Impetus 
theory tried to explain why and how things move, but it was only 
when Galileo replaced this static model with a dynamic one that we 
began to understand and predict the behaviour of moving bodies. So 
it is with conceptual ecosystems.
2.2 The Metaphorical Transference' of Ecological Models and their 
Compatability with Cognitive Research.
Black (1966), in the context of what he calls 'theoretical 
models' (eg. describing conceptual systems a s  i f  th e y  w ere  
biological ecosystems), describes a successful model as one which 
is 'isomorphic with its domain of application*. The rational basis 
for using an ecological model in a cognitive domain is, in the 
context of this thesis, the existence of open systems in both these 
fields. Vilden (1980) describes this unifying aspect of both 
domains
"Open information systems are defined to include all systems 
capable of using or incorporating new information (learning) 
and/or in which any kind of 'purpose' or 'program' - a kind of 
'open', as yet unstructured, feedback relation to an environment 
- can be conceived of as systematically ANTERIOR to any later 
construction of closed-loop relationships to certain kinds of 
information."
On the basis of this commonality between biological and conceptual 
systems, a good research model will also seek to promote the 
analogical development of ideas from one field into another.
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Stephen Toulmin’s (1953) use of the term 'conceptual ecology' was
an attempt to describe the complexity of interacting factors which
determine the evolution of scientific theories, but is underpinned
by a commitment to the power of models,
"It is in fact a great virtue of a good model that it does 
suggest further questions, taking us beyond the phenomena from 
which we began, and tempts us to formulate hypotheses which 
turn out to be experimentally fertile."
(Toulmin 1953)
Black (1966) in his description of 'archetypal models' comments on 
the nature of analogical extension in models where parent domains 
supply ideas to other fields of inquiry to which they do not 
immediately and literally apply. Black (1966) suggests that in 
these instances, a detailed account of key words and expressions is 
needed, along with their paradigmatic meanings in the field from 
which they are originally drawn. In the following section I will 
describe a variety of ecological terms and concepts in a biological 
context, the desire being to describe how these original meanings 
become extended in an ecosystemic model of conceptualisation. I 
will argue that, at a ’theoretical' and 'archetypal' level, ecological 
models derived from the life sciences have much to contribute to 
an understanding of conceptual systems. I suggest that this support 
is born out of their common concern with the dynamics of open 
systems and that ecological metaphors developed in biological 
contexts can be transfered to and extrapolated within the realms 
of conceptual systems with a view to testing their appropriateness 
in cognitive research. If the use of ecological models in cognitive 
research can be justified at a comparative level it should be 
possible to move towards a research posture which releases the
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creative potential of these models as new ways of thinking about 
conceptual systems. In the context of my research into children’s 
alternative conceptions of inheritance the use of biological models 
may also have the added advantage of facilitating the transference 
of research findings into practice; given that the target audience 
for the findings of the reserach will be students and teachers with 
some understanding of biological models.
2.3 Connectedness in Open Systems - a Comparison of Biological 
and Conceptual Ecosystems.
In the life sciences, ecological research emerged from a 
research tradition dominated by reductionist/mechanistic models. 
Ecological research certainly benefited and continues to benefit 
from the latter perspective. However, the emphasis has 
progressively moved to a study of organisms in the environment, 
acting on and being shaped by, the multidimensional features of the 
ecosystem. This ecological holism has focused on the complex webs 
of biological interaction within specific ecosystems and has begun 
to question the meaningfulness and utility of research findings 
based on simple, linear chains of cause and effect.
Ecological research has illuminated the nature of reciprocity 
and interaction within ecosystems, indeed many of our present 
concerns about the effects of pollution on the environment stem 
from research which has uncovered the biological ramifications and 
consequences of human activity. In such systems, organisms and 
their habitats are the products of adaptations, selection pressures
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and mutual interactions which are in a continuous state of 
evolution. Ecosystems are thus maintained not through isolation 
from interaction, but by remaining ’open* to the influences brought 
to bear on the ecosystem and by adapting accordingly.
Ecosystems are unique environments and, although limited 
generalizations can be made about the nature of interactions within 
them, these have to be moderated by the certain knowledge that no 
two ecosystems are identical. Consequently, ecological theories have 
to be flexible and cognizant of limits of generalizability. In this 
respect ecological research places great value on studies conducted 
in 'natural environments' where experimentation and theorising are 
open to the fluctuations and idiosync. racies of real life 
situations. The failure of many laboratory based theories to 
explain the activities of organisms in the wild underlines the 
value of ecological field studies carried out in natural 
environments: pest erj adication by natural 'enemies' has always 
proved less effective in the wild than in controlled experimental 
situations. There is undoubtedly a balance to be struck between the 
realism and meaningfulness of field-based research and the 
constraints placed upon the researcher by the practical problems 
with which it is associated.
If we now turn to cognitive research and conceptual 
ecosystems, it is possible to find a research paradigm in 
education which resonates with ecological research methods in the 
life sciences. By 'resonate' I mean the ability of the two research 
contexts to overlap and interact in such a way as to amplify the 
nature of the system under investigation. In describing the
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naturalistic approach to cognitive research Gilbert and Pope (1982) 
make the following points
"The aim of the naturalistic approach is to describe a natural 
setting as fully as possible (holistically) so that a better 
understanding of such persons/events can be achieved. This is 
in contrast to the usual aim of experimental research which 
seeks to prescribe what future interrelations are likely to be 
between certain variables which have been the focus of the 
study."
Rist (1977) supports these values and assumptions and stresses the 
interconnectedness of learning systems
it is precisely because reality cannot be broken down into 
component parts without severe risk of distortion that an 
holistic analysis is necessary. Focussing on a narrow set of 
variables necessarily sets up a filtering screen between the 
researcher and the phenomena he is attempting to comprehend. 
Such barriers, from the vantage point of those employing an 
holistic analysis, inhibit and thwart the observer from a 
necessary closeness to the data and from an understanding of 
what is unique and what is generalisable from the data, and 
from perceiving the process involved in contrast to simple 
outcomes."
Gilbert and Vatts (1983) compare naturalistic research methods in 
education with the axioms of more traditional methods.
"..these two traditions have become reflected in two paradigms 
for research in education, and hence in science education.
These we call paradigm 1 and 2. Paradigm 1 following the 
e r k la r e n approach is: ’traditional', in that it is of longer 
standing; 'scientific', in that it relates to the empirical- 
inductivist view of science; 'experimental', in that the notion 
of controlled situations is employed; 'reductionist', in that 
phenomena are subdivided and the divisions selectively paid 
attention to; 'prescriptive', in that the outcomes of enquiry 
are intended to determine future actions; 'quantitative', in that 
suitable sections of a general population are enquired into; 
'nomothetic', in that general laws are sought. Paradigm 2 on 
the other hand, following the v e rs t e h e n approach is: 'non- 
traditional', in that it is of fairly recent standing; 'artistic', 
in that its view of science is closer to the relativist 
schools; 'naturalistic', in that the notion of natural occuring 
situations is employed; 'holistic', in that phenomena are 
studied in their entirety; 'descriptive', in that there is no
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overt intention of determining future actions; ’qualitative’, in 
that it seeks to enquire into phenomena without undue regard 
to their typical .ity; ’idiographic’, in that it relates to the 
study of individuals.'*
The naturalistic paradigm in educational research described 
above, has emerged in response to the growing awareness of the 
need for a research paradigm which is capable of dealing with open 
systems in a meaningful and relevant way. In the previous chapter 
an ’actional' view of concept was discussed and this perspective 
led to a view of concepts and conceptual systems which stressed 
their creative construction in response to environmental influences, 
their uniqueness, their individual and communal construction .their 
adaptiveness and their ability to shape and be shaped by the 
learner’s experiences. In this sort of conceptual ecosystem, 
ecological/naturalistic research paradigms would seem to offer the 
best guidelines for meaningful research. At a paradigmatic level 
there is considerable overlap between the concerns of ecological 
research in a biological context, and the nature of conceptual 
systems in education. This observation is not surprising given that 
both are 'open systems’. I would suggest that this degree of 
convergence indicates that at a methodological and theoretical 
level, ecological models which have been developed in the life 
sciences, may have considerable utility as a way of looking at 
conceptual systems. Such a strategy would be aimed at verifying the 
appropriateness of these models and testing their ability to 
suggest new foci of research interest.
2.4 Extending the Ecological Model - Mew Ways of Looking at 
Conceptual Ecosystems.
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The notion that there are sets of common values and 
assumptions associated with an ecological research perspective of 
biological and conceptual processes, leads inevitably to a 
discussion of ecological theory and its relationship with 
conceptual systems. This will show to what extent different 
perspectives on their respective behaviours might yield different 
insights useful for both cognitive theory and pedagogic practice.
Research interest in conceptual ecosystems represents a 
transfer of interest from the static world to the changing, 
apparently ’chaotic’ world of fluctuating systems. The complexity of 
ecosystemic interrelations can often obscure the processes going on 
within ecosystems. For this reason they are often best perceived, 
and conceived of, when they are in the process of gradually coming 
into being. This perspective is encapsulated in the developmental 
and evolutionary theories of the life sciences. In ecological 
contexts, it is associated with the study of colonization and the 
pioneering activities of organisms in ’new’ habitats. The utility of 
the latter perspective is best illustrated by reference to a 
particular colonization scenario.
Consider a virgin habitat such as a new volcanic island; the 
island becomes a focus for the pioneering activities of plants and 
animals as they ’test' the limits of their geographical and 
physiological range. In the course of time, the island may 
experience several waves of colonization before a relatively stable 
population becomes established. In the period between initial 
colonization and the establishment of 'mature' ecosystems, the 
ecologist is afforded a unique insight into the interactions
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between organisms and between organisms and their physical and
biological environments. During this phase, the dynamics of
\
developing ecosystems are highlighted, and as a result it has been 
possible to study some of the processes controlling colonization. 
The following control factors have emerged as being significant in 
the development of models of colonization and ecosystem dynamics; 
selectivity, adaptation, interaction, competition, heterogeneity, 
stability and resilience (Jantsch and Waddington, 1976). These 
factors play distinctive roles in theories of colonization.
Habitats exert selection pressures on potential colonizers. 
Physical factors such as light, temperature and rainfall as well as 
biological factors, predispose habitats to colonization by specific 
types and groups of organisms. Animals and plants with 
physiological 'plasticity' and high levels of environmental 
tolerance may successfully colonize a variety of differing habitats, 
whilst those with a more limited repertoire may be confined to a 
very narrow range of potential habitats. The selectivity of 
environments can also affect individual oraganisms and populations 
in such a way that descendants are more closely adapted to the 
habitat through differential mortality and by affecting rates of 
reproduction. In this respect some populations may be directly 
adapted to the prevailing conditions, or they may have been 
preadapted, whereby features have been selected by a habitat in the 
past or at another place which now prove to be of advantage in 
completely different circumstances. A combination of pre-adaptation 
and physiological/behavioural plasticity may give some organisms 
an advantage over other potential colonizers. Where evolutionary
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adaptations (as apposed to plasticity) have had this effect on 
patterns of colonization, it is important to take account of the 
heterogeneity of populations of colonizers, as this confers on the 
group the ability to respond to changing selection pressures. In 
this respect many groups of organisms remain dormant within the 
ecosystem and it is only when selection pressures change or new 
habitats are created that the researcher gains an insight into the 
diversity and heterogeneity of the population.
This interaction between organisms and their environment is 
characteristic of open systems. It is important from a research 
perspective to realize that this is an ongoing interrelationship 
and not simply confined to phases of initial colonization.
Organisms which become established in a new habitat, change that 
habitat as a direct consequence of their physiological, metabolic 
and behavioural activities. In this way colonizers create new 
habitats, and although this may lead to the consolidation of their 
position in the habitat, it can result in a situation where 
pioneering organisms create an environment where they are at a 
selective disadvantage. In the latter circumstances initial 
colonizers may have to compete with other organisms better adapted 
to the ’new’ environment. Pioneering organisms poorly adapted to 
their environment may persist in the habitat if competition is 
weak or if there is an abundance of resources within the 
environment. It is important to stress at this point that these 
interrelationships within habitats and ecosystems are far from 
being deterministic. In fact they are profoundly affected by random 
events, Chance through the agency of fire, flood etc. can play a
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dramatic role in the dynamics of colonization and the creation of 
ecosystems.
Random events such as natural disasters are perhaps the most 
obvious change agents acting upon ecosystems. However, ecosystems 
are in a continuous state of flux induced by the covert but no less 
effective influences of selectivity, adaption and competition which 
combine to produce a continuously evolving system. The fluctuations 
of these open systems are fundamental to the colonization and 
evolutionary processes. If populations or individuals are to persist 
in the ecosystem they must be capable of adapting to change and 
responsive to transient periods during which favourable conditions 
exist. This persistence is assured by the unstable and fluctuating 
character of open system and their sub-systems. This paradox of 
stability through fluctuation is one of the most intriguing aspects 
of open systems as it challenges the uniformity/equilibrium centred 
models of change in complex systems.
Holling (1976) has suggested that the dynamic aspects of 
ecosystems with respect to change and stability can be defined by 
two distinct properties; resilience and stability
" Resilience determines the persistence of relationships within 
a system and is a measure of the ability of a system to absorb 
changes of state variables, driving variables, and parameters 
and still persist. In this definition, resilience is the 
property of the system and persistence or probability of 
extinction is the result. Stability, on the other hand, is the 
abiliy of a system to return to an equilibrium state after a 
temporary disturbance. The more rapidly it returns, and with 
the least fluctuation, the more stable it is. In this definition, 
stability is the property of the system and the degree of 
fluctuation around specific states...."
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Using Holling's (1976) definitions, ecosystems with high 
resilience will be characterised by having a high degree of 
flexibility, heterogeneity and fluctuation. Holling describes the 
corollary of such a system by refering to a specific biological 
situation
" It is not surprising, therefore, that the commercial fishery 
systems of the Great Lakes have provided a vivid example of 
the sensitivity of ecological systems to disruption by man, for 
they represent climatically buffered, fairly homogeneous and 
self-contained systems with relatively low variability and 
hence high stability and low resilience.
Nor is it surprising that, however readily fish stocks in lakes 
can be driven to extinction, it has been extremely difficult to 
do the same to insect pests of man's crops. Pest systems are 
highly variable in space and time; as open systems they are 
much affected by dispersal and therefore have a high 
resilience."
The notion of stability and resilience in the example above 
indicates, that if the extinction of an ecosystem or part of its 
population is the desired aim, then one course of action is to 
reduce the level of fluctuations in the system. In this condition 
the system may be 'pushed' in a specific direction by external 
influences. However, if heterogeneity, flexibility and fluctuations 
are maintained in the system ,the effects of unilateral actions 
imposed on the system will be unpredictable and generally damped 
out by the resilience of the system. If resilient systems have this 
power to absorb changes and damp out the effects of external 
influence, we must ask: how do they retain their openness and the 
potential for change and adaptation?
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2.5 Modelling Conceptual Change In Open Systems.
The dissipative structures theory of Prigogine (1980) is a well 
articulated model of qualitative change. It provides a model of 
change in open system which gives an interesting metacommentary 
on the notions of stability and resilience in ecosystems. Prigogine 
identifies three types of open system,
1) those at equilibrium with respect to the environment,
2) those near equilibrium and
3) those far from equilibrium with respect to the environment.
Open systems far from equilibrium are characterised by their
degree of diversity and heterogeneity. In this condition Prigogine’s 
model suggests that they are capable of reorganizing their internal 
relationships without the imposition of external change agents. 
Dissipative structure theory contends that fluctuations, variability 
and diversity in open systems far from equilibrium confer on the 
system the latent ability to self reorganize in a spontaneous way. 
These spontaneous changes emerge from the system as an indirect 
consequence of an external environmental change. Far from 
equilibrium systems can be pushed toward equilibrium conditions by 
increasing their stability, insulating them from the external 
environment or by reducing the diversity and the amplitude of 
fluctuations within the system. Dissipative structure theory 
suggests that systems moving in this direction ie. towards greater 
stability, will also change their sensitivity to change agents
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"Imagine a primitive tribe, If its birthrate and death rate are 
equal, the size of the population remains stable. Assuming 
adequate food and other resources, the tribe forms part of a 
local system in ecological equilibrium. A few additional births 
(without the equivalent number of deaths) might have little 
effect. The system may move to a near-equilibrium state. 
Nothing much happens. It takes a big jolt to produce big near­
equilibrium states. But if the birthrate should suddenly soar, 
the system is pushed into a 'far-from-equilibrium’ condition, 
and here non-linear relationships prevail. In this state, 
systems do strange things. They become inordinately sensitive 
to external influences. Small inputs yield huge, startling 
effects. The entire system may reorganize itself in ways that 
strike us as being bi.’zare."
(Prigogine and Stengers, 1984)
Ecosystems which are 'far from equilibrium' thus have the 
apparently paradoxical ability to resist change whilst being 
sensitive to change. 'Plus pa change, plus c’est la meme chose' or 
perhaps plus c’est la meme chose, plus pa change. How then do 
systems change and at what point is the system’s persistence 
relinquished in favour of change and adaptation. Jantsch's (1976) 
notion of 'going with the fluctuations', whereby fluctuations within 
the system are amplified by internal and external factors, suggests 
that' ’far from equilibrium’ systems reorganize in response to 
positive feedback influences. This positive feedback effect can also 
be seen in the contention of Sawada and Caley (1985) that
"As a system approaches far-from-equilibrium states it does 
not necessarily have to undergo a spontaneous re-ordering 
although the number and extent of internally generated 
fluctuations increases dramatically. At some indeterminable 
point, however, the possibility for spontaneous re-ordering of 
the system, as the result of internal fluctuations, occurs. This 
point is known as a bifurcation point because there will exist 
two or more possible re-ordered states.... It is impossible to 
predict with certainty when or where a bifurcation will occur 
or what the re-ordered state will be...."
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In natural ecosystems, for example, an increase in the density 
of a particular species may lead to an increase in the number of 
pathogens associated with this organism. Before the population 
density increased, host-pathogen interactions would result in 
fluctuations within their respective populations. However, if as a 
result of host numbers increasing the pathogen increases from 
endemic to epidemic proportions, the effects on the ecosystem can 
be catastophic. In these situations host and pathogen may require 
to dramatically reorganize their ecosystemic relations. Host 
organisms may mutate and give rise to more resistant forms whilst 
pathogens may require to enter a dormant phase of their life cycle. 
During this period of reorganization the entire ecosystem may also 
be undergoing fundamental changes in its patterns of interaction 
and interdependence. Thus when the resilience threshold of the 
ecosystem is exceeded, positive feedback leads to its 
reorganization and the emergence of a new order.
In the biological sciences, the evolution of an ecological 
research paradigm has led to the emergence of ecological principles 
which guide applied research. Elements of this praxis, discussed 
above, focus on the resilience of ecosystems; the heterogeneity and 
adaptability of their populations; the selectivity of habitats; the 
dynamics of colonization,; fluctuations within ecosystems and the 
effects of these changes on the system. In accordance with the 
contention that these biological perspectives may yield useful 
insights into conceptual systems, the next section will describe a 
putative model of how these insights might be obtained.
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2.6 Modelling Conceptual Systems on Ecological Theory.
Ecological theory has emerged as one way of understanding an
evolving, unpredictable, plural and diverse world of interacting
organisms. Ecological models are a representation of open systems
and they allow biologists to communicate their observations of
ecological systems. When children share their learning experiences
with each other, and in the process use their conceptions in
solving communal and personal problems, they become open systems.
Sawada (1984) comments that
"By participating openly and freely in the process of 
communication with themselves and with others, students and 
teachers as individuals and as a group become open systems...."
When children conceptualise they leave a residue of ambiguity and 
indeterminacy which many cognitive theories find hard to ’explain’. 
The problem here is that the ’organization’ of children’s 
conceptions does not fit into models which are based on fixed 
hierarchies of concepts and 'logical' interactions. What makes it 
worthwhile to extend ecological models from organic to conceptual 
systems is the extensive parallel between accounts of children's 
conceptual ’organization’ and ecological systems. The questions 
raised by conceptual and biological interaction are intrinsically 
ecological and to do with the nature of open systems; how do 
things interact, what determines the ways in which they interact, 
what conditions are necessary for interaction. An ’actional’ view of 
concept puts to one side the notion that ’scientific’ concepts are 
the only components of the child’s conceptual system. If we
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consider the problem solving world of the learner and the 
conceptions used in particular contexts and situations then we move 
closer to an ecological world. This perspective invites the 
transference of ecological ideas from organic to conceptual domains 
because of the common concern to describe events in a particular 
context and not on the basis of generalizations and 'absolutes'.
This metaphorical extension thus represents more than a likeness 
between two domains of knowledge. What is being suggested is that 
there is a connectedness between ecological and conceptual systems 
and that by extending the ecological metaphor it is possible to 
evoke and describe a level of intra-connectedness between 'open' 
systems which goes beyond simple comparison.
Ecological theory suggests that by observing the coming into 
sbeing of an ecosytem through the dynamics of colonization, insights 
can be obtained into the nature of ecological interactions. Posner 
e t  a l (1983) in their description of conceptual ecologies, describe 
a complex system of metaphors, metaphysical beliefs, previous 
knowledge etc, Understanding the complexity of interactions within 
an individual’s conceptual ecology is an enormous research 
undertaking, representing as it does the unravelling of a lifetimes 
experience of the world. Conceptual ecologies represent a 
population of beliefs and ideas about the world , and a pool of 
experience on which the learner draws when constructing and 
updating his understanding of natural phenomena. Conceptual 
ecologies are a source of tried and tested ideas, conceptions and 
beliefs available whenever the learner is confronted by novel 
experiences or 'problem' situations. If we consider the latter as
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conceptual niches then it is possible that the student's existing 
conceptual ecology provides a ready source of colonizing 
conceptions. Theoretically, some of these existing ideas may 
provide an adequate explanation of new experiences and consequently 
conceptual niches may be rapidly colonized. New learning 
experiences beyond the student’s present understanding may also 
exert a selective influence on the sorts of ideas he imports from 
his conceptual ecology. In some situations the conceptions derived 
from intuitive ideas and previous experience may be adapted, 
extending their range of convenience and their explanatory 
adequacey within the problem niche. Whatever the mode of 
colonization, the conceptual ecology of the individual creates an 
ecosystem of conceptions as existing theories colonize and interact 
with new areas of experience. By studying the way that elements of 
conceptual ecologies are selected for by the conceptual niche and 
the adaptation of conceptions by the student during the creation of 
a specific conceptual ecosystem it may be passible to illuminate 
the processes of interaction within conceptual systems and the 
dynamics of conceptual ecologies. Conceptual colonization of 
problem niches or novel situations by naive learners creates a 
research environment in which the observer/researcher may be able 
to describe some of the factors influencing conceptual change. 
Indeed, when conceptions are adapted or selected by the learner to 
become part of a created ecosystem this process involves 
conceptual experimentation which tests their personal worth and 
their social acceptability/plausibility in terms of providing a 
coherent understanding of the world.
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Conceptual ecosystems constructed from the learner's existing 
ecology of conceptions, are open systems which may be in varying 
states of stability. Dissipative structures theory suggests that the 
equilibrium state of the system will determine the effects of 
change on the ecosystem. Conceptual ecosystems ’far-from- 
equilibrium’, for example, would be extremely sensitive to small 
perturbations which in turn would bring about disproportionately 
large effects on the system. Ecosystems at or near equilibrium 
would be less sensitive to small scale fluctuations which the 
system would tend to damp-out. Assessing the state of conceptual 
ecosystems may be of critical importance in determing the timing 
and the type of learning experiences which will have the greatest 
effect on student understanding. In this respect research interest 
would focus on indicators of ecosystem states, in particular the 
effect of personal inputs (teachers, other students) and contextual 
changes on conceptual ecosystems which may reveal how discussion 
and argument between individuals, or learning strategies designed 
to bring about conceptual change interact with ecosystems. This 
research perspective in turn may illuminate factors influencing the 
stability of the system,
Dissipative structures theory suggests that if conceptual 
ecosystems are made up of heterogeneous and diverse papulations of 
conceptions, they will approach a far-from-equilibrium state. 
Research into the diversity of the conceptual ecosystems created by 
students may illuminate the importance of this factor in 
determining conceptual change.
- 87 -
2.7 A Research Model.
Diagram 1 is a synthesis of the ideas discussed in the 
previous section. A, B and C represent the conceptual ecologies of 
three individual students, an outline of which has been made 
indeterminate in an effort to convey the notion that our 
understanding of these ecologies will always be hypothetical and 
incomplete. Indeed, the students themselves may have little 
awareness of the complexity, variety and interrelatedness of their 
experience within these systems until a particular event or set of 
circumstances raises their awareness. Ai , Bs and C3 represent 
conceptual ecosystems created by each student in response to new 
experiences or problem niches. In the diagram the degree of overlap 
between ecologies and ecosystems denotes the mutualism and 
interdependence of these syterns, and the fundamental continuity 
that exists between them. Ecosystems are not isolates of conceptual 
ecologies. The creation of ecosystems Ai etc. would encapsulate the 
notion that constellations of ideas, conceptions and beliefs are 
actively colonizing 'problem' niches. This process may or may not 
result in the adaptation of existing conceptions, but if it does 
this would be of particular interest in research into conceptual 
change. The heterogeneity and diversity of ecosystems created in 
this way would also be of interest as this may be indicative of 
the potential of the ecosystem to bring about conceptual change .The 
central triangle in the diagram represents the interactions between 
individual ecosystems. These may be verbal or non verbal 
transactions between students as they agree and disagree about the
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merits of particular conceptions. Equally it may represent the 
ongoing dialogue between individuals as they develop an 
understanding of one another's ideas in relation to a specific 
conceptual niche. This social discourse will link individual 
ecosystems, influencing and being influenced by, the conceptions 
which emerge from each ecology. Interactions between individuals 
and their respective ecosystems will also be a source of 
fluctuation<s), which, depending on the level of resilience within 
the ecosystem and its state of equilibrium, may or may not bring 
about change within that system. The nature of group discourse may 
in this respect provide an insight into, and an overview of, the 
quality of interactions between individuals thus providing a 
measure of the system’s potential to generate fluctuations.
The use of an ecological model in conceptual change theories by 
Posner et a l , (1982) and Toulmin (1972) is the product of a 
metaphorical transference between biological and cognitive systems, 
mediated by the 'universal' characteristics of open systems. This 
extension of ecological terminology from organic to cognitive 
systems is also facilitated by the parallelism between ecological 
accounts of interactive systems and cognitive development. The 
ecological model as applied to conceptual systems has, to date, 
focused on the consideration of sociological, political and personal 
issues within disciplines and their effects on the development of 
concepts. Toulmin has achieved this, in an historical context, by 
making philosophers of science more aware of the sociological and 
scientific factors which have surrounded the history of science.
The work of Posner e t  a l , has suggested that in personal
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conceptualising, researchers must countenance a situation where a 
wide range of personal, cognitive, metaphysical and epistemological 
considerations have to be considered. The research model proposed 
above takes the ecological model one step further in the 
investigation of conceptual systems, In research terms this 
requires that the model be operationalised so that it can find 
application in a set of specific contexts. Through analogical 
extension it is proposed that this research model can provide new 
insights into conceptual systems. The model provides a non- 
falsifiable framework an which to structure my observations of 
children’s conceptualising. This framework provides a way of 
articulating my research findings whilst providing an opportunity 
to test its applicability in research design and data analysis. In 
this way the limitations of the model can be explored, although it 
is recognised that from the outset the model focuses on the 
development of existing conceptions rather than on the generation 
and the origin of children’s beliefs about inheritance.
Research findings which emerge from this study will not test 
the model directly at the level of empirical evidence, but will 
evaluate the framework provided by the model in terms of its 
explanatory utility. To this extent the model operates at a 
’metaphysical level' insulated from empirical disproof, although 
this in no way negates its role at a comparative, descriptive and 
creative level.
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Chapter 3
Fieldwork - Research Practice and Design
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3.1 Theoretical Influences on Research Design.
Over the last decade, research into children’s conceptions of 
natural phenomena has left few educationists believing that 
students come to lessons with minds that are scientific "tabulae 
rasae". In order to illuminate the world of children’s science, 
researchers have developed and deployed a range of research 
methods; some novel and innovative, others, adaptations of existing 
instruments derived from base disciplines such as anthropology and 
psychology. Alternative conceptions research has utilized a range 
of research methods, a feature which has tended to obscure the 
theoretical and epistemological underpinnings of these 
methodologies. This is a critical issue in any review of research 
methods, for it is the theoretical stance of the research worker 
that influences his choice of instrument and the conduct of 
research. At a phenotypic level research instruments which appear 
identical may have important differences in terms of the 
researcher’s perceptions of the problem and its possible solutions. 
In the following section I will selectively review a number of 
research methods in association with the theoretical influences 
that have shaped the nature of these approaches .
The choice of intuitive theories as a focus for investigation 
acknowledges the importance of children’s conceptions in the 
context of the individual's own cognitive development and their 
relationship with the norms of school science. Research focused on 
the latter aspect has been investigated by a large group of 
research workers, A characteristic of these workers is their
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assessment of children’s intuitive theories by reference to the 
accepted norms of teacher and curricular science (Gilbert et al., 
1982). When student conceptions are seen to run counter to these 
norms they are described at best as misconceptions or at worst 
mistakes, misunderstandings or ’simply’ wrong. From this 
perspective, the orthodoxy of school science is a major influence 
on research methodologies, in that it defines the nature of the 
problem (students getting it wrong) and the character of possible 
solution (better teaching strategies). Consequently, the design of 
research instruments has reflected patterns of school assessment, 
student activity, course content and teaching strategies associated 
with learning in science.
In order to investigate student difficulties with content areas 
of biological syllabuses, Johnstone and Mahmoud (1980, 1981) and 
Johnstone and Mughol (1976) have used a number of methodological 
approaches in order to illuminate student misconceptions.
Structured individual interviews as well as group interviews were 
used by these workers to identify student misconceptions. Findings 
obtained as a result of these procedures were authenticated by 
written tests involving a large 'sample' of students. In some 
instances special classroom materials were prepared by the 
researchers in order to test improved teaching strategies designed 
to alleviate conceptual difficulties. Hackling (1982) using written 
responses and word association techniques constructed frequency 
measures of particular misconceptions in genetics. In subsequent 
studies (Hackling and Treagust 1984) 'probing* interviews were used 
in conjunction with a list of key propositional statements deemed
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by the researchers and ’experts’ to be fundamental and relevant to 
a complete understanding of the topic. In these studies ’cross 
validation and construct validity’ were emphasised in relation to 
the school biology syllabuses followed by the ’subjects’. Searching 
interviews closely linked to known courses of instruction have also 
been used by Posner et al. (1982) and Pines et al.(1978).
Whatever the instrument, whatever the method, the prevailing 
influence on this type of research is the yardstick of school 
science and the ’barrier’ of student’s intuitive theories. 
Methodologies are directed and orchestrated by the perception that 
misconceptions can be put right by better teaching strategies 
which are more effective at getting school science over to the 
student.
In contrast to the latter group of 'conceptual pedagogues’ a 
number of research workers investigating children’s science can be 
thought of as 'conceptual ecologists'. Again specific research 
interests go hand in hand with methodological options. Interview 
techniques, laboratory observations and written tests are also 
commonly used by these workers. However, in their attempts to 
capture student’s conceptions there is a concern not to influence 
those conceptions (although various aids may be used to capture 
the child’s imagination and stimulate discussion) a consideration 
which acknowledges the power of misology and affirms the perceived 
importance of student conceptions in their own right rather than 
describing them as the products of inattention or misunderstanding. 
Driver (1983) using classroom observation and audio recordings of 
student discussion has developed a research methodology which is
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closely related to school learning situations. By analysing 
transcripts of student dialogue she focuses on the explanatory 
adequacy of children’s intuitive theories and their ability to 
explain natural phenomena as perceived by the student. Gilbert et 
al (1981) and Watts (1982) using an Interview about Instance (IAI) 
approach conducted interviews with students. Using pictorial 
representations of instances and non-instances of concepts to 
elicit student conceptions these workers were able to describe a 
range of intuitive theories held by individual students. Researchers 
using this technique pay great attention to the student’s own 
language and are reluctant to paraphrase the child's descriptions 
of natural phenomena. IAI methods can be likened to 'case studies’ 
of student understanding where interviewer and interviewee 
negotiate meanings far words and critical comment and evaluation 
are avoided; the emphasis being on open discussion and the 
importance of the student’s own viewpoint. Concern that this method 
might be sensitive to interviewer bias, Gilbert and Pope (1982) 
explored the nature of the interviewers influence on the 
conceptions produced by groups of children. Video tapes were made 
of small groups of ten to twelve year olds discussing IAI style 
cards concerning energy. These workers noted that in the presence 
of an interviewer certain types of questions seemed to evoke 
particular 'frameworks', When left alone in their groups Gilbert and 
Pope describe how the children produced a rich set of conceptions 
and maintained a debate about the adequacy of their ideas based on 
their own experiences. These workers commented that this 
adaptation of IAI methods seemed to produce a more realistic and
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spontaneous environment in which children could discuss their 
intuitive theories, and that without the prompting of an adult the 
children were free to talk at their own level, at their own pace 
and in a direction determined by their own interests and 
experiences.
Osborne (1981) describes a single lesson procedure in which 
students are encouraged to think through a practical investigation 
from initial planning to prediction of results. Using their own 
conceptions students were then encouraged to discuss their ideas 
and then implement them in experimental procedures. Working in 
groups students record and discuss their results and suggest 
further experiments. Much of this activity is carried out in open 
class discussion where individuals can relate and Interchange their 
ideas with those of other learners. Solomon (1983) has used 
recordings of classroom discussion to investigate the flow of ideas 
between students and the effects of consensus on student learning,
Conceptual ecologists place great emphasis on conversational 
methods and the individual beliefs of students, Criticism that this 
method merely generates information of an anthropological nature, 
unrelated to school learning and nebulous in terms of informing 
teaching, fails to recognise the constructivist underpinnings of 
this research (the Personal Construct Theory of George Kelly in 
particular). Research methods used by conceptual ecologists reflect 
a viewpoint which allows students to play an active part in the 
construction of their personal theories, to make judgements as to 
their validity, to listen to the opinion of others, and to change or 
not to change their ideas to those held by other students or by
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their science teacher. Interviews, transcripts of group discussion 
and video recordings of student activities are not instantly 
identifiable as being relevant to the classroom However,if learning 
has anything to do with communication, sharing ideas, and 
subjecting those ideas to trial, discussion and modification then 
these research methods are highly relevant to all teaching and 
learning environments.
In summarising this section on research methods the phrase
i »"its not what you do ,its the way that you do it " seems 
particularly relevant. In judging the utility of research methods or 
selecting particular designs of instrument the researcher must 
carefully consider where his interests lie, his perceptions of the 
problem and those of his audience, as well as the practicality of 
using particular methods. The ultimate choice or design of a 
method cannot be taken as a reliable indicator of relevance or 
utility until it is matched with a resonant set of epistemological 
and theoretical commitments.
3.2 Research into Children's Conceptions of Inheritance: The Design 
of an Appropriate Methodology,
On the basis of a personal commitment to the constructivist 
theories of learning described above, and the naturalistic methods 
of research adopted by conceptual ecologists, my initial 
investigations into children’s conceptions of inheritance were much 
influenced by the research methods of workers who shared this
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commitment. In this respect the Interview about Instance approach 
(Gilbert, Osborne and Fensham 1981) was the starting point for my 
research design. IAI has been used extensively to study children’s 
intuitive theories. Using audio and/or video recordings of dyadic 
discussions with students, focused by a series of picture cards, 
researchers have elicited student conceptions in a range of content 
areas such as light, energy, characteristics of living things, 
gravity, and force. Much of the research using this technique 
(particularly the group based at the University of Surrey) has been 
carried out within a naturalistic paradigm of research and has been 
guided by a constructivist epistemology. The IAI approach extends 
the format of Piagetian clinical interview by giving students 
greater freedom of response within a wider contextual frame; a 
frame constrained only by the limits of their experience and their 
imagination.
IAI approaches using picture cards (Vatts 1981) or observable 
phenomena (Erickson 1979) offer relevant and interesting content 
to the student and encapsulate it within a task situation. This 
provides an interface between interviewer and interviewee which 
diffuses suggestibility and provides a reference base on which to 
ground shared meanings. In this respect the most critical element 
of all interview strategies is the interviewer himself. Interviewers 
require to have a good knowledge of the content area of the 
investigation as well as an empathetic feeling for the meaning 
structures of the student. The skilled interviewer's use of dialogue 
and questions and answers is the background on which student 
conceptions acquire their tone and perspective. In essence the
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interviewer using IAI methods seeks to understand conceptions 
which are not his own, in so doing he is required to walk a narrow 
path between convergent questions which keep the interview on 
track, areas of suggestibility where he may influence the nature of 
student responses, and divergent questions which may reveal the 
diversity of the student’s conceptual conceptual system. Planned or 
structured interviews may enable interviewers to determine the 
route taken by interviewees, however one of the strengths of the 
IAI approach is that its loose structure often leads to Interesting 
'excursions' into realms of meaning which can never be anticipated.
In order to develop a personal perspective on these research 
methods, a pilot study was undertaken. The aims of my pilot study 
were
a) to learn interviewing skills whilst developing an 
understanding of how children perceived the notion of family 
traits and inheritance,
b) to develop an effective elicitation procedure based on IAI 
technique which would give me access to children’s conceptions 
of inheritance,
c) to develop a research method which would be sensitive to 
those features of conceptual ecologies which affect conceptual 
change in students,
d) to identify a group of students who were capable of 
becoming co-participants in my main study, ie, who would enjoy 
the research activities, would have good levels of engagement 
with the activities, and would be able to communicate their 
ideas in a natural and unhindered way, and
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e) to provide an environment for the ongoing development and
refinement of methodologies,
3.3 Design of IAI 'Inheritance' Cards.
The design of IAI card decks is traditionally focused on 
situations which may or may not represent an example of the 
concept. Underpinning the drawings/pictures on the cards is a 
concern to depict in some elemental form the essence and 
application of the concept in a particular set of contexts. The 
concept of inheritance is a complex one, but basically it involves 
the relation between parents and offspring and the transmission of 
inherited traits. Using the mouse as a model organism a set of 
cards were designed which focused on the phenotypic traits of 
parents and their offspring. At a theoretical level (not explicitly 
refered to in the cards) the card design was based on the 
dominance and recessiveness of characteristics in simple 
monohybrid crosses involving black and white mice. A large number 
of genes affect coat colour in mice, C b.eing the fundamental colour 
gene necessary for the production of any pigment at all. In a 
recessive form c, this leads to an albino condition no matter what 
other characters are present. Black colour is determined by the 
dominant gene B.
It was elected to use the mouse as a exemplar of inherited 
characteristics in that it is a familiar pet, a well known 
character in books and cartoons, as well as being one of the 
classic organisms of genetics. In this respect human or plant
genetics were also candidates for inclusion, however the mouse 
seemed in the former instance less controversial in terms of race 
and sex issues, and in the case of the latter less arcane and more 
relevant to everyday experience, (not everyone is aware of the 
differences between smooth and wrinkled peas - they are all Birds 
Eye anyway). The triadic method of elicitation used in conjunction 
with repetory grid techniques (Pope and Keen 1982) appeared to 
offer an interesting format for unstructured interviews and it was 
decided that a combination of pictorial and triadic methods of 
elicitation might have considerable utility in the design of IAI 
cards.
After some pre-testing with the children of colleagues the 
following format emerged, A set of 12 cards were designed each one 
depicting a set of mouse parents. Below each parental set appeared 
drawings of three 'baby* mice. The colouring of all the mice was 
initially kept to black or white or spotted (black and white) the 
aim being to keep the drawings as simple as possible. The task 
associated with the cards was for the student to decide on the
basis of being told that each ’family’ had two ’babies’, which two
offspring belonged to the parents or which one didn’t. On the basis 
of the students choice, questions could be asked about why they had 
made a particular selection. At a superficial level the cards 
depicted a variety of 'crosses’ but fundamentally they centred on 
the differences between offspring produced by parents of the same 
colour and those in which the parents were of two different colours
. In order to study student reaction to situations where parents of
the same colour give rise to babies of different colour, some of
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the cards depicted situations where the child had to choose a baby 
mouse which was a different colour from its parents, eg. two black 
parents were associated with two white and one black baby.
Although this triadic method of elicitation tended to restrict 
student choice to the coloured offspring presented on the card, it 
was an effective focus for discussion and debate between the 
interviewer and interviewee.
3.4 Interviews,
After negotiations with head teachers and their staff 
interviews using these cards were arranged in primary, middle and 
secondary schools with students in the age range of 7-16.
Interviews were conducted on a one to one basis and in private. The 
children were told that the research was aimed at helping teachers 
and students understand how pupils went about solving problems.
The interviews were anonymous and the students were assured that 
although it was a problem situation it was not a test nor would 
their teacher be in any way involved. The interviewer also stressed 
that the task problems were "not like maths problems" because 
there were no right or wrong answers, only different ways of 
seeing the problem. The permission of the students was sought to 
record the interview on audio tape and they were given details of 
what would be done with the tape. A small lapel type microphone 
placed on the table and a dictaphone style recorder were used to 
minimise the effect of equipment on the informal atmosphere 
created by the researcher. Children coming along to interviews were
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selected by their teachers from those whose parents had given 
agreement for their involvement in the study. In selecting the 
students, teachers were asked to choose a range^personalities and 
'abilities’. Although there must have been a tendency to send ’good’ 
students to interview, I felt happy that a good cross-section of 
the class were turning up at the sessions. In most cases the whole 
class came to interview and teacher selection was based not on who 
should come, but on when. was the most opportune time for 
individuals to leave their class work. The conversations with 
students lasted from 20 to 30 minutes, this included some general 
chat at the beginning and end of the session. The aim of the 
interview was to conduct a non-evaluative, reflexive, and open 
discussion; emphasis was given to establishing a good rapport with 
the student. Interviews were focused by the card deck and this 
provided a basis on which to extend the conversation in ways which 
reflected the interests of the researcher. As student and 
researcher made their way through the cards replicates of previous 
instances were encountered. These were phenotypic ’negatives' of 
earlier cards and allowed the interviewer to challenge and revisit 
previous aspects of the student explanations,
During the course of this pilot study 65 students drawn from 
four schools were interviewed and as the research progressed the 
order of presentation and the content of the interview was 
reviewed. In addition to the cards depicting mouse 'families’, a 
picture of cows and their offspring and dogs and puppies was 
included in the task format; the question being once again to 
identify the 'babies’ /offspring. At a later stage a pictorial
- 104 -
representation of a mouse family tree was used to describe 
generations of mice and their offspring. This picture was used at 
the end of the interview and the children were asked to describe 
what they thought the drawing was meant to represent.
3.5 Outcomes of the Pilot Study
Initially interviews were transcribed in full, providing a 
basis for analysis as well as developing transcribing skills and 
an awareness of its associated difficulties. After ten interviews 
had been analysed in this way, transcription gave way to a less 
formal method of analysis as the amount of data increased. This 
approach involved a research notebook containing summaries of each 
interview annotated directly from tapes. During the pilot study 
analysis was much influenced by the received biological viewpoint 
and centred an ’framework spotting’. In hindsight, this was a 
rather restricted outlook but as with the research methods which 
were to develop from this preliminary study, this outlook on data 
analysis did much to shape the character of the main study. I will 
not discuss the details of children’s conceptions of inheritance at 
this point as I intend to give a more detailed description of these 
ideas in the context of my main study. Suffice to say that the 
process of interviewing and listening did much to enhance my own 
awareness of the child’s point of view and to acquaint me with the 
descriptive vocabulary and the meanings used by a range of 
children when talking about inheritance. Interviews allow the 
researcher to follow up 'interesting' responses, and in this respect
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over a period of time with a large number of children a feeling for 
meaning can be developed; not that you can ever be certain that you 
share a child's frame of reference.
The dyadic interview in itself is a powerful research 
methodology, coupled with an IAI type elicitation procedure it was 
very successful in creating for the researcher stimulating, 
enjoyable, and revealing conversations with students. However, as 
the pilot study developed and my own expertise improved, the 
convergent, selective probing of my questions, albeit against a 
background of open and divergent discussion, had a considerable 
impact on the nature of interview. Gilbert and Pope (1982) in 
describing "the interviewer effect" draw attention to how types of 
question can cue specific types of response in terms of student 
frameworks. Although the transcripts of my interviews have no 
specific instance of this type of question - response relationship, 
as the pilot study proceeded and my own interviewing skills were 
refined, there was a growing awareness of how my inputs, 
challenges, reflections, clarification, reiterations and summations 
modified the quality and quantity of the child's responses. This 
developmental perspective highlighted the process whereby the 
'target' conceptions of the researcher are progressively exposed to 
the interviewee and how this leads to increasing congruity between 
the researcher's viewpoint and that of the student, ie. the 
researcher's viewpoint 'becomes' that of the student. This meeting 
of minds seemed to me to be based on points of contact rather than 
areas of overlap, where ideas were being bounced off the researcher
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by the student in order to determine the direction of the 
conversation and the nature of the hidden agenda.
The influence of the interviewer is an inevitable consequence 
of moving research away from a purely observational mode toward a 
more interactive pasture. In naturalistic-ecological research the 
ideal is always to have a minimal effect on the system being 
studied, nevertheless this cost-benefit aspect of interview-based 
research has to be balanced against the aims of the research. Given 
that my interviews were designed to reveal intuitive theories about 
inheritance, that my hidden agenda was to focus on those 
phenomena, and that this illumination of the child's conception had 
to be done in a short interview session, then it is inevitable that 
the interviewer will. influence the student. This effect would seem 
to be entirely acceptable in the context of studies aimed at 
describing student competence and their ability to use a range of 
conceptions of inheritance. However, if the focus of research is the 
natural conceptual ecologies used by children in everyday thinking 
and discussion ,then this approach may be inappropriate. If 
research is concerned with interactions between a child’s existing
t
intuitive theories, then the influence of the interviewers own 
specific interest in aspects of inheritance may obscure more 
childrens conceptions than it reveals. Cognitively, children in 
discussion with an adult are fragile entities, and if we seek to 
investigate the fine structure of their understanding in natural 
learning environments, then we may have to use a research 
instrument whose interaction with their conceptual ecologies is of
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an order of magnitude which stimulates rather than conditions 
student responses.
The design of the IAI type cards and the triadic elicitation 
procedure were successful in terms of stimulating discussion, 
focusing activities and diluting the "strangeness” of the interview 
setting. However, the restricted choice imposed on the student by 
the ’rules' of selecting two baby mice, and the fact that the mice 
were either black, white or spotted seemed to frustrate a number of 
the children. Having to make a choice in this way was a major 
constraint on their imagination and tended to reduce the openness 
of the conversation. The interviewer’s request " which two baby 
mice do you think belong to these parents" fallowed by "why do 
you think it was those two" seemed to short circuit the discussion 
at a level where the student was having to justify a choice which 
to a certain extent he was 'forced' into making. This aspect of the 
task situation seemed to be suboptimal and in need of revision.
The mouse as a model system proved to be sufficiently abstract 
and unfamiliar to allow speculative and hypothetical thinking by 
the student to occur, yet familiar enough to encourage the use of 
the student’s everyday experiences of inhertance.
The pilot study involved a wide age range of students in 
primary, middle and secondary schools. The younger students aged 
7-10 were keen co-participants in the project and they provided an 
interesting range of ideas and theories in relation to the problem 
task; indeed they were no less capable than the older students in 
their ability to engage with the problem and to theorise about 
possible solutions. However, with the younger children the choice
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of the baby mice was the central focus of their activities, and 
once selected there seemed less of a need from their point of view 
to explain that choice. If pressed they would come up with a 
rationale behind a selection but this often seemed to me to be 
'superfluous' in terms of their reading of what the interview was 
about. This behaviour was much less common with the older children 
although it was observed with some of them. Through the ages of 11 
- 16 the students were more inclined to present a concerted 
approach whereby they linked their choices to consistent theories 
of action. However, with many of the older children particularly 
those following exam syllabuses with a genetics, health education, 
inheritance component, there was a great deal of concern to choose 
the 'correct' mice, in spite of being told there was no right or 
wrong answer. In more than one case, at the end of the session I 
found myself and the student engaged in an a d  h o c revision session 
based on the "Laws of Inheritance". The feeling that there was a 
definite solution to the problem haunted many of these older 
students, particularly the specialist biologists. This concern did 
not prevent the older students discussing a range of intuitive 
theories with the researcher, but it tended to change the character 
of the interview from a free and open discussion toward a 'set 
piece* evaluative test of understanding, ie. they had accepted the 
idea of a 'scientific truth’ and/or the utility of a 'correct* answer 
in the context of a 'test'.
Early on in the pilot study children from middle schools in 
the age range 11-13 seemed to me to be a group of students whose 
engagement with the task and the interview was often optimal. They
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were often "naive biologists" in that they had had no formal 
introduction to concepts of inheritance and they were generally a 
confident group of children able to settle quickly into a 
productive rapport with the interviewer. Lastly, many seemed to 
enjoy the interview experience and appeared to relate meaningfully 
to the situation. One other facet of middle schools as a research 
environment was the ease of access to students; when compared with 
secondary schools the flexibility of their timetables and the 
absence of external exam pressures made the process of negotiating 
access to students much easier and less time consuming. Middle 
schools still demanded letters to parents and formal approaches to 
education authorities etc., however once access had been negotiated 
a productive period of research was almost guaranteed.
On the basis of my pilot studies I concluded that various 
explanations were used by children to account for the transmission 
of inherited characteristics and that this was indeed a fertile 
area for my main study into children’s intuitive theories of 
inheritance. The IAI type of approach used in the pilot study 
seemed suboptimal in terms of investigating the normal range of 
conceptions used by children. What seems to be called for is an 
elicitation procedure which causes a level of perturbation in 
student conceptual ecologies consistent with the intensity of 
normal learning situations. This consideration would be reflected 
in a desire on the part of the researcher to minimise the influence 
of methodological factors which could have a potentially radical 
effect on the quality and quantity of interactions within 
conceptual ecologies. Eleven to thirteen year olds in middle
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schools were identified as a group of children whose accessibility 
and engagement with the inheritance tasks made them excellent co­
participants. These findings and considerations, coupled with an 
improved awareness of children’s personal theorising, were to 
become the central determinants of the elicitation procedures, 
tasks and methods used in my main study.
3.6 Main Study - The School Setting
The school setting has always been the desired context for my 
research. However, this necessitates that the researcher make a 
number of decisions affecting the form of that research. The 
investigation of children’s conceptions in a school setting can 
take a number of forms, One method is to gather information about 
conceptions within the working classroom, with the research 
instrument as part of the everyday work of the class. Using 
individual microphones the researcher can 'eavesdrop* on student 
discussions during practical, group work or normal class activity. 
Technically this is a difficult procedure made even more complex if 
video taping is also part of the research technique. The classroom 
milieu, the sounds generated by class activity and the extraneous 
noises which surround every classroom, is capable of defeating the 
most comprehensive recording equipment and makes the analysis of 
classroom recordings extremely difficult if not impossible. In an 
effort to overcome these technical problems many researchers have 
sought to isolate groups of children in 'laboratory' type
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classrooms where recording and observation can be optimised. This 
extraction technique can be very successful (Gilbert and Pope
1982), but requires preplanning and experience on the part of the 
researcher . The artificiality of these 'studio* environments and 
the fact that the children have been transported from their normal 
classrooms, makes it imperative that time and effort is invested in 
giving the students time to acclimatize to the situation. This may 
involve the researcher, the students and the school in a 
considerable investment of time, energy and resources.
A compromise arrangement, between the classroom setting and 
the studio, and the prefered methodology of my main study, is the 
extraction of groups of students to 'quiet' areas close to their 
classroom (usually an adjacent classroom which was not being used) 
where audio and video equipment had been ,set up previously. 
Technically this arrangement gave excellent results, although in 
keeping with other extraction techniques, qualifications have to be 
made about the transferability of findings to actual classroom 
situations. The primacy of the spoken word in this type of research 
and the need to have good recordings of student talk limits the 
number of degrees of methodological freedom; research in this field 
will by necessity be a trade-off between artificiality and realism 
in terms of the selection and creation of a research environment.
3.7 The Selection of Children
No specific ‘type* of child was involved in my research. VRQ, 
performance grades etc., were not used to select individuals.
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Children participating in the study were selected by their class 
teachers with the proviso that they were not to be ad hoc 'super 
groups’ put together especially for the purpose of the research. 
Teachers were told that there was no evaluative sub-plot or 
’hidden’ aspect to the work and that the prime consideration was to 
listen to what children had to say about inheritance problems. 
Teacher selection was most often motivated by the social and 
behavioural attributes of the groups. Friendship/working groups 
were the most common basis for selection, but on several occasions 
teachers put together groups of children on an experimental basis 
uncertain of ’’how they would get on”. The methodology used in my 
main study required groups of three children to work together on a 
task, this number representing the minimum group size and such 
technical considerations as being able to discriminate individual 
voices in audio recordings where group members often spoke 
simultaneously. The groups of middle school children chosen were 
always from the same class or year group and they tended to come 
to the sessions in natural working groups or friendship groups. In 
all of the middle school participating in my study, group work was 
a natural classroom activity and many of the children involved in 
the study were experienced in this method of working. Arranging to 
sit in on lessons was not difficult to negotiate once the nature of 
the researchers presence was made clear. Indeed, the researcher in 
these circumstances becomes more often than not another teaching 
resource within the classroom. Groups were sometimes single sex 
and sometimes mixed. The children involved in the main study 
represented a range of personal, interpersonal and cognitive styles.
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Given that there is no such thing as an average child or group of 
children, the students in this study were on the basis of my own 
teaching experiences mostly able, well adjusted, healthy children of 
European origin drawn from caring educational and social 
backgrounds. This ethnography was a product of social geography 
and opportunity rather than deliberate research policy. By taking 
whole class groups from mixed ability sets a reasonable level of 
group diversity was achieved within the limits described above.
3.8 The Task.
The nature of this methodology and instrumentation was based 
on the findings of previous pilot studies. The instrument was 
presented to the children in the form of a problem task consisting 
of three elements, The problems related to the prediction of the 
phenotypes (observable characteristics) of first generation 
offspring in situations where they were given or chose the parental 
phenotypes. Each group member was given a set of twelve large 
cards (Appendix I), each one featuring a coloured ’cut-out1 of two 
mice (the parents) showing their phenotype in some detail. The 
selection and production of these cards and the colour of mouse 
families were based on actual strains of mice and real life 
crosses. The strains of mice appearing in the cards were Agouti 
(wild type), Albina, Black, Black and Tan, Brown and Grey. Coat 
colour in the mouse pictures also depicted variations of coat 
colour within these strains showing the action of dilution genes. 
This referent introduced a much wider variety of mouse coat colours
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and this was consistent with the outcomes of the pilot study. In 
this way greater choice and variety of phenotype gave students 
more flexibility and realism in their predictions. Some of the 
cards displayed an additional feature consisting of an ’extra' cut­
out depicting one of the offspring derived from the parental cross 
shown on the card. Each student received an identical set of cards 
arranged in an identical order. Each set of cards used a different 
coloured background to aid identification on video and to enhance 
the appearance of the cards. The task was introduced to the group 
in the form of a problem which required them to "find the missing 
children". The group were told that the mice on the card 
represented "a family which had lost some of its children", (the 
approximate number of lost children was decided upon in 
negotiation with group, somewhere between four and six.) The 
problem for the children was to visually identify the offspring or 
as it was described to the group, "find the missing baby mice" in a 
box of missing babies containing over 200 cut-outs of various mice 
with different coat colours. Each cut-out in the box represented a 
possible missing offspring and the children were encouraged to 
empty them out and find the estranged babies. Each of these cut­
outs was backed by a velcro pad which allowed the students to 
stick or unstick their selections to the card. The search for 
missing mice and the sticking and unsticking of choices encouraged 
a great deal of collaborative activity and debate amongst the 
group. Motivation and engagement with this task was immediate in 
the majority of cases and this activity was both a successful
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elicitation procedure and an effective way of raising the student's 
awareness of inheritance.
As each member of the group made their way through the cards 
(most groups started off working in unison, some maintained this 
throughout, others worked in a more individual way), the order of 
presentation of the first few cards was designed to coincide with 
the most common conceptions of inheritance illuminated by the 
pilot studies. This possible ’garden path’ was interrupted by the 
subsequent presentation of potentially, counterintuitive, anomalous 
offspring eg, two brown parents were shown with one of their 
albino offspring. This type of card was not designed to produce 
some form of cognitive disonance but to provide a potential focus 
for student discussion and debate in which one students existing 
theories might be challenged by another, I saw this as a 
significant development of the challenges and debates stimulated by 
the interview method of the pilot study, in that these discussions 
were at the level of the students and phrased in their terms, in 
their vocabulary and in their own particular style. Throughout this 
activity, ’replicate’ cards with the same basic crosses as previous 
cards were encountered. In these cases the phenotypes were always 
different and the greater variety of coat colours used in this 
activity made them less obvious and more effective at eliciting 
more discussion rather than ’’we’ve done this one before its just 
the same as that last one”.
On completion of this task the children were invited to read a 
’’solution” to the previous activity. This second phase of the 
research instrument represented a form of comprehension task. The
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text given to the children to read was a reasonably complex factual 
description of Mendel's Law of Dominance (although not explicitly 
mentioned in the text) as it relates to the phenotypes of mice in 
the initial task (Appendix II). The information contained in the 
text gave the children, at least in theory, the ability to predict 
the phenotypes of offspring given the parental phenotypes. (no 
frequency data was included in the text). This element of the 
research instrument was in no way intended to teach the students 
the principles of genetics, but was designed to
a) keep the format of the activities interesting by 
interposing a different activity between two similar ones,
b) to change the nature of the activity to maintain 
motivation,
c) to illuminate the ways that they tried to make sense of 
the text and its relationship with the ideas that that had 
expressed in the first activity and,
d) to observe how a potentially interactive notion such as 
dominance might align itself with existing conceptual 
ecosystems. This facet of the design is derived from the 
Vygotskian (1978) "functional method of double stimulation" in 
which the way an object or an idea is drawn into a problem 
solving situation is observed. It was hoped that in this way 
the researcher might gain an insight into the existing 
conceptual ecosystem of the student and develop an 
understanding of how it interacts with student comprehension 
of related problems.
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The third and final element of the task was carried out by the 
children in the group after they had finished their reading. This 
phase involved a similar problem to the first task but was based 
on the construction of a mouse family tree. This open-ended task 
has identical characteristics to the first activity where students 
predict the phenotype of offspring, but it has, potentially at 
least, an added dimension of family lineages. The group were 
invited to use the cut-outs from the previous task and to work 
together on the creation of the family tree. One large board with a 
family tree skeleton was given to the group, and this provided a 
central focus for group activity, collaboration and interaction 
(Appendix III). Once again the velcro pads enabled the group to 
change their selections as they constructedd the family tree. A 
record of the group’s effort was made at the end of the session to 
aid subsequent analysis (Appendix IV)
The design of these tasks reflects a change of emphasis 
between my pilot study and the main study. In an effort to 
minimise the influence of interviewer effects on children’s 
conceptions the tasks are orientated toward the creation and 
maintenance of autonomous group discussion in an interviewerless 
situation. The major concern is to provide an opportunity for 
children to ask one another about their conceptions and to give 
each member of the group the chance to try out their ideas and 
predictions. The aim of the researcher is to gain access to 
individual conceptual ecosystems through the dialogue and the 
interactions of the children. On a continuum of research styles 
from observational to interventionist, this design seeks to enhance
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the quality of observation through increased interaction at the 
level of the participants.
3.9 The Task Situation and Procedures.
Children taking part in the study were selected by their class 
teacher and withdrawn from the classroom, Usually they were given 
advance notice of their participation but little detail about the 
nature of the activity. Consequently the children arrived in the 
"quiet area" with many preconceptions about what they were going to 
be doing (many of these were based on vague ideas derived from 
what had been said by classmates who had already participated in 
the study, "something to do with mice"). In the main, the students 
arrived 'cold' with little real idea of what the activity was about. 
After formal introductions by the class teacher I was left alone 
with the students. Ideally I would have liked to have introduced 
the tasks and then left the children completely alone during the 
task activity, but in all four schools this was seen to be less 
than desirable and it was prefered that I should be close by and 
in earshot, and that the children should be aware of this. In the 
light of this constraint I decided it better to be in the room with 
the students rather than to be seen ’lurking’ about nearby.
The students were seated at a desk or table with chairs 
arranged in a horseshoe pattern the intention being to enhance eye 
to eye contact; the children more often than not migrated from this 
position to one where they worked side by side facing the camera.
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The nature of the research project was explained to the children in 
the following way
Rchr. "Did Ms Smith say why I wanted you to come along today"
Stds, "No   eh something to do with mice"
Rchr. "Thats right... .what I want you to do is to try and solve some
problems which concern mice "
Stds, (worried glances)
Rchr. "Don’t worry these aren't difficult problems. The problems I 
want you to solve today have no right or wrong answers, only
different ways of seeing the problem. I am interested in how you go
about doing the problem . Why I want to know is because if we know 
how you went about it, then we can tell other boys and girls and 
their teachers how best to go about doing these problems."
The group were told that I wanted to video record the session 
and that this record of their activities would not be seen by their 
teacher or their classmates unless they wanted them to see it. They 
were told that the video record would help me understand how they 
had gone about solving the problem.
The group were introduced to the first task; every opportunity 
was taken to settle the children and to familiarise them with scene 
around them. Often we would discuss technical matters about the 
video and they enjoyed seeing themselves on the monitor. Depending 
on the group I would draw their discussion together after 
completion of the first two cards asking open ended non suggestive 
questions to make sure that they had understood the nature of the 
task. This chat continued the process of acclimatization before 
letting them go on by themselves. Vhile working on the first two
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cards there was much debate about how they looked on TV and this 
awareness of the camera/audience produced many performance 
behaviours. During this period the monitor was left in view and 
they were able to make faces etc. On completion of cards one and 
two a playback session was used to continue the process of coming 
to terms with the technical features of the method. The children 
enjoyed this and used it as an insult session joking with each 
other about hair and noses etc. This period of acclimatization took 
up to 15 minutes but it was time well spent in terms of overcoming 
the group’s embarrassment and anxiety at being the focus of 
attention. It was noticeable in many of the groups that during this 
period voice levels increased and a more confident persouna 
emerged as they became familiar with the situation.
The TV camera (a small portable unit of modern design) 
(Appendix V) was positioned as far away from the group as 
passible but in plain sight of all three students. Once the camera 
was focused on the group it was left alone, a fixed position being 
used throughout the session. The tightness of the frame on the 
group was a compromise between getting a good view of what they 
doing and keeping lively children in shot. Sound recording was 
achieved using an extension microphone of the lapel type feeding 
the video recorder, and a separate audio tape recorder as backup. 
The two small microphones were positioned in front of the group.
No attempt was made to conceal the equipment only to reduce its 
impact on the local environment.
The students were left to complete the first task at their own 
pace. Inevitably there were interruptions and distractions as with
normal class activities however a high level of task engagement 
was achieved. The duration of this phase was of the order of 20-30 
mins. On completion there was a very short ’debriefing* the intent 
being not to elicit more information but to draw the activity to a 
close, to thank and praise the group and give them a breather. The 
next activity, that of reading the prepared text was usually 
introduced in the following manner
"that was well done can I tell you what I want you to do
next. When this problem was given to some boys and girls in the 
secondary school they used a set of rules to help them decide 
which mouse belonged to which family. Before we do the last 
problem today which is a bit like the first one, I would like you 
to read some of the rules that they used to see what you think of 
them and whether they might be useful in solving these kinds of 
problems."
The text was contained in a flip card booklet (Appendix II) 
which made it easy for each student to move readily through the 
contents. Reading styles varied; some read out loud to each other , 
some in silence and some in unison. Some groups discussed their 
reading in the context of the previous problem while others moved 
quickly from page to page scanning the contents. The text 
information was presented in the style of ’key facts' and reading 
took between 5 and 10 minutes.
The family tree problem was presented on completion of the 
reading task. Many of the children recognised the format of the 
problem having experienced historical manifestations of family 
trees relating to kings and queens (usually Henry VIII or the
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present Royal Family). With the help of the group I would go over 
one or two branches of the tree in a random fashion to 
refamiliarise them with the conventions of laying out the tree and 
haw my skeleton tree gave the information about offspring numbers 
etc. The basic familiarity of the children with this format made 
these sessions more confirmatory rather than instructive. With all 
three students working together on this task, this activity was a 
lively forum for debate and collaboration. Engagement with the task 
was excellent in spite of the fact that they had been working 
together for nearly 45 minutes. On completion of this final 
activity a debriefing session took place although this was often 
terminated by the school bell. The debriefing was not a mini­
interview but an opportunity to give the children a brief summary 
of their achievement and leave them with a positive attitude 
towards their efforts. Any outstanding concerns or problems were 
dealt with before a playback session was organized (usually at the 
end of the school day). To my knowledge no child found their 
participation in the study to be any less than an interesting and 
enjoyable experience. The study involved 30 groups of three 
children drawn from four middle schools. The schools were in 
predominately urban settings with a catchment area populated by 
mainly white middle class families. Nevertheless, most teachers 
felt that students in this study were closer to a ‘comprehensive’ 
population rather than a ’selective’ one, and as such, were a fair 
cross section of 11 to 12 year old bays and girls.
3.10 Transcription of Tapes.
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The transcription of tapes is a very difficult and time 
consuming process; this fact was amply illustrated during my pilot 
studies and it was a major concern when the decision to use 
interviewer less group discussions was taken. When compared with 
the 'simplicity* of the one-to-one interview and the luxury of 
transcribing one voice at a time, group sessions had children 
talking simultaneously, children who sounded alike, noise from a 
variety of sources, children speaking softly, all elements which 
made the transcription process less than straight-forward. However, 
against this background the use of video recordings did much to 
minimise the problems of trying to decide who was saying what and 
what it was they were saying. Audio tapes were used as a back up 
in my study and when listened to in isolation it was difficult to 
make out what a child was saying or who was actually speaking, 
However, when the audio sequence was matched with the video 
recording and the visual channel was open to the transcriber 
difficulties were substantially reduced.
The basic transcription procedure was to go through the audio 
tape record first and make a rough draft of the group session.
This process left many gaps, question marks and uncertainties in 
the transcript but it allowed the researcher to concentrate on what 
was being said, With the video tape record one often felt caught 
between watching and listening, especially in the early stages of 
transcription. After the preparation of a rough draft the video 
tape was used to refine its accuracy and to annotate the session.
It is difficult to measure this level of refinement in quantitative 
terms, certainly it dramatically reduced the number of doubts about
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what was said and who was saying it, but at another level it made 
a qualitative difference to the transcripts in that the transcriber 
was now not just listening to children talking but was reliving the 
session. The qualitative approach to research places much stress on 
the meaningful'.ness, credibility and utility of the information 
gathered; the contribution of the video recording is that it 
expands the researcher’s interpretative base by creating an 
information channel which is considerably richer than that offered 
by audio recordings alone. A component of this richness must be 
the researchers access to non-verbal information but there is 
undoubtedly much more to this in terms of developing a feeling for 
the data. (In this latter respect I feel that as a result of the 
nature of my research it was important that all aspects of the 
transcription process should be carried out by the researcher). In 
refining the transcript a great deal of searching, replaying, and 
'freezing1 is carried out. A facility used in this research which 
made this process much easier, was to have an elapsed time display 
appear on the monitor screen. Used as a tape counter and in 
conjunction with a remote control unit this technical refinement 
made the review process much easier.
Transcribing tapes can be a major effort in the context of 
this type of research, however, it represents a means to an end in 
terms of providing a basis for data analysis. Transcripts are 
interpretations of situations seen through the eye of the 
researcher/transcriber, and as such they form part of the 
relationship with the subsequent methods of analysis used to ’make 
sense* of group discussions. In the following chapter I will
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selectively review some methods of discourse analysis as a way of 
developing a rationale for the analysis of my trancripts of group 
discussion.
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Dialogue, Interpersonal Communication and Conceptual Change
Chapter 4
4.1 Accessing Conceptions through Dialogue Transformation.
Many of the strategies used to gain an understanding of 
children's science have evolved from research instruments designed 
to access conceptions from interview data. The style of analysis in 
this research has often had as its focus the description and 
illumination of 'cognitive structures' embedded in discourse. 
Consequently, less attention has been given to those features of 
children's talk which play a part in the communication, adaptation 
and evolution of conceptions. In the following sections I will 
selectively review strategies used to 'uncover' conceptual systems 
in children’s talk, and compare these methods with alternative 
strategies of analysis which seek to understand the 'life histories' 
of conceptions through discourse. In subsequent sections I will 
argue that we may have to unite these methods of discourse 
analysis if we are to understand how children use their conceptions 
and adapt them in the light of experience.
4.2 Categories and Frameworks,
A method used by a number of research workers (Watts 1983,
Ault 1984b) is to reduce the unique and variable conceptions of 
individual students obtained through interview, to a finite number 
of alternative conceptions; the contention being that there is a 
strong derivative relationship between the scientific viewpoint 
and the alternative conceptions of children. Gilbert and Watts 
(1983) have made a case for varying levels of response
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transformation, from short summary descriptions which capture 
explicit and personalised meanings of individual conceptions, to 
’categories’ constructed on the basis of multiple data, and 
'frameworks' which represent generalised transcontextual 
characterizations derived from multiple sources of student 
response. A problem associated with this method of analysis 
discussed by Gilbert and Pope, (1982) and Engel, (1982) is the 
practical difficulty of containing 'mixed' student responses 
(written and verbal) within specific conceptual frameworks. This 
gives an insight into the complexity of interactions within 
conceptual systems and the problems of trying to isolate specific 
conceptions from a constellation of interrelated and idiosync. ratic 
ideas. The reduction of unique and variable conceptions to a finite 
number of frameworks has much utility in terms of data management 
and as a way of making teachers aware of the common 
'misconceptions' held by their students. However, if research is 
concerned with change, and how children's conceptions live out 
their lives within a conceptual ecosystem, then systems of analysis 
which depersonalise and decontextualise meaning are less than 
desirable. The creation of highly transformed 'categories' or 
'frameworks’ during discourse analysis may have its merits where 
research is focused on relations between orthodox science concepts 
and children's conceptions, or where the adaptation of the latter 
can be seen in terms of the reasoned and rational steps that 
transform children’s intuitive ideas into 'scientific* ones. However, 
if research is concerned with the fate of particular conceptions 
within a particular student's conceptual system, then the emphasis
- 129 -
of analysis is directed toward following the 'life' of that 
conception and the influences which affect its development. 
Consequently, this type of research will value analysis which 
focuses on the personalised conceptions of indivduals and the 
actions of the person, made evident through the use of language and 
discourse. Analysis at the general level of the framework and the 
category may give a representation of statements used by children, 
but they cannot capture the nature of discourse involving 
conceptions and therefore give little information about 
interactions between conceptions or between different conceptual 
ecosystems.
4.3 Concept Mapping and Conceptual Ecologies.
Concept mapping has already been discussed in the opening 
chapter of this thesis as a method used to gain access to 
children’s conceptions. However, it has also been deployed by a 
number of workers as a method of discourse analysis designed to 
give information about conceptual change and development. 
Characteristically, transcripts derived from interview studies have 
been transposed into a concept map which compares the students' 
understanding with that of an idealized scientific ’template'. This 
analysis focuses on how the student's concept map (and its assumed 
underlying cognitive structure) changes as the child learns 
specific concepts (children are asked to do a concept map once a 
term for example). These maps are ’freeze frames' of conceptual 
development which may reveal a great deal about the content of
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conceptual systems as children go through school, but very little 
about the interactions between these conceptions as they change. 
Concept mapping as a method of analysing conceptual change 
strategies tends to be dominated by the notion that if enough ’time 
slices' are taken through the process of concept development, 
researchers using a hierarchical ’template’ will be able to infer 
what has been happening to conceptions between successive maps.
In conjunction with these activities members of the Cornell 
Group (Ault, 1984b) have tried to codify natural language (as 
opposed to children’s concept maps or knowledge vees) and its 
semantic structure as a way of searching for and verifying the 
relationship between proposed hierarchical patterns of conceptual 
understanding and the organization of the learner's conceptual 
system. The Novice Science Semantics (NSS) of Ault (1984b) in this 
respect contends that changing contextual features observable in 
the semantic patterns used by students result in changing concepts 
and that concepts derive meaning from their role within a network 
of concepts. Unfortunately, this notion is diluted by Ault's system 
of analysis (NSS) which over-formalises the connectedness of 
concepts and meanings used by children; the impression being that 
these dimensions can be interrelated in a 'logical' network of 
hierarchical concepts. The effect of this epistemological 
commitment to concept hierarchies on discourse analysis can be 
likened to giving an amoeba a rigid skeleton and then trying to 
describe its activities as amoebic.
Paralleling these efforts to analyse the use of concepts by 
students and their relationship with conceptual organization,
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Posner, Strike, Hewson and Gertzag (1982) have articulated a method 
of analysis which emphasises how concepts change. Their 
categorization scheme of conceptual change conditions 
(dissatisfaction, intelligibility, plausibility, fruitfulness) and 
mechanisms of change (anomaly, metaphor, metaphysical belief) 
considers concepts as part of a conceptual ecology which influences 
the nature and direction of conceptual change. This analytical 
perspective is based on a theoretical and epistemological 
foundation derived from contemporary philosophy of science and the 
nature of change within scientific disciplines. Using complete 
descriptions, or examples of their categories drawn from transcript 
excerpts, these workers have tried to stress the interconnectedness 
between conceptions and the effects of knowledge and experience on 
these ideas. The category system used by Posner et al. (1982) 
reflects this group's commitment to an interactive model of change. 
However, the effectiveness of their data analysis is reduced by 
allowing these categories to take on a taxonomic role when applied 
to discourse analysis rather than to be used as a basis for 
studying interaction between categories and within the conceptual 
system itself. It would seem that the next step to take in terms of 
analysing children's conceptual organization and verifying the 
features influencing conceptual systems is the use of models which 
give a more dynamic picture of the activities of conceptual 
populations and tell us more about how they operate in specific 
learning situations. Children using conceptions to solve a problem 
or conduct a discussion reveal much about how conceptions function 
and how they connect with other viewpoints. Therefore we need to
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consider theoretical models which, when used in the analysis of 
conceptual systems, take into consideration the activities of the 
student (verbal/non-verbal) as well as placing those activities 
within a relevant model of conceptual change. In developing 
analytical models of the latter kind, the role of student discourse 
and its influence on conceptual systems would seem to be of great 
relevance and importance given that many of the learner's 
activities will be mediated by communication and discourse.
4,4 Analysis of Discourse - Conceptual Systems in Action.
Changing and adapting one’s conceptions is catalysed by the 
ability to communicate and receive ideas. In this respect a 
student’s ability to collaborate with others when solving problems, 
to see another’s point of view, to elicit and facilitate an 
exposition of differing viewpoints, and to use and appreciate 
’hypothetical’ speech modes, will influence the process of 
conceptual change.
Conceptual ecosystems are ’open* systems thus they are involved 
in and influenced by exchanges of information with the learning 
environment. This exchange of information will be based on the 
learner’s existing conceptualisations of natural phenomena which 
will be understood through the ongoing dialogue that he has with 
other learners as he relates these experiences and responds to the 
comments, observations and criticisms of others. Conceptual change 
does not occur simply because someone tells you 'how it really is', 
for in the first place you may not choose to say what you think
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and secondly you don't have to listen. Conceptual change has much 
more to do with the quality of interpersonal communication which 
not only gives the student access to alternative viewpoints but 
also provides an insight into his own belief system. Conceptual 
change strategies will embody activities in which there is an 
internal dialogue between the learner's conceptions and direct 
experience, but there also has to be an external articulation of 
these beliefs if the student is to evaluate the worth of these 
ideas to himself and to others. Conceptual change will thus have a 
great deal to do with the way the learner explains his conceptions 
to others, and how this discourse determines the range and the 
number of opportunities for conceptual change. In theory at least 
it is possible to visualise a situation where student discourse 
dominated by exploratory speech characteristics such as 
questioning, tentativeness, reflexivity, and self awareness. As well 
as the interpersonal linguistic skills of making qualifying 
statements, recapping, acknowledging the viewpoint of others and 
interrelating different ideas, might enhance the opportunities for 
conceptual change.
Methods of discourse analysis designed to illuminate this 
verbal and social interplay must try to capture both of these 
elements of children’s talk as well as the content on which the 
student’s activity is focused. Speech characteristics and the 
content of discourse are of course not isolates but interdependent 
components of interpersonal communication, and this is where the 
difficulties of analysis begin. Halliday (1978) has developed a 
system of discourse analysis with an orientation towards the form
- 134 -
of language and its semantic character in social situations. 
Halliday's (1978) analysis assumes a direct and parallel 
relationship between semantic systems and linguistic form, ie. it 
is theoretically possible to proceed from a sociological analysis 
of 'situation* types to an analysis of 'meaning potential* in a 
given situation, to an analaysis of 'functional components’ of this 
meaning potential, to an analysis of grammatical structures.
" Now it is very important to say that each of these systems, 
semantics, grammar, and phonolgy, is a system of potential, a 
range of alternatives. If we take the grammatical system, this 
is the system of what the speaker can say. This relates back 
to the previous point we were discussing - it seems to me 
unnecessary to talk about what the speaker knows; we don’t 
need to be concerned with what is going on in his head, we 
simply talk about an abstract potential. Vhat the speaker can 
say, ie., the lexicogrammatical system as a whole , operates as 
the realization of the semantic system, which is what the 
speaker can mean - what I refer to as the meaning potential.
I see language essentially as a system of meaning potential. 
Now, once we go outside the language, then we see that this 
semantic system is itself the realization of something beyond, 
which is what the speaker can do - I have referred to that as 
'behavioural potential*. I want to insist here that there are 
many different ways of going outside language; this is only one 
of them. Perhaps it would be better at this point to talk in 
terms of a general semiotic level: the semantic system, which 
is the meaning potential embodied in language, is itself the 
realization of a higher level semiotic which we may define as 
a behavioural system or more generally as a social semiotic. So 
when I say can do , I am specifically refering to the 
behavioural potential as a semiotic which can be encoded in 
language, or of course in other things too.”
Halliday's (1978) 'potentials' and his system of discourse
analysis generally ignore the diversity of meanings available to
individuals and groups. This diversity is highlighted by research
into children’s conceptions of natural phenomena where children are
seen to continuously negotiate their conceptions and interpersonal
beliefs, their social relationships and what they deem to be
relevant knowledge in a given context, Halliday’s approach may have 
some utility in formal linguistics but it lacks a dimension of 
analysis which would allow it to cope with the flexibility and 
imagination of children's talk; a feature characterstic of the 
cognitive and interpersonal dynamics of children’s conceptual 
systems.
Researchers interested in how children understand different 
viewpoints and how they reflect on their existing organizing 
principles in social situations have considerable problems in 
coping with the diversity of these personal and interpersonal 
domains of language. Consequently, the analysis of children’s 
discourse has focused on either situations where language is 
structured by situations such as the classroom (Eggleston et al, 
1976), or the analysis has imposed a set of a priori ’rules' by 
which to judge the nature of discourse. In the latter style, Toulmin 
et al, (1979) have developed a system of discourse analysis which 
focuses specifically on
"the critical procedures through which ideas are examined in 
competition with each other and judged by relevant criteria so 
as to make it possible for us to arrive at reasonable choices."
Toulmin et al, (1979) identify two uses of language with the labels 
instrumental and argumentative. Instrumental language achieves its 
purpose directly without the need for supporting argument, ie., it 
may take the form of an order, a direct request, or a complaint. By 
way of comparison, argumentative uses of language involves 
utterances that succeed or fail only to the extent that they can be
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supported by argument, evidence and reasoning. The claims and 
assertions of argumentative language give rise to what Toulmin et 
al. (1979) describe as "trains of reasoning" which if successful 
result in a person changing his view. Toulmin et al. (1979) locate 
these trains of reasoning in public, interpersonal and social 
situations.
"Whenever an idea or a thought may come from, it can be 
examined and criticised 'rationally* - by the standards of 
’reason’- only if it is put into a position where it is open to 
public, collective criticism. Reasoning is thus not a way of 
arriving at.ideas but rather a way of testing ideas critically. 
It is concerned less with how people think than with how they 
share their ideas and thoughts in situations that raise the 
question of whether those ideas are worth sharing . It is a 
collective and continuing human transaction, in which we 
present ideas or claims to particular sets of people within 
particular situations or contexts and offer appropriate kinds 
of 'reasons' in their support."
Toulmin et al. (1979) acknowledging the transactive character 
of 'arguments’ and 'trains of reasoning’ and their role in 
conceptual change, have constructed a structural framework with 
which to analyse discourse. In this system six different elements 
of language likely to bring about conceptual change are considered; 
claims, grounds, warrants, backing, modal qualifications and 
possible rebuttals. Toulmin et al. (1979) summarise the role of 
these components as
"The claims involved in real-life arguments are, accordingly, 
well founded only if sufficient grounds of an appropriate and 
releevant kind can be offered in their support. These grounds 
must be connected to the claims by reliable, applicable 
warrants, which are capable in turn of being justified by 
appeals to sufficient backing of the relevant kind. And the 
entire structure of argument put together out of these elements 
must be capable of being recognised as having this or that 
kind and degree of certainty or probability and as being
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dependent for its reliability on the absence of certain 
particular extraordinary, exceptional, or otherwise rebutting 
circumstances."
It is difficult to imagine this system of analysis being useful 
to the researcher interested in children’s changing conceptions. It 
is based on highly formal situations where arguments are heavily 
structured by specific situations in which participants have 
defined roles and specific clear cut bodies of knowledge to draw 
on. Indeed, the various contexts used by Toulmin et al. (1979) 
which they refer to as ’typical' forums of argumentation such as 
university seminars, law courts, board meetings, medical 
consultations etc. are highly atypical when compared to the 
informal discourse of children talking about natural phenomena. 
Nevertheless, this type of ’logical* analysis based on highly 
structured situations is evident in interactional analyses of 
children talking, particularly in classroom settings where there is 
a measure of socio-linguistic structure imposed on the setting.
4.5 Interactional Analysis.
Bales (1950) analysis of group processes, which has been used 
extensively in educational research, has its origins in the 
analysis of discourse at management meetings in commerce. The 
category system of Bales provides an observational device which 
seeks to record the nature of interactions between individuals in a 
group, Using this system the researcher can arrive at a profile of 
the group which he hopes reflects the character of interpersonal
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activities within the group setting. The behaviour categories 
selected by Bales are designed to record task orientated and socio- 
emotional behaviours, and in this sense his system tries to direct 
the researcher's outlook away from the strictly logical interplay 
suggested by Toulmin et al. (1979). However, in spite of giving 
researchers greater awareness of the role of language in the socio­
personal dimension, operationally defined protocols of this type, 
impose on discourse a set of observational foci which distort the 
observer's perception of the linguistic and social milieu within the 
group. The a priori nature of category systems artificially 
rigidifles the observer’s perceptions of group dynamics by 
underpinning observation with notions such as group efficiency, 
democratic structure, and task orientation. In this way the actual 
content of group discussion and the orientation of individual 
students towards that content is neglected.
If we are to gain a better understanding of conceptual change 
processes, a cognitive dimension must be present in the analysis of 
group discourse. Previous research, particularly category systems 
have not always emphasised the intellectual content of student 
contributions to discourse, and this has impoverished our 
understanding of the relationship between cognition, communication 
and conceptual change. The purely linguistic approach to group 
discourse fails to consider how individuals organize information, 
ideas and conceptions. Any system of interactional analysis which 
fails to take into account individual meanings may misinterpret 
reality and provide only assumptions about broad patterns of 
interaction which lack the resolution needed to observe students'
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conceptions in action. Barnes and Todd (1977) comment on these 
limitations.
"it often seems that the features which are most visible, most 
readily isolable, are those which are the least important; 
whilst those features which the observer focusses on as being 
the mast significant are precisely those which are the hardest 
to categorise in a reliable way. It is clear to us that in 
these conversations much more was happening than as observers 
we could hope to be aware of, much less describe. Moreover, our 
concentration on the language at the expense of the 
paralinguistic channels of communication again narrowed our 
range of reference. Our approach has been to separate out from 
the very complex meanings negotiated in the discussions some 
of the more visible phenomena in order to make sense of these. 
This has necessitated the assumption that the meanings we have 
assigned to these more visible phenomena are in some way 
representative of other meanings out of reach, this assumption, 
though clearly open to dispute, seems to be forced an anyone 
investigating this kind of data. Under these circumstances any 
attempt to create rigorous and exclusive category system would 
have been out of place and misleading."
4.6 A Cognitive Dimension to Discourse Analysis.
If a better understanding of conceptual change processes is to 
be gained, a cognitive dimension must be present in an analysis of 
student discourse. Michell and Peel (1977), in their analysis of 
classroom discourse, developed a system designed to monitor both 
the levels of thinking of individual students and their 
interpersonal interactions during informal (teacherless) classroom 
situations, The aim of their anlysis was to reveal patterns of 
interaction between students working in small groups , and to 
illuminate the cognitive operations used during student discourse, 
The system of Michell and Peel (1977) divides student discourse 
into two categories; student talk deemed directly relevant to the
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content material presented to the group is allocated to a ’target’ 
category which is subdivided into Describer and Explainer 
utterances. Other discourse is categorised as being ’interactional'.' 
Although not directly concerned with conceptual change this work 
concluded that students analysed their experiences more effectively 
in discussions which were dominated by the open, tenative and 
hypothetical speech acts associated with their Explainer category.
From a methodological point of view it is interesting to 
reflect on the basis of this sort of conclusion. Michell and Peel 
(1977) describe Explainer and Describer categories as
’’Describer - Material quoted or repeated direct from source. 
Description of events without explicit evaluation or 
explanation. Anecdotal talk where there is no attempt to state 
generalizations or implications.
Explainer - Full interpretations, explanations, judgements, 
opinions substantiated with example and argument. Utterances 
which include the consideration of alternative viewpoints and 
possibilities. Anecdotes linked to the problems being 
discussed.’*
In the above category descriptions it is not difficult to see 
how the ’ideals’ of ’effective’ group discourse are in fact imposed 
on student talk. These descriptions do not emerge from an 
understanding of what student discourse is but of what it should 
be. When we try to give the analysis of discourse a cognitive 
dimension it has to be from the student’s perspective and that 
means getting much closer to the conceptions used by individual 
students. If we are to gain a better understanding of the way 
students interpret their experiences then we may have to be less 
concerned with systems of analysis which define ’target* material
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and 'relevant' content from a teacher/researchers standpoint and 
consider the intellectual contributions of students to group 
discourse in the context of the conceptual ecosystems of learners 
within a specific group. Category systems by definition reduce the 
variability and diversity of children's talk and give structure to 
an apparently structureless situation, however the cost of this 
approach is that we negate these features of discourse by this 
form of analysis. A cognitive dimension to discourse analysis must 
conserve rather than eliminate the content orientated and 
idiosync .ratic elements of individual cognition which form the 
basis of understanding and contextualise interpersonal 
communication; it is on this foundation that I can begin to 
construct a description of the cognitve activities of the student. 
The analysis of Michell and Peel (1977) also tries to bring the 
cognitive and social aspects of discourse together in order to 
highlight the relationship between learning activities and 
interpersonal interaction. However, the degree of interdependence 
between these 'interactional' and 'target' categories is obscured by 
a system of analysis which isolates them into 'distinct categories’ 
and leads to a de-emphasis of their mutual reciprocity.
Barnes and Todd (1977) have explored the utility of social and 
cognitive aspects of discourse in their description of group 
learning situations, Although this work is based on a category 
system which describes social skill, cognitive strategies, discourse 
moves and logical processes within group discourse, these 
categories emerge from their data in an a posteriori fashion. This
methodological posture is supported by their interpretation of 
conversational meanings as being problematic.
"Our gravest doubt about our categories is whether they do, in 
fact, conserve those features of the children’s talk which we 
see as theoretically important. We are interested in learning, 
in cognition, in the construction by the children of some of 
their own knowledge. We recorded children talking together in 
the hope that we could distinguish knowledge in the process of 
being made during their co-operative effort. The difficulty is 
to decide how crucial is the presence of any particular 
linguistic and interactional features. Those we find striking 
may merely represent the habitual style of these particular 
children. Perhaps other children would create equally valid and 
complex solutions to the same problems without using any of 
the same verbal strategies. This is a doubt we have to live 
with: our analysis is based upon what these children did.”
This modest approach to the limitations of discourse 
description, their hypothetical character and the uncertainty of 
analysis methods is much more in keeping with research which is 
aware of the nature of children’s conceptual ecosystems and the 
ways that children communicate their experiences to others, Barnes 
and Todd (1977) conducted a number of studies of small group 
learning situations on the basis of their category system. During 
these activities they became aware of individuals in the group 
constructing a cumulative and idiosync.. ratic account of what had 
being going on. The construction of this account was often out of 
phase with ’observable* events within the group as each member 
reflected on previous utterances and events. This observation 
displays the ’leads and lags’ of natural discourse and highlights 
how the researcher is confronted by a situation where meaning may 
not adhere to particular utterances, but may be based on previous
utterances which remain tacit during much of the subsequent 
discourse.
The researcher/observer of natural dialogues between children 
is thus directed away from exclusive category systems towards 
'strings of cumulative reinterpretations' which characterise the ebb 
and flow of ideas, the ongoing interpretation of experience, the 
continuous conceptual adjustments and interpersonal interactions 
that comprise group discourse. The cumulative and dynamic aspects 
of these activities require a method of analysis which takes the 
linear and temporal aspects of group discourse into account as well 
as accommodating the episodic nature of events and experiences 
which may punctuate the evolution of understanding and 
conceptualisation within group discourse. When the research focus 
is on the ways that conceptions adapt over time and the factors 
influencing these modifications it is important that the method of 
analysis retains a temporal component and does not artificially 
fragment the nature of group discourse. To use a photographic 
analogy I am concerned with an analysis of discourse based on 
moving pictures rather than on a sequence of freeze frames.
In addition to these considerations, groups of children talking 
by themselves represents a situation which does not lend itself to 
structural methods of analysis. In an environment where no 
individual lays claim to the direction dialogue should take, and 
where perceptions of subject matter, order of speaking, and how 
content is to be handled, are negotiated rather than predetermined 
by specific roles, (student, teacher, classmate etc.) methods of
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analysis must match this level of fluidity if they are to capture
the interplay between dialogue, conceptions and conceptual systems.
In an effort to deal with the multisemic and fluid nature of
group discourse Barnes and Todd (1977) have proposed a theoretical
construct which they call a ’Frame’.
"The use of the concept Frame frees us from any need to assign 
a determinate and unchanging meaning either to the content of 
an utterance, or to its significance as a move in the 
interaction. It aids the observer to deal with (a) the 
different interpretations held by different participants, (b) 
the ebb and flow during a conversation between more sharply 
defined Frames and those moments when Frames are blurred, 
because in flux or mutually contradictory, (c) the dual aspect 
of the necessary tacit knowledge, which refers in one direction 
towards supplying a context for the subject matter and in the 
other towards a set of expectations about the social meaning 
of actions. To sum up, Frames refer to participants’ implicit 
expectations about (a) what they are talking about, and (b) 
their relationship and communicative behaviour. Frames are 
offered by those who speak and interpreted by those who 
listen, thus changing in the course of the conversation,"
Barnes and Todd (1977) identify two Frames used simultaneously
by participants in dialogue; a Content Frame which refers to
subject matter and an Interaction Frame which relates to the
interactive relationship between individuals. These workers suggest
that
"the meaning of utterances lies not in the utterance itself but 
in the implicit hypotheses about it which shape the future 
history of the conversation. Meanings are characteristics of 
people not of utterances, or - to be more precise - are 
attributed by people to utterances in context. Participants in 
communication understand an utterance in terms of the Content 
and Interaction Frames which they ascribe to it, that is in 
terms of 'knowledge of how things are’ which they bring to it,
(Barnes and Todd, 1977)
The notion of the Frame as a unit of analysis can be seen as 
the outcome of a desire to move away from category systems toward 
a more intuitive type of discourse analysis. It also possible that
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the Frame may represent a coming to terms with the limitations of 
discourse analysis and in particular the problems of the observer 
who tries to construct a ’picture’ of the world as seen by 
participants in group discourse. From a structuralist perspective, 
the Frames of Barnes and Todd (1977) could be interpreted as a 
symbol of defeat, in that they represent a method of analysis 
which acknowledges the ambiguity, indeterminacy and the flux of 
children talking in groups but fails to reduce this 'chaos' to some 
form of ordered perspective. Researchers/observers of group 
discourse impose an interpretative structure on events through 
their own experiences and beliefs (without this there could be no 
analysis); but what Frame analysis suggests is that this intuition 
should be used to help the observer construct a concurrent 
understanding of group discourse in much the same way as the 
participants. Thus as the individuals in the group piece together 
their understanding of events the researcher moves with the 
discourse, incorporating its ever changing character and 
indeterminate nature as part of his on going analysis: in some ways 
this activity can be likened to the construction of a historical 
narrative compiled by an historian in the same time stream as the 
events he describes, (as opposed to the picture described by an 
historian looking back on important events from another time 
period).
4.7 The Analysis of Group Discourse in this Study.
- 146 -
Two main themes emerge from the review above. Firstly, that in 
trying to describe children's conceptions and the way that they 
use, adapt and communicate these conceptions in a group setting, 
the researcher has to come to terms with the ’chaotic’ nature of 
discourse between children. In addition he must be aware of the 
limitations of methods of analysis which seek to give determinate 
meanings to children’s utterances. In my research I was interested 
in children’s conceptions of inheritance and the ways that these 
conceptions change, and therefore was required to develop and 
construct an interpretation of events relating to these interests 
as seen through the eyes of the participants in my research. The 
intuitive Frame analysis of Barnes and Todd (1977) allows the 
researcher to follow the development of group discourse and the 
participation of individuals in the communication of their ideas. 
This type of analysis resonates with a study of individual 
conceptions and the factors influencing their adaptation. However, 
if this is to be applied to children's conceptions of inheritance 
and an understanding of how these specific ideas change, then what 
this type of analysis requires is a model of change and conceptual 
activity in the context of group discourse. Secondly, if the 
findings of this research and this analysis are to have some 
impact on our understanding of how children learn then there must 
be a theoretical foundation on which to base the analysis. The 
nature of this theoretical base, as in Posner et al. (1982), can 
take the farm of a model of conceptual change derived from the 
philosophy of science. At an even more general level, a theory of 
learning such as Piaget’s or Wittrock’s (1977) might be used.
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Vhat I now wish to suggest is that the model described in 
Chapter 2 is capable of providing this theoretical base an which to 
analyse and describe the dynamics of children's conceptual 
ecosystems as they relate to inheritance. In addition, the same 
model is also relevant to the analysis of group discourse and can 
relate the character of children talking about inheritance problems 
to a theory of learning based on conceptual change. Thus the model 
used in the analysis of my data represents a symbiosis of theory 
and practice which emerges from a consideration of children’s 
conceptions of inheritance, the features of their conceptual 
ecosystem, and an appreciation of the learning context.
4.8 A System of Observation and Analysis.
The research data derived from this study consisted of audio 
and videotapes of group discussions. This data was analysed in the 
following manner.
An initial draft transcript of the group's activities was drawn 
up, the main aim of this being to prepare an accurate and detailed 
record of the discussion. No overt analysis was attempted at this 
stage; the emphasis being on increasing the
transcriber’s/researcher's familiarity with the group's activities, 
whilst recording as much of the detail of the session as possible. 
Ideally transcripts would be prepared immediately after the video 
sessions, however, in practice it was difficult to keep pace with 
the rate of data acquisition. Every attempt was made to transcribe 
tapes while the video session was 'fresh* in the researcher’s
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memory. This initial transcript, as with subsequent drafts, was not 
divided into sentences nor was it punctuated. The main aim of the 
transcriber was to capture the character of the spoken word. A 
standard transcript format was adopted, with speech filling the 
central part of the page with wide margins for tape counter units 
and elapsed time as well as additional comments . Where it was 
difficult to make out what was said asterisks in brackets were 
used to denote the number of ’missing’ words as far as possible. 
Pauses were shown by full stops, the number of dots indicating the 
length of the pause. Longer pauses were timed in seconds. Where 
appropriate the text was indented to show overlapping speech where 
the students talked simultaneously.
From this ’rough’ transcript a more detailed one was prepared 
and it was during this transposition that conscious efforts were 
made to analyse the data. This is a long and tedious task which is 
often ’sub-contracted’ to someone other than the researcher. 
However, there are definite benefits to be gained from the process 
of transcribing. Given that the researcher has been through the 
transcript at least once during the initial phase of transcription, 
the rewriting of the transcript and the concurrent analysis of the 
data, brings with it a definite feel for the evolution and 
development of the group's activities. This, coupled with the 
frequent replaying of the videotape, hightens the observational 
skill of the researcher whilst sensitising him to specific 
interpersonal interactions and conceptions.
4.9 The Analysis.
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The purpose of analysis is to develop a qualitative description 
of the transcript data. Through this description will be obtained 
an understanding of children’s conceptions of inheritance and their 
interactions with features of their conceptual ecosystems.
It is passible to adopt a procedure in which an individual's 
conceptions are identified and their characteristics examined in 
the context of the learning situation, An alternative approach is 
to analyse the group's social and cognitive activities as a whole, 
and then break this down into individual components. Bearing in 
mind the complexity of conceptual ecosystems a holistic approach 
followed by gradual analysis has much to recommend it. However, no 
matter what the approach, describing and understanding a 
conceptual system needs a starting point and the decison was made 
to look in the data as a whole for the emergence of ’units’ of 
interpersonal interaction and individual conceptions. These ’units’ 
of interaction and cognition are defined ecosystemically in that 
they are identifiable in a variety of student groups and represent 
patterns of conceptual understanding and interpersonal interaction 
in a number of similar group problem solving situations.
Meaning in a group discussion does not adhere to isolated 
’units' of conception or specific utterances, but are part of the 
conceptual and interpersonal ecosystem created by the participants. 
Each student creates their own conceptual ecosystem and this in 
turn is the basis on which they understand what other students in 
the group are saying.
As a conceptual ecologist/researcher 1 have adopted the role of 
the enlightened observer, making full use of the opportunity to
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listen and watch group activities again and again. No matter how 
many times one reviews the videotape, meanings attributed by the 
observer to student actions and words will always be hypothetical 
and from one particular viewpoint.
My personal model of this analysis was drawn from an 
ecological metaphor, where one imagines oneself in a variety of 
conceptual habitats observing and trying to understand what is 
going on in the ecosystem. One is aware of different settings, 
varying backgrounds, new backcloths to the actions and behaviours 
of the participants in the ecosystem. Simultaneously the observer 
is focusing in on identifiable conceptions and ’units’ of behaviour 
that can be recognised as interacting within the ecosystem.
4.10 The Analysis Procedure.
The initial (’rough’) transcript was analysed as it was 
rewritten onto prepared pages laid out with a large central section 
for the dialogue, a narrow left hand margin for tape counter and 
elapsed time information, and a wide right hand margin divided 
into two columns. As each piece of dialogue was 
transcribed/transposed, it was categorised in terms of social 
interaction and conceptual content. These conceptions and ’units’ of 
interaction were recorded in the right hand columns of the 
transcript along with any comments or observation. During this 
process video and audio tapes were used along with the initial 
transcript to ’revisit’ the groups activities and to make decisions 
about what was happening.
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The scheme of analytical categories which evolved from the 
data are given below. The formulation of this system being derived 
from the work of Gilbert and Pope (1982).It is important to stress 
that these are not absolutes but part of a descriptive vocabulary 
used by the observer to develop his own personal understanding of 
conceptual ecosystems.
Social Interactions
(a) Progress through the task
i. Suspension of discussion - often 
as a result of being unable to reconcile problems or obtain mutual 
agreement in the group; often associated with the group moving on 
to an alternative task.
ii. Moving on - changing the focus 
of attention to a new card or page or part of a family tree,
iii. Task management - looking for or 
being asked to look for offspring or find relevant pieces of text.
 Competition and Disagreement
i. Competition for the floor - 
usually two or sometimes all three students trying to tell each 
other at the same time which offspring they should choose, Often 
associated with 'thinking out loud1 and giving a public airing to 
personal opinions.
ii. Disagreement - often the 
unqualified rejection of another student's choice of offspring; or,
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the denial of a group member’s choices on the grounds that they do 
not concur with the group's or an individual’s present thinking.
iii. Challenge - A situation where one 
student, or two students in collaboration, would challenge another’s 
explanation of their offspring choice. This may take the form of 
asking for elaboration of the student’s conceptions or the 
consideration of the consequences of his/her conception. Often the 
opposing students would make their own challenging conception 
explicit during these sort of exchanges.
iv. Gatekeeping - Where one student 
seems to act as arbiter of what is logical, or acceptable, or a 
sensible suggestion for offspring selection.
Isl Supportive Activities
i. Acceptance - Often passive 
agreement by one student of another point of view or his particular 
offspring selections.
ii. Echo - Where one student repeats 
the words of another by way of support and making explicit their 
’alignment’ with the previously expressed viewpoint.
iii. Referring forward/back - Here one 
student refers to a previous or future card or page of text by way 
of supporting or describing the group’s present activities.
iv. Chairing - Usually where one of 
the students takes on the role of chairperson, summarising the 
group’s actions and providing an overview of any consensus of 
opinion.
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The following list of conceptions of inheritance have emerged 
from the pilot and case studies. They are not a set of a priori 
categories, but the product of many hours spent listening to the 
ideas used by children in their efforts to solve inheritance 
problems. As such, they constitute a set of 'results’ and in this 
respect they share many of the features of children’s conceptions 
of inheritance identified by other workers (Kargbo et al, 1980) and 
described in Chapter 1. However, I have chosen to place these 
descriptive categories or conceptual frameworks (Gilbert and Watts,
1983) within this chapter (as opposed to concluding chapters) 
because I view them as an analytical device rather than an ’end- 
product’ of research. This may be a personal reaction to 
alternative conceptions research in which the aim seems to be one 
of ’framework spotting’. My feeling is that although these 
categories help structure our understanding of children’s conceptual 
systems, they are a means to an end; they provide an overall 
picture of children’s conceptions and a framework for descriptive 
analysis, they do not constitute in themselves an understanding of 
the processes of change going on within conceptual ecosystems.
In this research project, the utility of the conceptual 
framework is acknowledged but the aim is to use these 
generalisations to illuminate and describe the specific and unique 
processes which make up conceptual systems. Having travelled from 
the specific to the general and back again it is hoped that one is 
better placed to make sense of individual conceptual ecosystems.
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Conceptions
Conceptions are unique, idiosync. ratic,' personal theories about 
the way things are. The categories of conceptions below are not 
definitive nor representative of individual conceptions. They 
provide a descriptive frame of reference through which an 
understanding of conceptual ecosystems can be constructed.
(a) 'Like begets like* - a conception which is based on the 
familial similarities between parents and their offspring. Students 
make their choice of offspring on the basis that 'children' look 
like (take after) their parents.
lb) Offspring variabiliy - students contend that there is a degree
of colour variation or variability in the offspring of a given 
family. They expect the offspring of a given family to look 
slightly different.
(c) 'Blending* - a conception which predicts offspring choices on 
the basis of a blend or 'mixture' of parental colours, A black 
mouse mated with a white mouse will have grey offspring.
id2 Sibling similarity - students contend that 'brothers and
sisters* will look similar. If a family of mice have one brown 
offspring they are likely to have another offspring of the same 
colour.
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(e) Grandparental influence - a conception linked to the idea that 
offspring can take after members of previous generations. Traits 
not obviously inherited from the parent are seen to come from the 
grandparents.
(f) Albino frequency - students contend that albinos are relatively 
rare occurences in families. They occur ’by chance’ and can happen 
in any family at any time.
(g) ’Dominance’ - a conception often linked to the student's notion 
of colour strength and the effects of 'strong' colours on 
parent/offspring coat colour relationships.
These analytical categories provided a descriptive baseline of 
the conceptual and social activities of individuals within the group. 
However, these categories are interrelated and part of an 
everchanging conceptual and social group dynamic. Within this 
dynamic are to be found the features of conceptual ecosystems 
which affect the process of conceptual change. Therefore, a more 
holistic analysis of group activity was carried out by interpreting 
and constructing the frames of reference being used by group 
members. By describing the content and interaction 'frames’ of 
students, (Barnes and Todd 1977) in the form of a metacommentary, 
conceptual and social interaction categories were interrelated with 
each other and with other features of the students’ conceptual 
ecosystems. The resulting 'narrative'/case study of the group’s 
activities was able to place conceptual and social interaction
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categories into a set of changing contexts. This interpretation 
allowed the researcher to follow conceptions as they ’lived out 
their lives’ within the group and to comment on those features of 
the students’ ecosystems which had a significant effect on their 
conceptions. At this level of interpretation and analysis it was 
also possible to describe features of conceptual ecosystems such as 
analogies, metaphors, and personal anecdotes.
Using this narrative approach to analysis, which involves an 
holistic and reductionist perspective, it was difficult to keep 
track of everything that was going on within the group. Faced with 
a complex and changing system of interactions, the researcher is 
forced to move back and forward in time trying to capture an 
understanding of events. Equally difficult is the task of focusing 
at one moment on a conception and the next on its interaction with 
the conceptual and social environment which surrounds it. The 
written word in the form of a metacommentary is a an excellent way 
of presenting data; but it is a difficult medium to work with when 
actually carrying out an analysis which requires one to glean a 
continuous overview of events past and present. Consequently, in 
addition to the evolving metacammentary of the groups activities, a 
symbolic/shorthand representation was made concurrently with the 
written description. This provided an alternative ’picture’ of 
events in a form that, although linear and two dimensional, gave an 
easily assimilated overview of conceptual and social patterns 
(Appendix VI). This ’symbolic’ form of representation made it 
possible to gain an impression of events over time as well as 
providing a 'reference map’ of the analysis.
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The final stage of analysis is to take the case studies 
obtained by these methods and to test the putative ecosystemic 
model suggested in Chapter 2. By 'colliding' the analysed data with 
the model it is hoped that insights will be gained into whether 
characteristics of open systems such as resilience, heterogeneity, 
stability and adaptation have utility in the development of our 
understanding of conceptual change processes. This in turn may 
inform subsequent analysis and interpretation of the data by 
focusing attention on specific aspects of conceptual ecosystems.
In the following chapter the products of this method of 
analysis are presented in the form of five case studies. These 
studies were selected from twenty eight group sessions as being 
representative of the children involved in the study, the groups’ 
composition in terms of age and gender, and the problem solving 
activities of the students.
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Chapter 5 
Case Studies
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5.1 Case Study 1.
This group consisted of three girls aged 12+, All three were 
classmates. The session took place in the students' classroom, in the 
presence of the 'interviewer', while the rest of the class attended 
lessons in adjacent rooms. The girls sat side by side, facing the 
camera which was positioned about twelve feet away. The researcher sat 
in view of the group monitoring the video equipment. Cards 1 and 2 
were used to introduce the first task and to give the children a 
chance to acclimatize to the situation.
Card 3 (albino x albino) began the girls’ discussion.
1 Su Grey.. do you think it could be like that one
2 T Yeah., a possibility
3 Su Have them all the same colour really..that colour cos thats 
nearly white
4 T Yeah
5 Su and the white ones they’d be darker than that
6 T Mmmm
7 Su Mmm
8 Sa They might be white ones
9 Su Do you think they will have an other one
10 T Yeah., what
11 Su like that
12 T They may have the add one
13 Su Yeah
14 Su ...have you got any more white ones
15 T I did but I’ve just dropped it (laughs)
16 Sa I’ve got one white
17 Su one like that
18 Sa Yeah
T Yeah
Sarah moves on to the next card, the others follow.
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Sue takes the lead, during the discussion of this card. She invites the 
others to participate but seems eager to have her ideas accepted. Sue 
presents a reasonably strong interaction frame as she attempts to 
control the group’s activity, The content frame at this point seems 
weak. Sue has a vague conception that parents and offspring should be 
similar (3) and that grey coloured offspring are a plausible variation 
in the offspring’s phenotype (1,3,5). Tracey and Sue are rather passive 
in their exchanges with Sarah, accepting her ideas but not really 
commiting themselves. Audience awareness may at this stage be 
encouraging Sue but inhibiting Sarah and Tracey. The latters' 
conceptions are not articulated and Sue’s are indeterminate.
Card 4 (Black x Light Brown)
19 Su thats got to be ****
20 T spotty one ...something like that
21 Su What about that one
22 T with a spotted..with different colours on it
23 Sa What about one like that
24 T You'd get one like that
25 Su Yeah definitely
26 T Black ones
27 Su What about that one
28 T Maybe it depends
29 Su something like that or that
30 Sa No (very quietly)
31 Su Might get .spotted..two like that ***..two mixtures
32 T This one ...that one put that one on
33 Su Yeah I've got that one
34 Sa Have you got that one
35 T Thanks.....it on its
36 Su ..it might have got brown .. from there and then its black
37 T Yeah
38 Su yeah thats about it
39 T Yeah
40 Sa Yeah....only it might have one of those as well on it
41 Su Might do (moves to next card)
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During discussion of this card Sue and Tracey ’compete for the floor’ 
over the choice of offspring. (19-23, 27-32). This ’competitive 
collaboration' between Sue and Tracey strengthens the interaction 
frame between the two girls. At (22) Tracey’s implicit nation of 
'mixing' seems to be cued by the black and brown parent mice. Sue, 
after trying to get her choice of offspring accepted, picks up on 
Tracey's lead of "spotted" (31). Sue qualifies this choice with 
reference to "mixtures" (31). The implicit conception seems to be that 
each parent mouse contributes its phenotype to the offspring and these 
are, as a consequence, a mixture of both parents (36). The agouti mice 
provided may act as a cue given that they are brown with black spots. 
On the basis of the "spotted" and "mixture" choices Sue and Tracey 
seem to have established a consensus view; an apparent resonance of 
ideas based on a still very weak content frame. Sarah is not very 
involved in the discussion, her contributions are largely ignored 
inspite of, or perhaps because of her ref (lections on Tracey’s and 
Sue’s actions (30,40).
Card 5 (Black x Black + Dark Brown Offspring)
42 T That ones
43 Su it might have that again
44 T Yeah, because because they've got the other one
45 Su If they’ve got
a brown one they might get another one
46 Su Do you reckon they would have a lighter one ...what about
that colour
47 T with that one they might have one of those
48 Sa its a bit lighter
49 T if they've got one brown
50 Su so they might get a mixture
51 T If they’ve got a brown one they could easily have a black
52 Su Yeah yeah like that
53 T a special one yeah
54 Su I think they’ll have another black one
55 T As they .as they've got so much of a sort of mix
56 Su sort of like that
57 T Yeah
58 Sa Yeah suppose so
59 Su They've got a mixture
60 T They've got so much of a mixture they might have a white 
one
61 Sa No. I don't think so.,its a bit too light really ..don't you 
think
62 Su A bit light
63 T Yeah
64 Su Thats about it
65 T Mmm
Sue and Tracey continue their ’competition for the floor’; a strong 
interaction frame is presented by both girls as they competitively 
collaborate. At (43 and 45) Sue seems to be implying that her choice 
of offspring is influenced by the ’sameness’ of siblings. At (50) she 
interrupts Tracey with her idea about ’’mixture” in the offspring and 
she uses it again at (59) to sum up the girls’ selections. What she
means by mixture remains vague. Tracey at (51, 55 and 60) picks up on
the word mixture and is allowed to develop her ideas as there seems 
to be some consensus as to the conception of mixture. However at (60) 
Tracey’s idea of mixture becomes more explicit (strengthening content 
frame) and this is challenged by Sarah (61). Tracey’s conception of 
mixture seems to be, given parents of different colours or an
offspring which is a different colour to its parents, that this
represents such phenotypic variability that a variety of offspring 
coat colours are possible. Sarah’s challenge at (61), and her 
disagreement with Tracey’s idea, brings her into the discussion. Her 
challenge to Tracey’s conception of mixture is elicited by the 
extension of the potential anomaly presented by card 5 (two black
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parents and a brown offspring) when Tracey suggests that they could 
even have an albino. This may be outside the limits of plausibilty for 
Sarah and may' interact with her own conceptions which might be that 
offspring should look a little like their parents.
It is interesting that Tracey's mixture conception may allow her to 
'explain* the potential anomaly of card 5 (Black parents, brown 
offspring), whilst Sue’s conceptions of sibling similarity on the one 
hand and phenotypic variation in the offspring on the other, may 
interact in such a way as to reinforce the explanatory adequacy of 
both conceptions. The possibility of discussion and interaction 
between the girls’ different conceptions is not taken up and from (62- 
65) there is a rapid suspension of the discussion.
Card 6 (Black x Agouti + Agouti Offspring)
66 Sa Oh no
67 Su Oh..thats funny..oh no get that one
68 Sa Yeah
69 Su I think you'll get one like that as well dont you
70 Sa You'll get one like
that
71 Sa Similar to that
72 T You might get some black..one
73 Sa Black ones
74 Su Black ones ..yeah
75 Su You might get ..black....with some yellow at the bottom
76 Sa They're orange..orange
77 T Yeah
78 Su Have you got ..have you got a black one..a plain black one
79 T Yes ..there
80 Sa (inaudible)
81 Su If they've got the..that one with spots..they might have one
without spots
82 T The grey
83 Su Yeah
84 Sa Oh yeah,.they might
85 T Might have said grey
86 Sa Mmm I don't know
87 T ..and dark grey like that
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89 Sa Yeah
90 T Darker than that
91 Sa Darker
92 T That one
93 Sa That one
94 Su That
95 Sa Yeah..might
96 Su That it
97 T Think so
98 Sa Yeah
99 Su Yeah
During the discussion of card 6 the content frame remains weak 
throughout. No conception is made explicit. All three girls are 
competitive in their collaboration. Tracey, who seems to take the lead 
in the choice of offspring, has her ideas generally supported and 
accepted (82-99). At (81) Sue seems to be returning to her conception 
that there may be variation in the offspring, but this is not taken up 
by the others. There is a reluctance to make explicit their ideas and 
an apparent emphasis on the development of consensus and mutual 
agreement. This social interaction coupled with the ambiguity of the 
weak content frames being used by the girls may keep the ecosystem 
heterogeneous and maintain/re-establish its resilience after the events 
of card 5.
Card 7 (Brown x Brown + Albino Offspring)
100 Su All right..all right thats good isn’t it
101 Sa (inaudible)
102 Su Maybe they will have some dark ones as well because
103 T yeah black
ones with some orange
104 Sa Have you got some white ones
105 Su got them there,.here’s a white one here’s a white one
106 T They might have one with an orange
107 Su They might have a darker brown
108 T ...an orange bit
109 Sa Yeah
110 Su they might have a darker brown
111 Sa Yeah
112 Su have you got a darker brown...mmm not that dark
113 T Thats the darker ...thats the only brown that I've got
(pause in discussion - no talk for 10 seconds)
114 Su No that’s too much of a mixture
115 T but they've got so much of them..
the greys and blacks there
116 Sa White ones
117 T Yeah
118 Sa dont think you’ll get a mixture
119 T Mmm yeah
Competition for the floor between Tracey and Sue with Sarah fallowing 
her own line of thought marks the beginning of the discussion. The 
conceptions being used are vague and implicit; the pause at (113-114) 
may be the result of an awareness by the girls of a lack of cohesion 
and the fact that their choices of offspring lack consensus. At (114) 
Sue questions Tracey’s choices and revisits the ’mixture’ conception at 
(60-62). This interaction between Tracey’s ’mixture’ conception and 
Sue’s conception is evident in (114,115) as Tracey tries to justify her 
choices on the basis of the amount of variability in their offspring 
choices. Sue’s ideas at (102 and 110) are vague but at (114) she seems 
to be indicating once again that the limits of the mixture will be 
determined by the colour contributions of the parents and the 'given' 
offspring. Sarah’s contribution at (116) defuses the potential for 
debate between Tracey and Sue over their respective conceptions. Her 
suggestion of albinos may indicate her awareness that this represents 
a coat colour which cannot be disputed as it is one of the ’givens' 
associated with this card. Alternatively this may represent her own 
ideas about sibling similarity. Tracey agrees at (117) and (119) to
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this 'compromise' and seems to accept Sarah's reservations about her 
idea of ’mixture*. It is interesting that as with card 5, card 7 also 
presents a potential anomaly in the context of parents producing like 
offspring. This situation again brings Tracey's mixture conception to 
bear and results in a degree of interaction between Sarah’s ideas and 
to an even greater extent Sue’s conceptions.
Card 8 (Agouti x Agouti + Black Offspring)
120 Su ..looks like they’ll get a mixture with that one
121 T Yeah
122 Su They've got a black one
123 Sa (inaudible)
124 Su Reckon they’ll get another black one
125 Su ...might get another brown one a mixture..,a mixture with
grey at the bottom
126 T thinking, a black one with orange at the bottom
127 Sa there might be ....they might have a little plain brown
one
128 T Plain brown one
129 Sa dark brown
130 Su like that
131 Sa No darker
132 T the dark brown
133 Sa yeah the dark
At (120) Sue immediately returns to the idea of mixture as the basis 
of offspring appearance. The fact that in this card the parents are 
Agouti, an obvious mixture of colours, and have black offspring, may 
resonate with Sue’s conception of mixture as this combination gives a 
great deal of potential in terms of colour mixing/blending. Tracey’s 
agreement at (121) is tinged with a smile and she may be reflecting 
on the previous exchange at the end of card 7 and Sue’s apparent lack 
of consistency. Sue and Tracey's differing conceptions of ’mixture’ 
seem to be simultaneously active and mutually tolerant in this
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situation; they do not re-examine their underlying assumptions <125- 
126) allowing an apparent consensus to be established by Sue whilst 
Tracey, perhaps understandably in the light of previous challenges, 
does not push her mixture conception. At (124 and 125) Sue seems to 
be using sibling similarity as the basis for her choice of offspring. 
During the rest of the discussion it is Sarah’s ideas that are a focus 
for the group activities. These are accepted by Tracey and Sue 
although they remain implicit; from (127-133) there is task 
collaboration between all three girls.
Card 9 (Light Grey x Black)
134 Sa These’11 be like the last one
135 Su They'll gonna get a grey one or some mixtures of
136 Sa probably get some dark greys as well
137 T Dark greys with different coloured greys
138 Sa dark and light ones
139 Su Have you any black ones left
140 Sa no. I don’t think so
141 T black ones with orange bits
142 T ...make it one of those browny sort of colours
143 Su Yeah I’ve got one of those
144 Sa that one
145 Su maybe because thats a bit lighter
146 Sa Yeah
147 T make it a white one
148 Sa ...but it couldn’t
149 Su ..brown one cause you had a white one with other 
colours didn't you...,mmm that one
150 T You might be able to get a white one
151 Su a white one
152 T there’s a white one ....there’s a white one
Sue at (135) seems to be indicating that her notion of mixtures is 
once again related to the blending of parental colours. Sarah seems to 
be echoing this notion making the blending notion more explicit in her 
reference to dark greys ie. the contribution of the black parent is
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significant when blended with the light grey (136). Tracey at (137) 
picks up on Sarah's qualification and seems to share her conception. 
At (141,142 and 147) Tracey also develops her conception of mixture 
(147) and her suggestion that an albino is again part of this notion 
of variability in coat colour. As before this leads to disagreement by 
Sarah at (148). Sarah does not qualify her disagreement but it may be 
that her blending notions used at (136) make Tracey’s choice of an 
albino seem implausible. Sue and Tracey at (149-152) seem to develop 
agreement on the possibility of a white offspring. Sue seems to be 
influenced at (149) by the evidence of a previous card (card 7) which 
had an albino as the product of two brown parents. The girls develop 
a strong interaction frame in this discussion perhaps associated with 
their increasing confidence in their predictions. Sue and Tracey seem 
to have adapted their respective conceptions of ’mixture’ and have 
achieved a consensus view.
Card 10 (Black and Tan x Brown and Tan + Black and Tan Offspring)
153 T You might get a multicoloured one
154 Sa You might get a spotty 
ones as well
one ..you might get a dark brown
155 Su Yeah...what like that
156 Sa Yeah
157 T put one more on ..plain ....black one
158 Sa Yeah
159 Su I’ve got that one ...no I haven’t
160 T They've got a mixture
This card gives rise to a brief discussion. Tracey seems to be using 
her mixture conception at (160) as a qualification of her offspring 
choices, The range of coat colours involved in this card seem to
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resonate with her ideas and may cue her description at (153). Tracey's 
description of the offspring at (160) may serve to re-establish the 
plausibility of her mixture notion. Sarah seems to retain her notion 
of blending at (154). Sue seems to be taking a back seat in the 
discussion at this point.
Card 11 (Dark Brown x Dark Brown + Light Brown Offspring)
161 Su They’ll get a brown one in that won’t they
162 T Yeah
163 Sa a bit obvious
164 Su a brown one (**)
165 T have you got another brown one
166 Sa I couldn’t find it . I haven’t got a dark brown
167 Su have you got a dark brown one.. change it
168 T can’t find a dark one
169 Sa (inaudible)
170 T make it a black one
171 Su or white one...yeah
172 Sa you might get a sort of
173 T grey sort of colour
174 Sa yeah that black really
175 T you might get,..mmm darker sort of colour
176 Su that sort of colour...that one there
177 T get me one like that
178 Sa Might do
179 Su yeah I don't know..they did have (****)
(Suspension as Tracey moves on to 12)
Sue's strong lead at (161) and its acceptance by the others may 
indicate the plausibility of the conceptions being used. In this 
instance the 'like begets like’, sibling similarity and blending/mixture 
conceptions are all plausible. Sarah's comment at (163) may reflect 
on the plausibility of Sue’s choice of offspring and her own 
conceptions (shared content frames). The content frame being used by 
the girls remains implicit. At (170) Tracey’s suggestion seems to cue
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Sue’s qualification at (171); Sue seems to be using Tracey’s mixture 
conception; indeed her choice of a 'white one’ is a strong echo of 
Tracey’s previous 'mixture' conception, A strong interaction frame is 
presented by all three girls as they collaborate on the task in a 
competitive spirit, each trying to influence the other without actually 
making their ideas explicit. It may be that this style of interaction 
keeps their personal ecosystems open and heterogeneous, insulates them 
from being 'wrong' whilst keeping open the possibility of conceptual 
and social resonance.
Card 12 (Agouti x Albino)
180 T white ones white ones white ones
181 Sa here’s another one..I’ve got it
182 Su I've got a spotted one
183 Sa brown ones
184 Su They might be like that
185 Sa they might be
186 Su cos its lighter
187 T You might get one with an orange stomach
188 Sa might
189 T as they’ve got a sort of mixture
190 Su You might get a grey sort of like that
191 Sa Yeah
192 T Yeah
193 Su Yeah
At (180, 187 and 189) Tracey seems to deploy her mixture conception 
with the tacit agreement of the others. This conception combined with 
her notion of variability in the offspring and non-familial 
resemblance have a great deal of explanatory power in the context of 
the task; almost 'anything goes’ in terms of offspring choices. Sue at 
(184 and 186) seems to be using her blending notion in which the 
offspring is lightened by the albino parent. Sue and Tracey present
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strong interaction frames but there is little actual interaction 
between their respective conceptions of mixture. This perhaps 
indicates the mutual adaptation and tolerance which has been developed 
between the two conceptions, Sarah is eager to help in the task 
activity and seems happy to follow the other girls' ideas,
The girls were introduced to the second task (reading/comprehension). 
They read the materials mainly in silence but with the occasional 
quiet aside to one another. This behaviour may be associated with a 
set of expectations about the nature of reading in class and the need 
to do it quietly and in private. The girls read for four to five 
minutes in what seemed to be a 'browsing style'.
The girls were now introduced to the third and final activity of 
'making' a mouse family tree. They were familiar with the idea of 
family trees and after a brief resume of the skeleton tree and what it 
meant they started the task.
194 Su Shall we start with two coloured ones
195 Sa Yeah
196 T two different colours
197 Sa one there...a grey
198 T and make one a black one
199 Sa Yeah
200 Su and how can you ..uhm
201 Su ..and a grey
202 T have a grey one and a white one or someth:
like that
203 Su or a speckled one
204 Sa white one ..have a darker grey
205 T Have a white and a sort of speckled one
206 Su yeah a speckled one
207 T white and speckled
208 Su that way you might get...you might get one like that cos 
you'd get one
209 T yeah
210 Su and you’d get one with speckled as well
211 Sa you might get one thats just plain black
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212 T Mmm
213 Sa just plain black yeah
Strong interaction frames are presented by all three girls as they 
choose the components of the first level of the tree [1] and [2]. The 
content frame is weak with choices being ‘thrown’ into the discussion 
with no justification. The exchange between Sue and Tracey at (205 - 
209) highlights how even when Sue makes an attempt to qualify their 
agreement over a set of parents for Cl], her reasons for the choice 
are vague. All three are concerned with getting their choices on the 
board whilst trying to work together.
214 T Thats inherited the sort of orange and that has inherited
the sort of plain
215 Sa yeah
216 T ..dominant and the darker colours are dominant so you
might have a plain one
217 Su and a grey
218 T sort of black or dark grey..dark grey
219 Sa dark grey
220 T dark grey
221 Sa Oh no
222 Su or maybe a light grey cos if you get a grey and a
white you make a lighter grey wouldn’t it
223 T but the darker colours are dominant
224 Sa no the darker colours are dominant
225 T so you might get a black and a plain black
226 Sa No one of those..why don’t you change that for a dark..I
don't think you'll get a grey there you’ll probably get 
another one like the white one
229 T could you get a black one
230 Su I think you’d get a dark brown one
231 T yeah
232 Su yeah
233 Sa here’s one
234 T no.a darker brown
235 Su darker
236 Sa I don’t think you’ll get that dark
237 T Mmm . possibility
At (214 and 216) Tracey introduces the words ’inherited’ and 
’dominant’ which she has probably gleaned from her reading of the
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text. This may bring some authority to her choice of offspring for E2] 
at (214), and for Cl] at (216), where she refers to the dominance of 
darker coat colours. At (217) Sue's suggestion of a grey coat colour 
for one of the offspring in C2] is immediately modified by Tracey at 
(218) to dark grey; she seems to be using dominance not as an 
absolute phenotypic effect, but as an additive factor (colour strength) 
in colour determination/modification. Tracey’s use of this conception 
is interesting in terms of its contrast with her previous ideas about 
mixture and variability. Sarah echos Tracey’s choice at (219) 
apparently accepting her reasoning. Sue at (222) has an alternative 
view of what the offspring in Cl] should be in which she makes 
explicit a blending conception of coat colour determination. Almost in 
unison Tracey and Sarah at (225-226) challenge this conception. Sue 
does not respond in defence of her offspring choice, At (230) Sue 
seems to accept the dominance notion through her alternative offspring 
choice; Tracey and Sarah accept this reconciliation to their viewpoint 
at (231-232). Sarah at (226) seems to be also operating the conception 
that 'like begets like’ in relation to the statement that the parents 
in Cl] will "probably get another one like the white one". Indeed, 
despite her support for Tracey’s dominance conception Sarah questions 
the implicit use of this conception by Tracey (233-236). Tracey seems 
uncertain at (237) about how dark the offspring will be and this 
perhaps indicates that Tracey and Sue are using dominance as an 
adaptation of a blending conception which might equate dominance with 
strength of colour and the notion that dark colours will tend to make 
lighter colours darker as opposed to the corollary of this effect.
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238 Su What about those two
239 Sa Yeah those two
240 T Ehmm.,get ..see a dark brown
241 Sa . might get a dark with a line
242 T Black black...have any might get another dark brown
243 Su Dunno...might get that
244 T I don't think you'll get a black one
245 Sa You could with an orange
246 Su Mmm I wouldn't have thought so
247 T I think you might get another one of those...there’s an 
orange
248 Su No but then you’ve got the same
249 T get a lighter one
250 Su a lighter one
251 Sa No you wouldn’t
252 Su could have that because ..looks
253 T Yeah
254 Sa I doubt it because thats got the same
255 Su Put a black on then .right
In this discussion the girls are trying to select the offspring of C4L 
A strong interaction frame is presented by all three girls. At (242 
and 244) Tracey weighs up some alternative offspring colours without 
making her reasoning explicit. At (247) she is suggesting that one of 
the offspring will be like one of the parents (dark brown). Sue at 
(248) and Sarah at (254) disagree with this sameness between parents 
and offspring. Equally Tracey and Sue (249, 250) suggest a lighter 
coloured offspring to which Sarah objects (251). It seems that there 
is a highly contradictory environment of conceptions being used; 
dominance/blending is proposed and questioned; 'like begets like' is 
used and questioned by individuals. At (255) Sue's strong lead and 
task direction suspends the discussion of C4L
256 Sa Start over here..have a white
257 T No no
258 Sa have a grey
259 T a black a black
260 Sa a black, yeah
261 T black black black...that one’s
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262 Sa
263 Su
264 T
265 Su
266 T
267 Sa
268 T
269 Su
you'd probably get another black 
No you’d get a black with maybe . a maybe 
you’d get a speckled one
Yeah a speckled one ..put it 
there,.you'd probably get a dark brown one 
Yeah a dark brown
dark brown 
dark brown..,.I’ve got one got one 
Right ..what about those two those two
In their discussion of [31 the girls seem to be again competitively 
collaborating as they deploy a number of conceptions. After an initial 
interchange between Sarah and Tracey about a mate for one of the 
offspring of Cl] (256-261) they decide on a black mouse. Sarah at 
(262) proposes that another black mouse like the parent is a possible 
offspring. This seems to contradict her previous position where she 
disagreed with the sameness of parents and offspring. At (264-269) a 
consensus develops between Tracey and Sue. The choice of speckled 
(Agouti) and dark brown offspring may also represent a compromise of 
conceptions with speckled being a 'blend'/mixture of the parents and 
dark brown derived from a conception of blend/dominance. By 'chairing' 
at (269) Sue again moves the focus of discussion to a new part of the 
tree.
270 Sa Get black because they (**•*) without colours
271 Su You might get a speckled because that brown and black
272 T Yes
273 Su a speckled one with orange at the bottom
274 T do we have a speckled one with orange at the bottom....
don’t think we do....get those with orange at the bottom
275 Su can you get a speckled one without
276 T can you get a speckled one (**) right at the bottom
277 Su got one here
278 T and you might get one of those
279 Su Yeah definitely
280 Sa You wouldn’t get a light one beacause look
they are the same dark colours
281 T you might you might if you get a speckled one
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282 Su I think you might
In their discussion of section C5] a number of conceptions are 
deployed. At (271) Sue seems to be using a blending conception in 
which the brown and the black of the parents give rise to a speckled 
(Agouti) mouse. The "orange at the bottom"(273) is used to describe 
the tan belly of some of the mice, its significance in this context 
being that one of the parent mice is a black and tan. At (280) Sarah 
suggests that light coloured offspring are unlikely as both parents 
are dark coloured. The use of "dark" in this context may indicate that 
the dominance/blending conception is operating here. Tracey's 
disagreement at (281) and Sue's support for her (282) indicate the 
fluctuating social and conceptual environment in which ideas are 
expressed.
283 Su (****) over here (**)
284 Sa Ve’ve got to get something to go with that
285 T have a grey one
286 Su have a grey one . a grey one
287 T You need two to go there,...don't you
288 Sa that one .that one
289 Su let me have that one and that one there
290 Sa I think you would get one of these because they’re sort of 
a mixture
291 Su Yeah...you might get speckled ...you might get that lighter 
brown sort of thing
292 Sa Yeah
In discussing C6] Sarah describes and justifies her choice using the 
mixture/blending conception (Agouti)(290). Sue picks up on this at 
(291) echoing Sarah, and describing the 'speckled' agouti, adding that 
a "lighter brown" is also a possibility. She is apparently using a 
blending conception.
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293 T now we've got these two
294 Su now we've got these two
295 T Oh you probably get a grey in there
296 Su oh yeah...yeah
297 T and a grey with a white
298 Sa yeah
299 Su and you'd get
300 T maybe a darker brown
301 Su a darker grey maybe like that
302 T maybe darker
303 Sa maybe you’d get brawn because you’ve got two different 
colours
304 Su yeah
305 T yeah...yes you’ve got two brown
306 Sa a dark brown
307 Su when you get speckled
308 Sa a dark there...there
All three girls compete for the floor as they discuss [73. The content 
frame is weak; the blending conception is used by Sarah at (303) and 
this is accepted by the others as plausible. The use of "dark"/"darker” 
by Tracey, Sarah and Sue may indicate that the 'dominance' of darker 
colours is actively being considered, A less critical consensus seems
to be developing during this exchange; they are still keen to have
their ideas accepted but also be supportive of one another.
309 Sa Right now we've got to have something to go with this 
..grey put grey and white one
310 Su Yeah have a white one for a change
311 Su you might get a white one
312 T yeah., you probably get a white one
313 T we get grey with white again..grey with white
314 Su pop it in
315 T no. that's about it really .you might get a sort of darker 
grey dark grey
316 Sa probably take the light colours
317 T maybe and have a white
318 Sa maybe that
319 Su Yeah
320 T a sort of odd one
321 Sa Mmm
322 T have another white
323 Su have another white
324 T no can’t see that another white
325 Su what about one of these
326 Sa they reproduce
In their discussion of [83 Sue and Tracey agree that an albino might 
be introduced as a mate for one of the offspring of [73 (310-312). The 
girls seem very tentative about their ideas. The conception underlying 
their choice of light grey offspring seems to arise almost by passive 
acceptance. Tracey suggests a white offspring at (317) and is 
supported by the others. She qualifies this choice at (320) as ’’an odd 
one". It seems that she may be referring to the frequency of albinos 
when at (322 and 324) she contemplates the possibility of another 
"white one".
327 T have a dark one
328 Sa yeah
329 T and might have one like that
330 Sa Ehmm..yet
331 T dark brown (***)
332 Sa I like that little black one
333 Su what about those two..those two probably have a light 
brown
334 Sa they have a darker...they have light browns
335 Su they might have light brown
336 Sa and another white maybe
337 T maybe an add white one...maybe another dark brown, dark 
brown
338 Sa No..because isn't it..oh yes
339 T another dark brown
340 Su maybe your dark
341 T make it a speckled
342 Su Yeah, you would get a dark brown..its not a very dark 
brown . yeah like that.
Discussion of [93 (327-332) very passive and uninvolved. The offspring 
are chosen by all three girls with little debate. At (333) Sarah 
suggests that the cross [103 will have "light browns". Sue seems to
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agree tentatively with this choice (335) which seems to be underpinned 
by a blending conception. Sarah’s response to Tracey’s suggestion of 
"dark brown” offspring is interesting; she seems to be in two minds as 
she perhaps reconciles blending on the one hand (light browns) and 
’dominance’ (darker/stronger) (338) on the other. Sue at (342) seems 
to be in the same predicament. Tracey at (337) again refers to the 
frequency of white mice in response to Sarah’s ’invitation’ at (336). 
Task orientation and consensus are again much in evidence. It is 
interesting that the four offspring chosen at [10] are albino, light 
brown, brown and dark brown, representing the spectrum of shades
’between’ the two parent coat colours.
5.1.1 Summary
Presented with the first task, it is Sue who takes the lead in the 
discussion, chairing the activities of the others. Her initial 
conceptions are, in common with most of the conceptions used by the 
girls, implicit rather than explicit. During this early period Sue uses 
her strong leads to ’float’ conceptions and seems to be choosing 
offspring on the basis of a) that they look like their parents (like
begets like), b) that there is a degree of phenotypic variation in the
offspring, c) that siblings tend to look alike, and d) that offspring 
are a "mixture” of their parents. This ecosystem of conceptions is an 
interesting response to the ’cues' set up by cards which show 
phenotypically homozygous parents, heterozygous parents and parents 
with one offspring. The mixture conception is being used in the 
heterozygous situations and ’like begets like’ in homozygous cases.
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VWith respect to Sue's use of her mixture conception and in 
particular the term "mixture”, the strong interaction frame presented 
by Tracey and Sue allows them to develop their own idiosynchratic 
understanding of this conception. Their mutual support and acceptance 
of each others offspring choices gives the impression that the mixture 
conception is the basis of common understanding. However, Tracey's 
mixture conception seems to be based on the idea that there is scope 
in the choice of offspring for a wide range of phenotypic variability; 
offspring are less of a colour mixture determined by the parents 
colour and more 'mixed up’ in the sense that their colour will be 
unpredictable. Sue's conception of offspring variability seems to be 
confined to limits set by the parental phenotypes, but the competitive 
collaboration between the girls never exposes this difference in their 
conceptions as they go along with one anothers suggestion without 
ever questioning the basis of the choice. The lack of conceptual 
explicitness and the nature of their interactions allows both girls to 
develop their own conceptions.
The differences between Sue and Tracey’s mixture conceptions are 
exposed when Tracey presents Sue and Sarah with the apparent anomaly 
of two black parents having a white offspring. This is in fact an 
extension/amplification of the potential anomaly presented by the card 
itself where two black mice have a brown offspring. It Is Sarah's 
disagreement with Tracey's albino choice that exposes and makes more 
explicit the difference between Sue and Tracey’s notions of mixture 
and may indicate that Sarah shares Sue’s conception of mixture and 
that this is the basis of her disagreement. Although Sarah seems very 
aware of the 'audience' around her and appears passive, this exchange
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with Tracey indicates she is involved in the activity. It is worth 
noting that the girls do not follow up this episode with further 
discussion of their viewpoints, indeed the discussion is suspended by 
Sue who moves on to the next card. This action may act in such a way 
to damp out the focus of disagreement and thus maintain the 
cooperative relationship within the group.
Before leaving this episode it is interesting to speculate that the 
anomaly recognised by Sarah only became effective when Tracey 
exceeded the limits of plausibility of Sarah’s conceptual ecosystems 
ie, offspring ’’mixtures” determined by the parents coat colour, and 
some degree of variation in the offspring coat colour.
In their discussion of the card following Sarah’s disagreement with 
Tracey, Sue seems to be supporting Tracey by using her conception of 
variation in the offspring phenotype. This meets with the agreement of 
the others and their consensus is re-established. Whether Tracey takes 
this as an acceptance of her mixture conception or not, she re­
introduces her related nation of offspring variability. Again Sarah 
disagrees with her and this is supported by Sue. Interestingly Sarah 
seems to arbitrate with the others to re-establish a consensus in 
which Tracey sticks to her conception of mixture/variability and Sue 
operates her sibling similarity conception along with her notion of 
m ixture/blending.
During the discussion of the next few cards Tracey and Sue seem to 
adapt their conceptions of ’’mixture” and accommodate each others 
ideas. Thus, neither Tracey’s nor Sue’s conception is refuted and both 
remain viable and active in their ecosytems. Sarah again disagrees 
with the selections made by Tracey and Sue on the basis of their ’’new”
conception of offspring variability/mixture/blending, she seems to be 
advocating the use of a mixture conception similar to Sue's original 
nation. She maintains this position whilst Tracey and Sue ’cement' 
their tolerance of each others mixture conception; Sarah seems to 
eventually accept this position and her disagreement seems to have 
little effect on subsequent offspring choices. The variability/mixture/ 
blending conception shared by Tracey and Sue seems to have developed 
a high degree of explanatory adequacy.
After the comprehension task the girls competitively collaborate 
over the selection of parents and offspring in the final 'problem' 
task. Tracey introduces the 'dominance' conception with some authority 
almost immediately; dominance is interpreted as strength of colour, 
and the 'dominance' of dark colours. Tracey’s choice of offspring on 
the basis of her 'dominance' conception cause Sue to challenge her 
selections. It is at this point that she makes explict her mixture 
conception and the notion of blending parental colours contained 
within it. It is intersting that this blending conception interacts 
with the notion of offspring variation in that various shades of 
colour are possible on the basis of the parental mix. This in turn may 
be the basis of Sue’s understanding of Tracey’s variability/mixture 
ideas, but she seems reluctant to adapt the conception to the idea of 
dominance as a type of blending in which strong (dark) colours 
dominate lighter coat colours. Indeed it is left to Sarah to make this 
connection between the blending of colours and the dominance of 
darker colours. This adaptation of the blending conception to 
accommodate the notion of dominance is an interesting reflection on
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how the range of convenience of a conception can be extended, and how 
an existing conception is used to 'make sense’ of a 'new' idea,
This episode with its contradictions and uncertainty seems to 
reduce the level of interaction between the girls. Perhaps conscious of 
the need to monitor the harmony of their relationships, this may again 
damp out the opportunity for more detailed discussion of their 
conceptions and their respective points of view.
As the discussion picks up again Sue seems to reconcile her 
conflict between blending and dominance conceptions accepting Tracey 
and Sarah’s synthesis of the dominance and blending. Equally, Tracey's 
choices of mice reflect the use of the blending conception without its 
dominance component. Sarah also perseveres with her conception of 
'like begets like’ whilst this is going on.
During the rest of the activity all three girls seem mutually 
supportive as they deploy dominance and blending conceptions. They 
seem to establish a consensus on the use of blending parental colours 
and dominance of darker colours; the two conceptions eventually seem 
to merge with Sue and Sarah appearing to extend the range of 
convenience of blending to include the 'dominance' of darker colours. 
Blending/dominance becomes the main conception used by the girls in 
the latter stages of the task.
Interestingly at this time Tracey introduces another conception 
about the frequency of albino offspring within families. This 
conception is not made very explicit but it is possible to speculate 
that not only does it increase the heterogeneity of Tracey’s ecosystem, 
but it may also have some bearing on the tendency of the dominance 
conception to produce darker colours ie. not white. Thus Tracey’s
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conception of the possibility of mouse parents producing the "odd 
white” (albino) may not only be based on an everyday awareness of the 
rarity of albinos but that this conception can explain the appearance 
of white mice alongside those chosen on the basis of the dominance 
conception. Thus Tracey in this way may add to the flexibilty and 
heterogeneity of her conceptual ecosystem as it evolves to meet the 
needs of the problem context.
As the girls work through the tasks, consensus and the maintenance 
of good working relationships seems to act in such a way as to 
reduce the heterogeneity of their conceptual ecosystems wheteher by 
adaptation (range of convenience of conceptions extended) or by social 
interactions which damp out debate and disagreement centred on the 
utility of conceptions. This consensus may bring temporary stability 
and reduced heterogeneity to their ecosystems as some conceptions are 
used more than others perhaps depending on their explanatory adequacy 
in a number of problem contexts. Acting against this trend are several 
other features of the ecosystem. The lack of explicitness surrounding 
conceptions coupled with the style of interaction in which offspring 
choices are ’thrown out’ by the girls (competitive collaboration/strong 
interaction frames) perhaps as a way of experimenting with their 
conceptions in a social context. This strategy maintains the 
heterogeneity of their ecosystem by insulating its conceptions from 
the selection pressures associated with ’getting it wrong’ in the eyes 
of the other girls or exposing the weakness of an idea in relation to 
someone elses conception(s). Even when disagreement causes a 
conception to be made explicit or anomaly brings it into competition 
with other conceptions, conceptions do not seem to be overtly
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discredited/destroyed’ or replaced. Either by adaptation of the 
conception (range of convenience extended) or by the suspension of 
debate eg. simply moving on to the next card, existing conceptions 
seem to be maintained in the ecosystem thus maintaining its 
heterogeneity. It is interesting in this respect that the blending 
conception seems to resonate with the girls interpretation of 
dominance and that this seems to result in the almost exclusive use of 
these conceptions in the later stages of the session. Indeed, the only 
other conception used is Tracey’s conception of albino frequency in 
mouse families.
All three ecoystems are heterogeneous and are consequently highly 
resilient in the sense they are able to absorb change by damping out 
the effects of social/conceptual perturbations. However, it is 
interesting to observe that the girl’s ecosystems are vulnerable to 
resonances set up by ideas from the text (dominance) which seem to 
amplify existing conceptions of mixture/blending. Perhaps this is 
achieved by giving the latter conception greater explanatory adequacy 
in the context of the problem or by being given more plausibility by 
the textual ’authority’ of the dominance notion. Equally, the girls’ 
desire to maintain positive working relationships through the 
accommodation of each others ideas may not only maintain the 
viability of ideas, and the heterogeneity of ecosystems but also allow 
the amplification of a conception as the other girls 'go along' with 
the idea.
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5.2 Case Study 2.
This group of 12 year old boys, Ben, Nick and James, were 
classmates and friends. They sat side by side in front of a desk 
about twelve feet from the camera. The session was conducted in 
their own classroom while the rest of the class attended lessons 
in adjacent rooms. The first task was introduced by the researcher, 
during which the number of mouse offspring in a family was 
negotiated and the general nature of the problem was explained. The 
boys were asked to discuss the first card, after which the 
researcher engaged the boys in a brief discussion by way of 
facilitating interpersonal communication.
Card 1 (Grey x Grey)
12 B Right ..a black one
13 Int I'll leave you to it
14 N It doesn’t have to be the same colour cause they might
turn out different colour mighten they
15 J Mmmm
16 B Has to be the same colour doesn’t it
(no discussion for 7 seconds, the boys look up)
17 Int Just about finished with that then ..What do you think
..lets have a look before we move onto the next one.,so 
what have you there
18 J Ehmm (laughs)
19 Int Other people have chosen them as well..what were you
thinking about when you chose that
20 J Same colour
21 N Yeah .same colour
22 B same colour
23 N as parent
24 Int What about that one there
25 N Well cause I don't know., they might be a variation of grey
26 Int What do you mean by variation..what are you thinking
about there
27 N Well a different sort of grey
28 B that’s brown though and that's black
29 N No that's brown
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30 B Mmm
Ben is quickly off the mark at (12) as he suggests black offspring. 
Nick’s disagreement at (14) is qualified with the implicit 
assumption that Ben is choosing offspring which are the same 
colour as the parents (Nick interpreting black as grey of parents) 
and that there can be variation in offspring colour. Nick presents 
a weak interaction frame at this point and Ben at (16) seems to 
restate his case for offspring/parent similarity, The boys look up 
at the interviewer signalling completion, effectively suspending the 
discussion. James says little at this stage and little effort is 
made by the others to involve him in the discussion.
During the interviewer's review of card 1 at (19) an effort is 
made to elicit James’s view, he looks puzzled and not surprisingly 
a little nervous. At (20) he seems to be restating Ben’s conception 
that the offspring will be the "same colour”. Ben and Nick support 
this statement with Nick adding a qualification at (23), indicating 
that he may share a common frame with the others. At (25) Nick 
restates his idea of possible colour variation in the offspring but 
is unable at this point to explain to the interviewer his reasons 
for this although he does give a description of what he means by 
variation at (27), Ben questions Nick's colour recognition and its 
relationship to what Nick says about variation and his choices on 
the card (28-30), The debate is short-lived and although no 
explanation is offered Ben seems to accept Nick's defence.
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The bays were next introduced to card 2 (Dark brown x Light brown 
+ Dark brown offspring) and the presence of the offspring in this 
card explained. There was no audible discussion of this card 
although the boys did monitor each others choices visually. After 
25-30 seconds the activity was suspended by the boys looking up at 
the researcher.
31 Int. Finished James
32 J Yeah
33 Int So what did you decide this time ..what did you 
choose..why did you choose that one for example
34 N that one
35 Int Yeah
36 N Well cause those two colours might make that sort of 
colour
37 B if they were mixed
38 N yeah
39 Int Yeah is that what you were thinking
40 B Mmm
41 Int James do you agree or what were you thinking
42 J (*•*) a mixture of these two colours all of them
43 Int Ok. Listen what I want to do now is let you see 
yourself and then let you get on by yourselves.
(replay of session on video recorder)
Asked about his choices in card 2 Nick seems to offer a blending 
conception (36). His use of the word "make” is interesting and may 
indicate an experiential idea related to colouring, painting/mixing. 
Ben's support and qualification of this notion at (37) is based on 
mixing. James echos this at (42) in response to the interviewer's 
question.
Card 3 (Albino x Albino)
44 J Turn them all over
45 N turn them all over
46 J keep turning
47 B someone has taken ages to do all these
48 N well they’re printed those aren’t they
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49 J and they’re
50 N coloured yeah
51 J (*•***) colour them and stick that on the back of them
(inaudible)...we are on TV again
52 N sort of TV
53 J Blimey they are masses of them . can we start on the next
one
54 N Yeah...,,..why have you put grey on them
55 B Why have you put black on them
56 If whites aren’t all that common are they
57 B but white times white
58 If Yeah I know thats why I put two
whites . but you don't usually get all whites do you
59 B but if you
60 N no you don't
61 B get white times white I reckon that it would be light grey
wouldn’t it
62 N Yeah it could..why did you put a grey one then
63 B do we move onto the next one
64 N I'm changing this grey one.
After an initial period of task management and task awareness (44- 
53) Nick and Ben engage in an episode of competitive questioning. 
Ben’s choice of some grey mice seems to be at the root of Nick’s 
question (54) and Ben’s response at (55) seems to be prompted by 
the same implicit anomaly of why white mice should have grey (Ben) 
or black (Nick) offspring. At (56) Nick suggests that albinos are 
rare in their occurrence and seems to be using a conception about 
albino frequency. Ben’s tries make his ideas more explicit at (57) 
but is interrupted at (58) where Nick seems to be acknowledging 
what he believes to be Ben's frame (the sameness of parents and 
offspring), and also qualifies his previous statement about albino 
rarity.
At (61) Ben manages to qualify his choice of light grey 
offspring. The use of "times" to mean 'crossed with’ is interesting 
in terms of the relationship between 'x' in a genetical cross and 
'x' in a mathematical context. It is not clear what Ben’s
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conceptions are but the emphasis on "light” grey offspring (61) 
may indicate that he has a notion of familial similarity and 
offspring variability, the latter perhaps being influenced by his 
exchange with Nick during Card 1. Ben does not pursue the 
discussion and suspends the activity by indicating that they might 
move on to the next card (63).
Card 4 (Black x Light Brown)
65 N Black one...grey yeah get one of those..yeah that ones got a 
grey bottom though .try and find one without
66 B Ahh..blimey there's not..he must have just forgotten to 
colour it in
67 N (***)
68 B Look it hasn’t any but maybe if its white times white one 
might be a light grey
69 N that’s what I’ve done
70 B no but light grey bottom
71 N no
72 B like his mother
73 N like one of those
74 B that one
75 N (♦****) don’t put too many on..silly baby
76 J well they’ve got up to about eight
77 B they’re usually quite varied aren’t they
78 J eight babies
79 B so move on to the next one
80 N Don’t don't don’t wait ..same colour as that ok
81 B yeah I’m ready
During the discussion of this card there is much talking at 'cross 
purposes' between Nick and Ben. Their implicit conceptions make it 
difficult for them to share each others ideas. Ben’s notion at (66, 
68,70,72) is focused on his idea that the belly colours and main 
coat colour are independently capable of 'mixing*. Nick does not 
seem to get the drift of Ben's argument as he sticks to his own
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implicit ideas. At (77) Ben maintains the strong interaction frame 
but seems to be offering to share with Nick the content frame 
related to their conception of variation in the offspring. Without 
further discussion, Ben signals the move to the next card at (79) 
suspending the debate. James plays very little part in the 
discussion ; he seems quite happy to get on by himself without the 
need to talk about it. He does monitor visually the choices of the 
other two, James is censured by Nick at (75) for putting too many 
mice on the card; he defends this at (76) although this episode 
seems to reinforce James's isolation from the activities of the 
others.
Card 5 (Black x Black + Brown Offspring)
82 N Black
83 B black times black
84 N equals black (laughs)
85 B Why is that brown one in there
86 N cause when they get brown genes might be different
(no discussion for 1 minute boys restrict themselves to
looking at each others choices)
87 B Maybe light grey
88 N light grey
89 B maybe dark grey then...black times black
90 N why would it be
91 B don't know
92 N go onto the next one
93 J (»******)
94 N no it was in there already
At (82-83) Nick’s completion of Ben’s ’’times” rhyme allows him to 
lead strongly with his choice of black offspring. At (85) Ben seems 
to be aware of the anomaly presented by the presence of a brown 
offspring. This would perhaps indicate that his previous
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conceptions of offspring variation are interactive with the 
blending conception, ie. the limits of variation are set by the 
blending of the parental colours. It is interesting in this respect 
that at (89) when questioned about his choice, a plausible outcome 
of ’’black times black” is dark grey (product of parental coat and 
belly colours). Asked to justify this by Nick, Ben seems tentative 
and unsure. Nick does not seem to share Ben’s notion of blending 
coat and belly colours. At (86) Nick's explanation using the word 
’’genes” is interesting, revealing that he has some previous 
experience of ’inheritance’ and ’genes’, but seems unable to explain 
to Ben what he means by it. The discussion of this card is very 
tentative, and the long pause after Nick’s ’explanation’ at (86) 
seems to underline their uncertainty about their choices. Again 
suspension of the discussion by Nick (92) damps out further debate. 
The apparent anomaly of the brown mouse remains unresolved, Nick 
and Ben seemingly unable to articulate or justify the conceptions 
they are using nor share a common content frame. In describing 
this episode it may be that we have an insight into the 
inarticulateness associated with intuitive theories and the way 
that the lack of a ’communal’ understanding affects the amount of 
interaction betwen their ’personal' conceptions.
Card 6 (Black x Speckled + Speckled Offspring)
95 J (****)
96 N Could get a black with that because that would turn into
that
97 J there's a dark brown one
98 N dark brown
99 J haven’t got any speckled one
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100 N Oh yeah, very dark brown
101 B very dark brown
102 N that's the
103 B that’s the darkest
104 N yeah that's the darkest brown
105 J What da you reckon black and grey would be called
106 N Black
107 B hey Nick
108 N black and brown
109 J black yeah
110 B yeah darkest grey..very dark grey
111 N no.but that's quite a light colour isn't it
112 B yeah I know it is but you know.,yeah I know its a very
light colour but its got black dots on it hasn't it
113 N Yeah
114 B Yellow bottoms
115 N Want a black without yellow bottoms
116 J dark brown with yellow bottoms
117 N there aren't any .turn some over
118 B Jamie you've gone miles ahead
119 N (**•***)
120 B <***)
121 J dark grey with yellow bottom
122 B just get yellow one black one
123 N black one
At (95-104) Nick and Ben seem to re-establish a shared blending 
conception; the black parent's contribution to the blend manifesting 
itself in their debate about the "darkest” brown offspring choice. 
This blending conception is used again by Ben at (112) in response 
to Nick’s disagreement. It is interesting that Nick comments on the 
dilution of colour strength in the offspring as a result of the 
"light colour” (111). Ben’s response that the black dots of the 
agouti parent will favour darker colours seems to be a plausible 
explanation of his choice and this is accepted by Nick. From (114— 
123) all three boys seems to be engaged in thinking out loud; this 
strategy has an 'experimental' quality in that offspring choices 
are articulated for public consumption as if to test the direction 
of the others thinking, to pick up on any conceptions that may
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resonate with their choice, all at minimal 'cost* to their own 
conceptual ecosystem which remains implicit and insulated from 
'error' and the need for adaptation. This pattern of interaction may 
enhance the resilience of their conceptual ecosystems by damping 
out conceptual interaction.
James is more involved at this stage in the discussion but is in 
fact working on card nine, out of step with the others. He is keen 
to help in task collaboration and makes an effort to elicit opinion 
(105) but is often ignored or censured by Ben in particular (118).
Card 7 (Brown x Brown + Albino)
( No discussion between the boys for 25-30 seconds)
124 J I wonder if two dark browns make up a black
125 N Yeah maybe ,.,.I don’t know if ..it is even might just
be any old colour...could be
126 B What
127 N I don't know ..those colours
128 B (***)
129 N I don't know....dark brown
(no discussion for one minute 20 seconds)
130 N Where are those ones without the grey stomach
131 J without the grey stomachs
132 N yeah
133 J there aren’t any
134 N Oh yeah thats the one that I got wasn’t it
135 B How are we meant to do this one
136 N put them on.,they've lost all of theirs haven’t they
137 B It hasn't got one has it
138 N nor did the first one . yeah the first one didn’t
139 B Look at this one there is nothing darker than black is
there
140 N No
141 J if they’ve been put on they've been put on the square
142 B I don’t know
(15 seconds of silence)
143 B Oh yeah I figure it
144 J (***)
145 B still an that
146 N Yeah
(no discussion for 40 seconds)
147 B Cor streuth
(10 second pause in discussion)
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148 B are there any of them
149 J any of those grey bottoms
150 N they probably didn’t da it
151 B it will just have to be grey bottoms then
152 J (***♦*)
153 B where...Oh no Jamie there must be one
154 B just have to use a grey bottom
155 N any dark browns
156 B only a few oh no 
(50 second pause in the discussion)
157 N haven't got a grey with
158 J see what the last one is
159 B
160 N don't have to
(no dialogue for 23 seconds)
161 N are there any dark greys
162 B do you think white times white will be white 
grey
163 N could be
(No dialogue for 30 seconds)
164 N are any of those without grey
165 J No
166 B No I looked as well
167 N darker grey
(30 second pause in the discussion)
168 B I’m finished
169 N Yeah
After card 7 the discussion between the boys is increasingly 
fragmentary. All three follow their own conceptions in isolation 
and although there is some visual monitoring of each others 
choices they quickly get out of step with one another by 
determining their own pace through the cards. At (139) and (162) 
Ben seems to be persevering with his blending conception of coat 
and belly colours as the basis of offspring colour. His invitations 
to comment on his choice of offspring are not taken up by the 
others and he tends to receive tentative, rather passive responses 
(163). At (124) James seems to be using a blending conception. 
Nick's response at (125) is non-committal indeed his suggestion 
that any colour of offspring might be possible may reflect this
uncertainty and his awn awareness of the limitations of the 
conceptions being used to predict the offspring. It is noteworthy 
that Nick’s response may in fact increase the heterogeneity of his 
conceptual ecosystem. In spite of the task collaboration involved 
in finding offspring cut-outs there is little explicit discussion 
about their choices; they seem more intent in completing the task.
It is interesting that although they may have become bared with 
the activity, which I doubt, this change in the pattern of 
interaction occured after the anomaly presented by card 7, This may 
be a manifestation of the boys apparent inability to give an 
adequate explanation of the relationship between the parents and 
the offspring when the latter is markedly different from the 
parents. They may even be aware of the limitations of their 
existing conceptions in this context.
After being introduced to the reading task the boys read for 
10 to 12 minutes, occasionally looking up, or whispering asides to 
one another. Again there was the feeling that this was a pattern of 
behaviour very close to the expectations of a classroom situation
when they are given "reading to do".
170 B What are genes
171 N Eh
172 B Genes,.what are they
173 N they are things inside you
174 B Oh
175 N see they're inside you ..they could be like our hair., 
might be ...what
176 J (**) biological
177 N Biological
(all three read in silence for 25 seconds)
178 J bits it says ..by parts of genes
179 N no genes are things inside you though ..not they are 
part of you
180 J no. what is this
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181 N
182 B
183 N
like people 
Jamie
people have probably got genes ....cause like black
parents won't have a white child will they
No but it says (****) will receive one gene from the
father and one from the mother making up a pair of
genes
well then
184 J
185 N
186 J its not inside the body is it
In response to Ben's inquiry about genes (he may have remembered 
Nick using the word earlier) Nick qualifies what he has read with 
his own previous understanding of genes (173,175). The disagreement 
that develops between James and Nick about genes (178-186) seems 
to be based on Nick’s previous knowledge of genes as being inside 
the body (in cells perhaps) and James’s understanding of the text 
when it refers to the transmission of genes (in sperm and eggs) 
during reproduction, which James sees as genes going out of the 
body. Interestingly, this 'misunderstanding' gives Nick at least the 
opportunity to articulate his understanding of genes and his 
anecdote/example at (183) provides an interesting insight into the 
sort of social experiences that he may be using to support his 
conceptions. This particular idea that "black parents won’t have a 
white child" may have some bearing on his previous responses in 
terms of the effectivness of the anomalies presented by the mouse 
families with offspring with no parental similarity. Ben is 
supportive of Nick during his discussion with James to the extent 
of gently ridiculing James's inability to see the point (182).
The boys read on for about 7 minutes, whispering asides, 
occasionally looking up, but mainly reading the text in silence. 
They stopped reading at the same time and signalled their 
intention to move to the next activity by closing over their texts
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and "sitting up straight”. Indeed the general pattern of behaviour 
during this task seemed to be very much influenced by the 
'traditional' style of classroom reading/private study.
The bays were familiar with the format of the family tree problem 
and after a brief resume of the "rules” they began the task on 
their own.
187 B don't do black
188 N why not its an easy one
189 B its the wrong colour
190 N it is it gets black
191 B oh yeah, you get black
192 N black
193 J can we kneel on the chairs
194 B make it neater
195 J is it ok if we kneel
196 B will it be another black do you reckon
197 N Yeah Mmm...we’ve got to do that one now
198 J Grey
199 N ok let’s have two grey
200 B its unfair really, we could do them all easy ones, like
we could do grey times grey or black times black all 
the way through it (awareness of researcher)
201 Int Its up to you
202 N dark grey . did it say you could get
dark grey
203 J You can
204 N no like that
205 J No
206 N can we look back in the book
207 B white., grey mice
208 N mice with coloured coats .albino mice they have got
them
209 B they have
210 N no it could be this ..no it won't be..grey mice they
haven't told you
211 B where
212 N that they haven't got grey mice
213 B yeah they have
214 N (***)
215 B it will probably just be grey Nick if. if black times
black is black it must be grey
216 N might as well do it dark grey then
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A strong interaction frame is presented by all three boys. Ben 
seems aware of task strategies at <200) and it is interesting that 
"easy" selections are based on his ’ritual' ("times") conception.
This implicit idea seems to be one of 'like begets like’ or the 
blending of identical parents (215). Ben’s attachment to this 
conception and his continuous use of it to guide his choices may be 
an ongoing attempt to test its adequacy and utility. Indeed it may 
be part of an increasingly stable ecosystem of conceptions with a 
high degree of explanatory adequacy.
The literary experience of reading the text appears to be the basis 
of the discussion at (202-213) as the boys seek to 
authenticate/validate their choices. When compared to James, Ben is 
much more facilitatory in his collaboration with Nick,
217 B so look you’ve got those two now
218 N you would get black wouldn’t you because that’s
dominant over that
219 B Oh yeah
220 N yeah black..black black
221 B and ...right got now to find a mate for this
one as well
222 N no do the other one first
223 J what about that there
224 N Mmm do another black
225 J (***)
226 B its lighter though isn't it
227 N No . its lighter you wouldn't
228 B if anything darker colours
229 N a darker grey or
230 J what if we put a lighter colour there
231 N (**■*) dark grey
232 J What if we put a lighter grey ..what about if we took
ehm . put a lighter grey there and a darker grey there 
...what about if we ehm if we put this one there
233 B You’re just trying to make it more easy
234 N put that one there ..where is that darker one
235 B have a look at these there might be more
236 N we need a dark grey one
237 J dark grey pull it out there
238 N that's not a dark grey one
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239 B its not going to be dominant
240 N no its not well
241 B because its
242 N we could do another black
243 B we'll do another black
244 N there aren’t any more blacks
At (218) Nick introduces the notion of ’dominance’ into the 
discussion. He and Ben develop a consensus about choices centering 
on the ’dominance’ of black coat colour. They emphasise the 
dominance of darker colours (228-229) as they develop their shared 
frame. It is interesting to speculate that their conception of 
’dominance’ as gleaned from the text is associated with the nation 
of strength of colour and the outcome of blending light and dark 
colours. Dominance as interpreted by the boys existing conceptions 
may be simply an amplification of an existing conception which 
resonates with their 'understanding* of the text information,
James’s efforts to have his ideas accepted are not facilitated by 
the others as they extend their own ideas of dominance. At (234- 
243) it is worth noting that Ben and Nick have decided that the 
introduction of a black mouse in the cross will have definite 
consequences and that this action will produce more black 
offspring.
245 J there are..look here you are get another black
246 B come on let’s find something
247 N that goes with that
248 B it doesn’t have to
249 J yeah but it can
250 B come on then
251 N put that one on there
252 B that’s going to be boring its all blacks and greys
253 N ok. do that then
254 B yeah that's better
255 N you like making things hard
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256 B it will be black again won’t it ..do you reckon it will 
be black because thats the dominant colour
257 N I don’t want to carry on doing black do it properly
258 B you have to..it will be black again..I’ll find some 
black....there are three..there and there.there’s black
259 N there's one black
260 B what else do you want
261 J there’s two blacks ..I’ve got hundreds of blacks on 
mine
262 N Black black
263 B they’ll all have to be blacks
264 N Oh all right how many one two three black . nine 
blacks
265 B well they'll be a family
266 N No no we need one from here..we can’t get a darker 
colour than that we are just carrying on doing blacks
267 B Mmm
268 J there you have some blacks
269 N that's going to be dominant all the time
270 J well it will just have to be blacks all the time won’t
it
From (245-262) the boys come to the growing realization that the 
family tree is made up of black mice and that this is the ultimate 
outcome of their strategy. Nick seems to have reservations that 
they are doing the problem "properly” (257) it may be that the 
uniformity conflicts with his expectations. Ben seems to be more 
realistic and seems able to convince Nick that they have no choice 
but to have black mice (263-4). Nick’s correction of Ben at (266) 
indicates his awarenes of black as the ultimate colour in terms of 
'dominance* and colour ’strength’. Ben seems to be able to reconcile 
the number of black mice chosen by saying that they are after all 
a "family” (265). This may reflect on his previous conception of 
familial resemblance.
271 B it will just have to be blacks all the time
272 N oh no boring
273 J let’s start again
274 N I'm not starting again
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275 J Why not it won't take long ..we don't want too many 
blacks
276 B you shouldn’t have put a black there
277 N you have to because there are two blacks there..if you 
put a black there then its still going to be dominant 
over whatever
278 B start again then
The reservation of Nick about the effects of 'black dominance' are 
raised again. At (276) Ben points out that having used a black 
mouse early on in the tree was a 'mistake'. Nick's reply at (277) 
restates the effect of dominance on later generations. It is 
interesting that the effect of dominance on their choices is seen 
by Nick and James (275) as a problem and it may be possible that 
such a phenatypically uniform tree conflicts with their existing 
conceptions and expectations,
279 N oh no
280 B let’s start with light colour now
281 N right .right not a black were not having a black
282 J but he’s got a yellow bottom..who owns him
283 N that's going to be dominant over that isn't it so we’re 
going to have those bee’s (sic) again
284 J oh no
285 B we’ll just get a darker colour won't we
286 J oh no.,what about one of those
287 N no you couldn’t no
288 J might
289 B Yeah its an idea Jamie .excellent idea
290 N we've got no
291 B Jamie Jamie we need one of those with a white bottom
292 N why wouldn’t you get black on it
293 J look Jamie's about to solve the problem
294 B look that’s the only light darker colour that the 
darker colours
295 N How would you get black though
296 B if you know what I mean
297 N how would you get black on it ..why would you get 
black on it
298 B we're not just choosing one
299 N you are stupid..its not logic
The boys decide to try again with the aim of not including black 
mice in the tree (281). They remove all previous choices from the 
board. At (283-285) they realise they are repeating their previous 
efforts. James chooses an agouti mouse at (286) as a compromise, 
this type having both light and dark colours in its coat. Although 
supported by Ben, Nick is very critical of this choice (299), Their 
activities are increasingly task orientated.
300 B we need a very dark brown
301 N we need a very dark brown ..we get another and get one 
of those with a white
302 B what do you want I'll find it
303 N do a darker grey it will be easier
304 B it will get darker and eventually end up with black 
well we’ll just use black for them all
305 N put one of those, now what happens..dark brown dark 
brown
306 J don't panic my son..look I got a dark brown
307 B it’ll be dark brown
308 N yeah pretty logical, get another dark brown..we need a 
dark brown there and a dark brown there..we need a 
dark brown there..dark browns are pretty popular
In spite of trying again the boys are once more faced with the 
'dominance1 of dark brown mice. Ben at (304) seems to be aware of 
the effect of dark colours in their crosses. In fact they end up in 
the same situation as before in which the family tree becomes 
increasingly dominated by dark colours, although this time it is
dark brown mice (308).
309 J dark brown
310 B it’ll just have to..cause if you change that it’ll 
the whole thing
311 J there’s another dark brown
312 N right dark brown
313 J there’s a dark brown
314 B there will just have to be a third dark brown
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315 J we can put some blacks into it
316 B here's another one
317 N there are too many dark browns in it
318 B well there’s not going to be anything else unless the
book is lying
319 N now what we need
320 J the book could be lying
321 B this just follows the book rules doesn’t it
Task orientation increases with, all three boys collaborating in 
their 'hunt' for dark brown mice. There is a 'fateful acceptance' of 
the constraints imposed on their choices by the 'dominance' notion. 
Nick (317) is still critical of this homogeneity ; James suggests 
that black mice could be used (315) but this is ignored, perhaps 
because it takes them back to square one. Ben's response to Nick's 
doubts about the number of dark brawn mice in the tree is 
interesting in that it may be an insight into his acceptance of 
textual authority (318,321). James’s suggestion that the book "could 
be lying" is ignored in spite of the fact that it might have opened 
up new lines of thinking. Perhaps a book lying is not particularly 
plausible.
5.2.1 Summary
The cognitive and social interaction between Ben and Nick is an 
early feature of the session. There is a collaborative style to the 
activities of these two boys as they present reasonably weak 
content and interaction frames. Ben seems eager to initiate and 
lead the discussion but is deferential to Nick’s ideas. Both boys 
develop a conception of ’like begets like' in homozygous crosses
-  204 -
but it is interesting that in their discussion of card 1, Nick 
qualifies this during a disagreement with Ben about the notion that 
there will be some'variation in the offspring. The content frame of 
this disagreement is weak with the ’variation’ and the ’like begets 
like’ conceptions remaining implicit, Aware of this disagreement 
both Ben and Nick establish a consensus around the use of a 
blending conception for offspring choices in card 2. This consensus 
orientation is a characteristic of their interactions and by card 3 
Ben seems to be using Nick’s conception of ’variation’ along with 
the ’like begets like* conception, During their discussion of this 
card Nick elects to use a black offspring, which appears to present 
an anomaly to Ben who disagrees strongly with this choice. In 
terms of the conceptions used by Ben up to this point his 
disagreement is understandable, although his challenge to Nick’s 
choice is only supported by his ’ritual’ statement "white times 
white". This disagreement allows Nick to support his choice of a 
black mouse indirectly by refering to the rarity of albino mice. 
This exchange increases the heterogeneity of Nick’s conceptual 
ecosystem, however, the boys do not sustain their debate and Ben 
suspends the discussion by moving to the next card.
Ben and Nick seem to develop a consensus again in the next 
card, however the strong interaction frames presented and the 
implicitness of their conceptions gives Ben the opportunity to 
develop the blending conception to include the coat and belly 
colours of the parent mice. Nick seems to understand this in terms 
of his conception of variation in the offspring and goes along with 
Ben without really understanding what he is getting at. Talking at
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cross purposes in a collaborative environment may very well allow 
conceptions to develop.
At card 5 Nick exhibits his awareness of Ben's conceptions by 
supporting his conceptions and by using Nick's 'rhyme* of "black 
times black". Ben and Nick seem to have established a set of 
shared, interacting conceptions focused on blending, familial 
similarity, and colour variation in the offspring which in turn may 
represent an area of conceptual stability within their respective 
ecosystems. It is possible to speculate that stability in these 
terms may be a social factor related to consensus, agreement and 
collaboration, whilst in conceptual terms the inter-dependance and 
interconnectedness of conceptions within individual ecosystems may 
also contribute to a decrease in the heterogeneity and resilience 
of ecosystems. During the boys discussion of this card Ben becomes 
aware of an anomaly presented by the brown coloured offspring.
This is an insight into his notion of offspring variability which 
seems to be set by the parental colours and the 'shades' of colour 
produced by blending. It seems that this may be the basis of the 
anomaly’s effectiveness. Nick's explanation of "genes” does not seem 
to be adequate and although Ben and Nick make an effort to come up 
with a plausible explanation, the discussion is suspended as they 
decide to move on, perhaps dissatisfied with the knowledge that 
their present conceptions are inadequate. In their efforts to 
resolve the anomaly the fragmented character of the discussion is 
marked by silences and pauses; this is an interesting reflection on 
the possible absence of a 'communal' element to their personal 
understanding of the problem and the inability of Nick in
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particular to make 'public' his conception of "genes”. Conceptions 
may need this communal dimension if they are to have any utility 
for the individual and have any worth within his conceptual 
ecosystem.
Ben and Nick establish a consensus in the next card. Perhaps 
they are aware of the need to maintain their collaboration for 
although they compete to have their offspring choices accepted they 
seem to be sharing a common frame based on their blending 
conceptions. This consensus may result from their inadequate 
explanation of the anomaly and may reflect the need for the boys 
to re-establish the communal worth of their conceptions.
Card 7 presents the boys with the same problem card as 5.
Again the dialogue fragments as they come to terms with the 
anomaly of the white offspring from brown parents. Long silences 
punctuate this episode. James for the first time, using a blending 
conception, makes an overt suggestion as to offspring colour. Nick 
seems to imply in his conception that offspring can be highly 
variable, the inference being that the colouring can be very 
different from the parents. It is interesting that this situation 
has brought James into the discussion and has encouraged Nick to 
add to the heterogeneity of his ecosystem. Nick’s conception is not 
supported and he himself seems very unsure about it. Once again the 
discussion is suspended by moving on, with the 'problem' 
unresolved.
The remaining cards are discussed in a very fragmentary way 
with the boys largely following their own ideas. Task completion
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seems to be the main consideration with little discussion and the 
use of strong interaction frames and implicit conceptions.
After completing the comprehension task the boys began on the 
third and final ’problem’. They seemed to have a very good 
awareness of the nature of the task and much of their activity was 
focused on the completion of the problem, Initially Ben uses his 
’ritualised’ "black times black" and its related conceptions as the 
basis of his choices. He sees this as an "easy" strategy and this 
may reflect on the confidence and stability of his ecosystem. Nick 
and James seem to accept Ben's leads on this basis, but when Nick 
qualifies their choice of darker and darker offspring with the 
notion of ’dominance’, this idea becomes the only conception to be 
used in offspring selection, Nick’s understanding of dominance has 
developed from his blending conception in which ’dominance’ is 
understood in terms of strength of colour. The uptake of this 
conception by the boys and its apparent resonance may reflect its 
plausibility and intelligibility with existing conceptions. This 
factor, possibly coupled with the dissatisfaction generated by 
anomaly, may explain the impact of the dominance notion on the 
boys’ ecosystems and its almost exclusive use for the rest of the 
activity. In conjunction with their inability to resolve the anomaly 
of dissimilar offspring, Nick's use of an everyday example during 
their reading of the text (black parents won’t have a white child 
will they), may represent lay knowledge at the centre of the 
anomaly.
The boys’ exclusive use of the dominance notion is initially 
fruitful as the basis for offspring choices. However, there is a
-  208 -
growing awareness that by the fourth generation in the tree all of 
the mice are black and that all subsequent 'crosses1 will be black. 
Ben in particular seems to be uneasy with this outcome. It is 
possible that the uniformity of the offspring conflicts with their 
expectations of what family trees should look like. When they try 
the problem again they end up in the same predicament this time 
with dark brown mice. The 'extinction' of their previous 
conceptions and the exclusive use of the dominance notion is very 
interesting in terms of it producing apparently stable homogeneous 
ecosyterns. It is passible to speculate that the boys’ conflict and 
dissatisfaction with the outcomes of using a dominance conception 
may facilitate the continued appraisal of its worth, and in fact 
enhance the metastability of their conceptual ecosystems.
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5.3 Case Study 3.
This group was made up of three 12 year old girls who were 
friends and classmates, The session took place in their usual 
teaching room whilst other class members attended lessons in 
adjacent classrooms. Justine, Julie and Scotty sat side by side 
about twelve feet away from the camera, They apppeared to be 
relaxed and confident from the outset of the session. The first 
task was introduced by the researcher.
Int. 1 What sort of size of family do you think mouse 
families have
Jus 2 About eight
Jul 3 eight babies
Jus 4 eight young
Int 5 maybe not as many as that
Jus 6 around about six
Int 7 Ok five or six
Jus 8 what just to go with that
Sc 9 just to go with that
Int 10 Yes these are the parents and they’ve lost their 
family
Jus 11 just like that
Jul 12 little bo peep has lost her
Jus 13 a bit light
Int 14 try and give each other an idea of what you are doing 
so the others know why you've
Jus 15 is that brownish, that's
brawny
Sc 16 they wouldn't all be the same
Jus 17 they would they would sort of if 
there’s the two parents
Sc 18 they would not
Jus 19 well if the two parents were the same
sort of colour
Jul 20 if one was white and one was black they might be 
black and white
Sc 21 Yeah
Jus 22 yeah
Sc 23 they might not be the same
Jul 24 well look..if you've got a black 
mum you’re not going to turn out...you'd be a bit black
Sc 25 Yeah you do
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Jul 26 ..Yeah you're not going to be red. yellow are you
Sc 27 ..I'll be pink instead...cor
Jus 28 (inaudible)
Jul 29 Your pink,.pinker now
Sc 30 are you doing all the same colours
Jus 31 Yeah
Sc 32 I’m doing some light and some..
Jus 33 cos they’re so often the same .
will they
Sc 34 They wouldn't...some of them would have a lighter 
colour
Jus 35 (***)
Jul 36 Oh can we swap that one for
Jus 37 this one..,.there we are
Jul 38 Yes it so (**•**) ..makes pretty patterns
Int 39 let's see how you are doing
Sc 40 there’s only four Julie
Int 41 so what have you got
Jus 42 Oh that one doesn’t have a back on
Int 43 what have you gat there
Jul 44 I’ve got the same as Justines. but we haven't been 
copying have we
Sc 45 we’ve all got the same
Int 46 the same
Jul 47 except for our spacing
Int 48 why have you chosen these
Sc 49 Veil because
Jul 50 same as parents
Sc 51 They’d be the same .same type so the
same
Int 52 so the babies look the same
Jus 53 Yeah
Jus 54 if they were a different thing they would be sort of 
different
Card 1 (Grey x Grey)
The session began with the interviewer and the girls negotiating 
the numbers of mice in a mouse family, Julie's nursery rhyme 
response to the cueing of "lost” babies giving an indication of the 
relaxed style of this group from the outset. At (16) Scotty 
disagrees with Justine about the latter's choice of identical 
offspring. Scotty seems to be implicitly using a conception of
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colour variation in the offspring. A strong interaction frame is 
presented by Justine and Scotty as they disagree. Justine appears 
to be challenging Scotty's conception of variation with her own 
notion of ’like begets like' (19). There is a ritual feeling to their 
disagreement and in part the girls look as if they are giving a bit 
of a performance for the camera/researcher. Nevertheless, Scotty's 
challenge has made Justine’s conception a little more explicit. At 
(20, 24 and 26) Julie seems to be arbitrating in Scotty and Julie’s 
disagreement by using an example of 'like begets like’ but with 
parents of different colours. This allows her to use a conception 
which seems to be an adaptation of 'like begets like’ and which 
includes the notion of gender similarity between mother and 
daughter. This is a compromise which supports the nation of ’like 
begets like’ but reconciles it with the possibility of offspring 
variation when the parents are heterogeneous. Her use of 
anecdotal/experiential examples and the appeal to ’common sense’ - 
"you're not going to be red" -is particularly interesting in terms 
of the integration of conceptions and the appeal to the 
plausibility of these nations (26). The ’joky’ episode (27-28) about 
"pink" and blushing/embarrassment may diffuse some of the 
'antagonism' of the previous exchange. The perturbation set up by 
disagreement has allowed Julie to enhance the heterogeneity of her 
ecosystem in her role as arbiter. Scotty at (23) seems to be 
holding on to her variation conception and from (30-35) she and 
Justine disagree again as they challenge each others conceptions. 
Interestingly by the time the girls come to discuss their effort 
with the interviewer they all have identical choices. At (50-51)
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Julie is quick to use the 'like begets like' conception in response 
to the interviewer's question and she is apparently supported by 
Scotty. At (54) Justine seems to be reiterating Julies conception of 
gender similarity used at (20). Scotty's variation conception is not 
offered as a justification for their choices,
Card 2 (Brown x Black + Brown Offspring)
55 Int Ok let’s put these in front of you and look at the
next one
56 Jus Aha.Hah
57 Int there you are
58 Jus yes
59 Int (description of format of card)
60 Jus that’s one  would you get them sort of mixed as well
maybe
61 Int What ever you think..its entirely up to you .
there’s no real right or wrong answer.there’s just how 
you think you see the problem ..see what the others 
think
62 Sc This is nice oh yeah
63 Int work together
64 Sc Julie if there was a dark one and a light one
65 Jul What
66 Sc a light would be darker
67 Jul gee that's a point
68 Int How are you getting on
69 Sc Justine's she (**) look get a darker one Justine
70 Jul yeah
71 Sc because a dark brown and a light brown they mix
together
72 Int what do you mean by mix
73 Sc well there’s a light brown and a dark brown and when
you mix light and brown it would make a darker light 
brown
74 Jul If you mix black ...if you mix black and white together
you get grey
75 Sc and that a lighter black
76 Jus and it might happen with mice..put mice together in a
pot
77 Int it might..I don’t know
78 Jul I thought we would be handling real mice
79 Int oh would you like that
80 Jul Yes
81 Int yeah,.but they get really upset when they are
handled too much
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82 Jus I like mice I think they are sweet
83 Int I’d like to but
84 Jus you wouldn't be
to afford all the mice
able
85 Int for this number I would need a mouse farm wouldn’t 
I.,how are we doing
86 Sc yeah
87 Jus that's my selection
88 Jul I haven't done one yet I'm trying tD find
89 Int do you think there are a few more
90 Jul no I’m trying to find one that's got that colour 
stomach with brown dashes on it. multicoloured
91 Sc what do you mean ..like that
92 Jul Yeah without the grey stomach
93 Sc would there be one
94 Jul a grey tumach (sic)
95 Int see if there are any
96 Sc maybe
97 Jul they’ve all got grey stomachs or orange stomachs 
must
it
At (60) Scotty leads the discussion of card 2 with the nation 
of mixing. Perhaps remembering Julie’s example of black and white 
parents previously she elicits Julie’s support at (64) and goes on 
to elaborate and make explicit her blending conception (66,69,71 
and 73), Julie supports Scotty’s ideas, returning to her example of 
black and white parents (74), It is interesting that using the same 
exemplar Julie’s conceptions of 'like begets like’ and blending have 
mutual tolerance and that she apparently sees no conflict between 
them in this situation. At (76) Justine makes explicit her 
perceptions of what the other two are doing in terms of the 
blending conception. Her reference to "it might happen with 
mice..put them together in a pot”, highlights the similarity between 
their experience of mixing paint/colours and the blending 
conception. Her sceptical use of this analogy externalises and 
gives an insight into the process of extending the range of
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convenience of existing conceptions (painting/colour mixing), their 
colonization of new situations and how existing conceptions can be 
used to make sense of the 'new'. Interestingly, Scotty and Julie 
seem to ignore Justine’s perception of their blending conceptions, 
perhaps all three are aware of the analogical element in the 
blending conception, but whilst recognising its fruitfulness in the 
problem context they are aware that it is. different from painting.
Card 3 (Albino x Albina)
96 Jul Eee
99 Sc You’re only supposed to have four
100 Jus four there’s my four
101 Jul I can’t count
102 Jus when your finished
103 Jul You just sort of throw it away
The discussion of card 3 was very restricted, all three girls 
found four albino mice from the pile and then moved on. Perhaps 
this is an indication of their shared frame and the consensus born 
out of it, or the uncertainty which now surrounds the painting 
analogy after Justine's 'revelations’. The conception being used is 
not obvious with the content frame being weak. This level of 
implicitness may keep the girls options open whilst insulating 
them from error in a competitive interpersonal environment; in 
terms of maintaining the integrity of their conceptions 
(explanatory adequacy, plausibility) this may be one way of 
achieving a 'low cost' consensus.
-  215 -
Card 4 (Black x Brown)
104 Sc
105 Jus
106 Jul
107 Sc
108 Jul
109 Jus
110 Jul
111 Jul
112 Jus
113 Sc
114 Jus
Right now we’ll all decide , oh look at this one this 
one Julie look 
Its going to be
oh no we’ve still got the same problem..its all done 
in the worst passible taste
look they’ve all got white stomachs the ones on the 
basic cards 
whats the point
(pause in the discussion for 10 seconds) 
you need a brown one with a white 
keep it to four its easier 
(***)
we will 
what about this grey colour
No I don’t think so. I think that will be that that’s 
all because
Scatty is very keen to motivate and chair the activities of the 
others (104,113). It seems that the girls have lost their way a 
little; their conceptions remain very implicit and they seem 
content to make their choices without discussion. Audience 
awareness (camera) during this episode may have combined with the 
general uncertainty about the task and the adequacy of the painting 
anlaagy, (106) to produce this rather distant, detatched level of 
interaction. At (113-4) Scotty and Justine compete for the floor 
but the basis of their disagreement over the grey colour remains 
implicit.
Card 5 (Black x Black + Dark Brown Offspring)
115 Jul I've done it..black times black would be
116 Jus black and black equals black look there's one
117 Jul oh look we aren’t on TV anymore
118 Jus oh we’re probably (*****-*) I don’t know
119 Jus (**) they’ve got brown on theirs that must mean they
have a brown baby
120 Jul I haven’t got a brown one
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121 Jus well yours hasn’t had a
brown baby has it
122 Sc has yours got one Justine
123 Jus Yes
124 Sc ’ so has mine
125 Sc that must be the square one that you found must be the
one for Julie
126 Jus no that was mine*.you gave it to me
127 Jul Pinow w (makes a noise).,I reckon we're still
being recorded but not on the screen
128 Jus Yeah
129 Jus so we can’t pose in front of you
130 Jul Poseu rrrr (laughs)
131 Jus it has to be dark brown with black on it
132 Sc hey this one..it doesn’t really matter about the
grey stomach
133 Jus its a bit light a bit light
134 Jul (#****-*) too light
135 Jus too light
136 Jul and a grey
137 Sc Grey
138 Jus Yeah yeah
139 Jul It might have had a white grandfather
140 Jus grey one
141 Jul yeah black times black equals.. red
142 Jus and if they’ve got brown
143 Jul they might have had a grey grandfather
144 Sc What about having one like this
145 Jus its a bit too light
146 Sc this
147 Jus its a bit like black
148 Sc have you got four on yours Justine
149 Jul Pino w I have
150 Sc and there's one for you Justine
151 Jus I’ll have another black one, black one black one
152 Jul Pino w
153 Sc right next one folks
At (115 and 116) Julie's solution to the "problem” (perhaps their 
uncertainty about paint mixing as an analogical base to their 
conceptions) seems to be the use of a 'mathematical* analogy based 
on the 'times’ sign between parent mice. Justine seems supportive 
of this lead although she seems to be 'adding* black to black to 
"equal” black. This 'new' analogy may in some way give their 
choices renewed plausibility as long as it is not 'exploded' again.
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At (119) Justine seems to be using a conception of sibling 
similarity and at (131 and 133) a blending conception involving 
parents and offspring. It is interesting that Justine makes no 
comment about black parents giving rise to brown offspring. Scotty 
seems happy to facilitate task activities and lend support to 
Justine.
At (136) Julie's "grey" choice of offspring may indicate that 
she is aware of the potential anomaly presented by card 5 perhaps 
in terms of her previous ’like begets like’ and blending 
conceptions. Scotty’s questioning of her choice (137) allows Julie 
to elaborate her conception of grandparental influence and make it 
more explicit. Interestingly the origins of the grey offspring 
chosen by Julie seem to be in a blend of "a white grandfather" and 
a black parent. At (141) Julie may be questioning the utility of 
her "black times black" notion by mocking it; at (143) she again
offers the grandparental conception but it is not supported by
Justine or Scotty who seem to be continuing their collaborative 
competition focused on a blending conception (144-7). Shortly 
afterwards Scotty suspends the discussion by chairing and
signalling the move to the next card (153).
Card 6 (Black x Speckled + Speckled Offspring)
154 Sc Ah they’ve got a speckled one
155 Jus Ah they’ve got a speckled one ..and it hasn't got any
grey stomach
156 Jul that's pretty peculiar don’t you think
157 Sc It might have a grey stomach because there’s a black
158 Jus Yeah and they might have a black with an orange
stomach from the orange in that one
159 Sc Yeah good idea
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160 Jul don’t see any orange
161 Jus no well the orange came from there
162 Sc and then they'd
..have maybe a dark brown one like that yeah
163 Jus dark brown definitely dark brown
164 Sc How many have you got Justine
165 Jus three four five
166 Sc I’m only putting four on....what about a grey one
167 Jus right I'm getting one of them
(Scotty and Justine move an to next card)
Scotty and Justine seem to ’cement’ their collaboration during this 
episode. They present strong interaction frames to one another and 
seem to be sharing a content frame of blending conceptions (162- 
167). The emphasis on dark brown (162-3) perhaps indicates the 
influence of the black parent in their offspring blend. Julie’s 
questioning of Scotty’s choice at (160) is defended by Justine; 
Julie seems peripheral to the consensus developing between the 
other two girls.
Card 7 (Brown x Brown + Albino Offspring)
168 Sc Hey Justine look its got a white one
169 Jus Eh..that got a white.,they must have some cross­
breeding... wrong couple (laughs)
170 Jul They're grandfather (laughs) was you know
171 Jus I think they’ll have a grey one
172 Sc white and light grey..may be a speckledy one
173 Jus or a lighter
one as well, because as they get white
174 Sc a speckled one as well
175 Jul this is like mixing colours you know
176 Sc there you are what about a speckledy one
177 Jus yes that's about right
178 Jul do you think they’ll have.I think they’ll have Mmm.
179 Sc thats about it..got the same Justine
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The discussion of card 7 starts with Scatty drawing Justine's 
attention to her observation that brown parents have had a white 
offspring (168). This may represent an anomalous situation for 
Scatty in the context of the conceptions she has used to date, and 
it is possible to speculate that the effectiveness of this anomaly 
may have a great deal to do with the albino condition. This cannot 
be easily explained in terms of blending, 'like begets like’ and/or 
variation conceptions in which the parental phenotype is the 
yardstick which determines the colour of the offspring choices.
Justine’s response at (169) uses the description ’cross­
breeding" a term that she may associate with her experiences of 
domestic animals with mixed parentage or with a high degree of 
phenotypic variability. The others do not pick up on this phrase, 
however Justine's qualification of "wrong couple" and its inference 
of infidelity triggers a series of embarrassed looks and laughter 
among the girls which effectively diffuses the impact of her 
contribution, Julie reintroduces her conception of grandparental 
influence with humerous overtones and perhaps racial inferences 
(170). From (171-176) Scotty and Justine seem to be using a 
blending conception as the basis far their choices. Scotty seems 
keen to develop a consensus with Justine within the context of 
their strong interaction frames. It is interesting that Julie seems 
to be monitoring their activities and ’confronts’ them with 
Justine’s earlier ’revelation’ about "mixing colours" (paints) (175), 
This contribution and Julie’s next effort to elicit information 
(178) seems to be ignored by the others as they accelerate their 
consensus and Scotty suspends the discussion. Task
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orientation/completion may now be the main priority with the most 
fruitful and unambiguous conceptions being deployed in spite of any 
uncertainty about their plausibility in novel contexts. Again the 
possibilities of conflict produced by anomaly situations, which may 
set doubts in the minds of the girls about the adequacy of their 
blending ideas, are damped out by the heterogeneity of their 
conceptions and perhaps their reluctance to abandon something that 
’works’ at a personal and social level.
Card 8 (Agouti x Agouti + Black Offspring)
180 Jul then look at the next one
181 Jus I think they'll have one of those again. I think
182 Sc speckeedy and speckeedy
183 Jus and a grey one ..they've got a grey stomach
184 Jul a grey stomach maybe
185 Sc what, a grey yeah if they've got a dark grey one
186 Jus a dark grey one alright
187 Jul I'd say a light grey one
188 Sc Oh yeah
189 Jus light grey one
190 Jul everyone’s agreeing..let’s have a white one you know
191 Jus no. I think they’ll have that one again because they've
slightly lighter
192 Sc You're going on the wrong
193 Jul I’m not (**-**) ehm
194 Sc a black one with a
195 Jul what about yeah what about
196 Sc what about this ..a brown one
197 Jul let's ask the mice
198 Sc have you got a black one with a orange stomach
199 Jus Yeah I reckon
200 Sc no I don't think so
201 Jus I do because (***♦*) black with that bit of orange
202 Sc black is yeah and then yeah...have you got any white
ones on yours
203 Jus I've got four
204 Sc I've got four one two three four oh yeah
205 Jul I’ve got four
206 Jus Oh you
207 Sc just copy Justine
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Scotty and Justine actively compete for the floor as they 
competitively collaborate over the choice of offspring. They seem 
more concerned with the harmony of their working relationship than 
with the reasons for their choices. Consequently the content frame 
being used is very weak. Julie at (190) is conscious of the 
uncritical consensus between Scotty and Justine but her efforts to 
disturb this are censured (191-2), (206-7). Julie seems frustrated 
by the closed cycle of leads and acceptances inherent in the other 
girls' collaboration.
Card 9 (Grey x Black)
208 Jus Oh grey
209 Sc some grey
210 Jus does it have a grey one
211 Sc yeah a dark grey one
212 Jus a black one
213 Sc and a dark grey one
214 Jus a dark grey a very dark grey
215 Sc Yeah
216 Jus maybe a white one . they might have a white one
217 Sc I wouldn't have thought so
218 Jul I don't think so no
219 Jus No
220 Sc what about one of those speckly ones shall we put 
on a speckly one
221 Jus no there isn't any brown in the family though is there
222 Jul or any orange
223 Jus I reckon they’ve sort of
224 Sc they’ve got a lot of grey
225 Jus I reckon they’ll have a browny grey
226 Sc yeah and then what else.,what
about these
227 Jus well no
228 Jul I’ve got three different shades of grey I’ve got three 
different shades
229 Jus a black
230 Sc Yeah thats it ..thats right
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Justine and Scotty continue their active collaboration during the 
early part of the discussion (208-15). They seem to be using their 
conceptions of blending, the black parental contribution giving 
rise to the stress on "dark" colours (213-4). At (215) Justine 
tentatively suggests a white offspring. She may be revisiting her 
ideas of cross-breeding or imitating the situation in card 7.
Scotty and Julie offer no support for this suggestion (217-8) and 
Justine seems to accept their reservations without challenge.
At (221) Justine qualifies and gives authority to her rejection 
of Scotty’s choice by using the notion of traits running ”in the 
family”. This is an interesting overlap of lay science and the 
conception of blending being used by the girls. It may be that a 
blending conception constrained in terms of offspring phenotype by 
the parental inputs can be validated by reference to family traits.
Once again Julie seems to be providing a metacommentary of the 
others' activities; at (228) she makes explicit the blending 
conception being used by making explicit the "shades" of grey.
Julie may still be uncertain of the applicability and the 
plausibility of this conception.
Card 10 (Black x Brown + Black Offspring)
231 Sc Oh look they've got orange stomachs
232 Jus oh orange stomachs
233 Sc there's a speckly one definitely
234 Jus and one of these as well...a speckly one
235 Jul no call them thrushes its easier
236 Sc two black ones with an orange
237 Jus Oh well right two black ones
238 Jul are we still being filmed..oh no
239 Jus thats what I've done,..right next one
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Card 11 (Brown x Brown + Light Brown)
240 Jul what have you done that I wouldn't like to say
241 Sc that and that that and that
242 Jus two brown and two light brown
243 Sc Julie can I just have a look at yours
244 Jus they wouldn’t have an orange dark
245 Sc what about dark brawn with a white stomach
246 Jus no a light brown with
247 Sc dark brown dark
248 Jus yeah dark lightly dark ones
249 Jul look I’ve got three diferent shades of brown
250 Sc yeah one of those
251 Jus right next one
Card 12 (Agouti x Albino)
252 Sc oh last one,.a speckly and a white
253 Jul and a white one
254 Sc and a white
255 Jul speckly one I reckon grey
256 Sc grey
257 Jul I don’t
258 Jus I do cos its got a grey stomach
259 Jul I’m having that cos thats got a grey stomach
260 Sc Yeah and that that’s it
261 Jul We’ve done it
262 Sc that’s it
263 Jus we’ve done it
In the discussion of cards 10, 11 and 12, strong interaction frames 
are presented by all three girls. Task completion seems uppermost 
in their minds, and their conceptions become increasingly implicit. 
Competition for the floor, collaboration, and competition to have 
their choices accepted result in a cycle of leads, acceptances or 
transient disagreements fallowed by more leads, Julie continues to 
be rather sceptical about the whole activity and she seems removed 
from the enterprise. Justine and Scotty maintain their
collaboration and are slightly reproving in their interactions with 
Julie. Although the content frames being used in the discussion are 
very weak it is possible to speculate that the like begets like and 
blending conceptions and their analogic underpinnings are the basis 
on which Justine and Scotty's consensus is built. These conceptions 
may have achieved a degree of stability derived from their 
fruifulness in maintaining interpersonal relationships and giving 
answers to the 'problem*.
Following on from the first task the girls were now asked to read 
through the text material. They tended to read out loud and 
together; giving a bit of a performance at the same time.
264 Jul
265 Jus
266 Jul
267 Jus
268 Sc
269 Jus
270 Sc
271 Jus
272 Sc
273 Jus
274 Sc
CO CJ
I Jus
276 Sc
277 Jus
278 Jul
279 Sc
genes,.yes you know things you put on 
(silence as girls read 10-12 seconds) 
the gene which black colour (**) brown 
why has it got an orange spot on it 
oh if there’s a brown if there’s a parent that's 
black yeah and a parent that's white
children be grey 
will be black because the black is the stronger colour
strongest
colour...but not all of them will be black 
it would be black
black and some of them may be grey 
because they made one (***) way..Mmm 
the black gene is stronger..this one . this one is 
just then the brown gene
yes I know but this ..are they could be the same type 
of ..Mmm
same same black one..that might be because it has 
black in it..it will be
the same weakness or strong
sort of
I think these others these 
Yes I quite agree (laughs) 
where am I
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At (267) Justine reads from the text, Scotty picks up the "a parent 
that’s black yeah and a parent that's white” and completes the 
sentence far Justine with "children be grey” (268). Scatty seems to 
be using her blending conception but is quickly contradicted at
(269) by Justine who has gleaned from the text the idea of black 
dominance which is interpreted as strength of colour. Scotty at
(270) seems to be accepting Justine’s lead but is also trying to 
accommodate her blending conception; she finds it difficult to 
articulate her ideas and reservations (274) and eventually seems to 
align herself with Justine’s view. Interestingly it was Scotty who 
used the conception of variation in the offspring during the first 
problem and perhaps this coupled with the variations explicit in 
some of the cards is the basis of her reservations, Julie (278) 
aware of the difficulties of the developing frame between Scotty 
and Justine seems to be mocking their communication problem.
280 Sc what where are you
281 Jus dominant over the albino gene so that gene b is more
powerful than that gene so it will be that sort of 
gene there
282 Jul yeah what about a jumper
283 Jus not quite Julie
284 Sc stop trying to be funny Julie
285 Jul Oh look I’ve just found some mice.take it home and
train it
286 Jus dark chocolate colour
287 Jul ah nice one
288 Jus if a mouse receives a non-agouti gene from each parent
the mouse will have a coat made up of only one colour 
and a white belly sometime mice can have the gene At.
289 Sc which gives
290 Jus gives non-agouti mice with tan bellies
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The synchrony between the girls and their reading of the text 
eventually gives way to 'flicking through' the pages. Julie seems to 
be very aware of the camera and is censured by the dthers for 
"being funny". She is either bored or not convinced about the task. 
There is very little discussion of the text and what it means. 
Scotty finishes first with Julie taking her cue to stop work. 
Justine carries on reading for a few minutes then stops.
After a brief discussion of the text which the girls described 
as "very complicated" they were introduced to the final activity. 
They were familiar with the format of the family tree problem 
relating it to Henry VIII and his family of Tudor kings and queens.
291 Jus shall we do a black shall we do those two
292 Sc right, black is the stronger colour yeah
293 Jus sort of black
294 Sc ah Julie
295 Jul I’m not touching you
296 Sc you're chair was
297 Jus it wouldn’t be tan it would be sort of mixed
298 Jul it would be very very dark
299 Jus very very dark brown yeah
300 Sc no .yeah that now those two have was it those
301 Jus no no just put another one there . two families there
302 Sc let's have a speckly one I like them
303 Jus and a tan
304 Sc and that's a stronger colour
305 Jus that’s stranger than that
306 Sc let’s say it would be black
307 Jus it wouldn’t be
308 Sc it would be black
309 Jus it would be that one
310 Sc sorry
311 Jul that's ok don’t let it happen again
312 Sc and a dark colour ..not one of those
313 Jus yes yes ..and one of those two get married and 
they make
what do
314 Sc eh . a dark brown
315 Jul I think they would make this definitely
316 Jus Yeah
317 Sc no no
318 Jus between them I reckon they'd make a black one
319 Jul so do I .1 reckon that and that
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320 Sc no no that’s too light
321 Jul no I don't know
322 Jus Yeah let’s put that down
At (291-2) Justine’s choice of black mice is supported and 
qualified by Scotty who now seems to have the notion of black 
being ' a strong colour'. It is Interesting that black is selected 
and that in the context of a ’paint box’ ecosystem of conceptions 
there is a certain degree of resonance (plausibility) in the idea 
that it 'dominates' other colours. In addition it is possible to 
speculate that the assimilation of this idea represents an 
adaptation of their blending conceptions to allow for strength of 
colour: the ’new' being interpreted through the ’old’. At (298 and 
299) Justine and Julie's blending conceptions seem to be active 
although the use of "very very” may indicate that it is now 
interacting with the notion of colour strength. At (304-312) there 
is a debate between the girls about strength of colour and its 
effect on offspring colour. Scatty seems to be advocating the 
dominance of black while the others seem to be using a modified 
blending conception. Justine’s leads seem to hold sway over the 
discussion and it is interesting how this may damp out Scotty’s 
efforts to imitate what was originally Justine's conception of 
’dominance’.
During this episode, everyday ideas of 'marriage' (313) and families 
are used by the girls and this may be cued by their previous 
experiences of family trees.
323 Jul put it there and make those two have kids
324 Jus its dark grey so the dark grey would be stronger dark
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325 Sc
grey ..no put a white in there 
and a speckly one there
326 Jus no no you can’t cos that has to be one of the children
327 Sc oh yes
328 Jul ' a black one black and black
329 Sc no a grey
330 Jus a grey yes
331 Sc yes light grey
332 Jus dark grey
333 Sc that's not dark
334 Jus right dark grey..yes right
335 Sc black and black
336 Jus wait we’ve still gat ta decide
337 Jul it doesn’t matter..well let's just keep going down
338 Jus
the one side 
black and dark grey
339 Jul no then the other two would be easy because it would
340 Jus
be just black black black (laughs)
no no we’ll do these two we’ll have a black and a dark
341 Jul
grey
its not possible
342 Jus yeah black
At (324) Justine seems to be using the dominance/strength of
colour conception which is accepted by Scotty but which is also 
simultaneously active in her ecosystem with her blending 
conceptions (331). Their conceptions remain implicit as they
competitively collaborate. Julie does make explicit her conception 
of dominance and its consequences at (339). She seems to have 
reservations about the invariability of the offspring after 
crossing black with dark grey; it is difficult to say whether this 
is motivated by task consideration or by conflicts with her 
conceptions of phenotypic variability.
343 Jus Right now a black and a brawn put black on that side
and brawn on that
344 Sc put a black one there
345 Jus no it would be a dark brown wouldn’t it
346 Jul that one its that one
347 Sc there you are
348 Jul families get bigger and bigger
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349 Sc we could put anyone there..shall we put a spotty one
350 Jus Yeah
351 Sc and another spotty one
352 Jus get another albino the albino has faded away up there
there's a whole load of stuff up there, put another 
albino there
353 Jul I doubt it because the brown's stronger that the white
354 Jus I think they would have at least one
355 Sc black and light brown makes quite a dark brown dark
brown
356 Jul same with that one...we’re just mixing colours
At (343 and 345) Justine seems to be using her conception of 
dominance/blending; at (352) she acknowledges the consequences of 
their choices based on this conception (disappearance of albino 
mice after C33) and the need to reintroduce white into the tree at 
[9], At (352-355) Justine’s suggestion that an albino may result 
from an albino/brown cross is challenged by Julie who refers to 
the notion of dominance. Justine’s suggestion that they might have 
"at least one" (albino) may indicate that she is still operating her 
idea of cross-breeds, Julie seems to be applying the dominance 
conception in spite of her earlier notions about variation and 
grand parental influence. Her disagreement with Justine may be more 
of a reflection on the 'social' climate between herself and the 
others, At (356) she again makes explicit the analogic basis of 
their activities and perhaps her continuing reservations about its 
plausibility.
5.3,1 Summary
The discussion of card 1 begins with Justine and Scotty 
challenging their respective conceptions of 'like begets like’ and
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phenotypic variation in the offspring. Their disagreement allows 
Julie to introduce a ’compromise’ conception based on her example 
of parents of different colours who have offspring which take after 
one or other of the parents. Thus 'like begets like’ but black and 
white parents will have black and white offspring ie. offspring of 
different colours. Julie thus supports Justine’s conception but 
presents Scotty with an opportunity to accommodate her conception 
within it. Interestingly, Julie supports the 'like begets like’ 
conception by using an example which suggests that if Scotty had a 
black mother "you’d be a bit black”, perhaps implying a gender 
component to the inherited trait. Scotty seems reluctant to give up 
her ideas and the disagreement with Justine about their choice of 
mice goes on without any effort to support their conceptions or 
make them more explicit. Justine and Scotty compete for the floor 
and continue their disagreement but by the end of the discussion of 
card 1 Scotty seems to have accepted the 'like begets like’ 
conception, collaborative needs perhaps outweighing her personal 
conviction.
Justine leads in the next card with a blending conception but 
her interaction frame is weak and she seems tentative. Scatty and 
Julie support this conception and a consensus of opinion seems to 
develop. However, Julie makes explicit the analogical basis of her 
blending conception (painting/mixing colours) and seems to be 
questioning the adequacy of her conception and its plausibility in 
this 'new' context, "and it might happen with mice..put mice 
together in a pot". Following this ’revelation’ the girls seem very 
uncertain about what they should do. In the next card their
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discussion is fragmented and sparse and a ’low cost’ consensus 
develops where they all seem to agree about the choice of offspring 
but do not say why. Throughout this period Julie seems to be aware 
of the ’’problem” associated with the paint box analogy and the 
'solution' which she offers seems to be a ’mathematical’ analogy 
(perhaps cued by the parental cross-x on the cards). ’’Black times 
black would be black” is offered as basis of predicting offspring 
and this is picked up by Justine who seems to be adding rather 
than multiplying; ’’black and black eqygtls, black”. It is interesting 
to speculate that what we are observing in these instances is the 
’experimental’ colonization of a new situation by the 
extension/adaptation of existing conceptions.
Arising concurrently with these mathematical analogies the 
potential anomaly presented by card 5 allows Julie to put forward 
an explanation of black parents and their brown offspring, based 
on the conception of grandparental influence. Justine seems to be 
putting forward the conception that sibling similarity is also a 
viable theory on which to base offspring choices. The anomaly in 
terms of their previous conceptions of 'like begets like’ and 
blending introduces new conceptions into their conceptual 
ecosystems, and these form the basis of the girls’ competitive 
collaboration during the discussion of card 5. There is no attempt 
to discuss the relative merits of these conceptions and after the 
girls have achieved a consensus they suspend their discussion.
In the next card Justine and Scotty develop a consensus 
centred on the shared conception of blending. While they actively 
collaborate Julie seems distant from the discussion and seems to
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be rather isolated from the activities of the others. Card 7 
reintroduces the anomaly of non-familial resemblance, this time it 
being brown parents and a white offspring. Julie brings her 
conception of grandparental influence to bear again, and Justine 
explains the 'problem1 in terms of cross-breeding which seems to 
have a notion of infidelity linked to it. Julie is ignored by the 
others in terms of her conception and Justine does not explain 
what she means by cross-breed. After this initial response to card 
7 Scotty and Justine seem to revert to their consensus based on 
their blending conceptions, in spite of the fact that Julie reminds 
them of the painting analogy. In doing this she may be expressing 
her own reservations about this conception or her puzzlement why 
Justine and Scotty continue to use it. At this point it is 
interesting to speculate that in spite of the girls awareness of 
the anomaly, and Julie and Justine's ability to provide explanations 
based on grandparents or cross-breeding, there is no resonance 
between these ideas and other conceptions nor are they picked up 
in conversation between the girls. Perhaps in their task orientated 
situation, the fruitfulness of the blending conception in providing 
an answer, and a consensus outweighs their concerns about its 
plausibility and its explanatory adequacy in this novel context. 
This situation may also determine the way that the girls respond 
to 'new* conceptions. In the case of Julie's conception of 
grandparental influence and of Justine’s cross-breeding, these may 
be adequate and plausible explanations in an everyday context, but 
are in fact perceived as having little use in solving the problem. 
The heterogeneity of the girl’s conceptual ecosystems may thus
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provide a way of damping out the impact of anomalies, and thereby 
insulating those conceptions which have problem solving utility 
from change. It would be interesting to speculate what might 
happen if Justine and Julie’s ideas were to interact and overlap, 
and how this might affect the other conceptions within their 
respective ecosystems.
Julie is aware of the consensus forming around the blending 
conception and in particular the nan-critical collaboration between 
Justine and Scotty. She still has her reservations about the paint 
box analogy and the blending conception and increasingly she seems 
to lose interest in the activity. Her scepticism is largely ignored 
by the others and they become critical of Julie’s actions. Scotty 
and Justine continue their shared frame and seem to be actively 
maintaining their consensus. When Justine suggests a white 
offspring from non albino parents, Julie disagrees. Equally, 
Justine's suggestion of brown speckled offspring from grey and 
black parents, is challenged by Julie on the basis that there is no 
brown "in the family". It is interesting how this common expression 
is used to support Justine's blending conception and how it is 
accepted with little articulation of what she means.
During the reading task Justine interprets the notion of 
dominance in terms of strength of colour. Black is interpreted as a 
very strong colour (dominant) and it may be passible to infer that 
her comprehension of the text in this way is derived from her 
existing conception of blending. Scotty seems to accept the notion 
of ’dominance’ as it relates to strength of colour but she seems to 
have difficulty in reconciling it with the notion that as a result
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there will be no colour variation amongst the offspring. This 
interaction between Scotty’s conceptions may give an insight into 
the way that her blending conception overlaps with her conception 
of offspring variability. ’Dominance’ may resonate with the colour 
blending conception but may not be easily reconciled with the loss 
of 'shades’ of offspring which result from the ’tyranny’ of dark 
(strong) colours. This conflict seems to be resolved by Scotty in 
the course of the family tree problem during which she and Justine 
develop what appears to be a common conception. It seems that they 
have adapted the blending conception to take account of colour 
strength, thus retaining shades of coloured offspring but with the 
emphasis on the 'darkening' effects of dark coloured parents rather 
than the corollary of this situation. It may be that in this way 
not only is the existing conception used to interpret the ’new', but 
also that ’old' and 'new* conceptions are kept simultaneously active 
without the need to replace or refute existing ideas ie, Scotty’s 
conception of offspring variability.
While Justine and Scotty competitively collaborate during the 
family tree problem, ’cementing’ their shared content frame, Julie 
is aware of their conceptions but seems uncertain about its 
plausibility, She once again makes explicit the colour mixing 
analogy being used by the girls, and this may indicate that Julie 
remains unconvinced about the transference of their painting 
experiences to this novel situation. These considerations may 
explain Julie’s rather limited engagement with the task and her 
apparent lack of commitment.
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5.4 Case Study 4.
This group consisted of three boys aged 12+. All three were 
classmates and were accustomed to working with one another in the 
context of classwork. The session took place in their classroom 
while the rest of the class used an adjacent room. The boys (Luke, 
Simon and Peter) sat side by side in front of a table, facing the 
camera which was in view about twelve feet away. The researcher 
sat close to the camera monitoring the equipment in view of the 
boys. The discussion started with the researcher introducing the 
first task. Cards 1 and 2 were used for this purpose.
Card 1 (Grey x Grey)
1 S (inaudible)
2 I Right. I'll tell you about that one in a second..if you have
that for the moment.,Try that first one first of all and 
see how you get on
3 P I think I think it will be this one
4 L Yeah
5 P cos they’re dark..two dark coloured ones and kind of
dark coloured cos the darkest colour turns into that
6 L everybody the same
7 P Yeah
8 S its still the same size as that
9 P yeah
10 S that one
11 P Yeah but the parents are the same size as the children
(laughs) that'd be (**) as the children..yeah that's it
12 S (inaudible)
13 P this is one on the black look next one says two that’s
right
14 I How are you doing..could you find them all...do you think
they had one of a family or do you think they had more..
15 P Yeah
16 I you thought five or six Pete
17 P I’m going to put yeah
18 S (inaudible) look they’re the same
19 P its like there’s two.,no suppose some of them would be a
bit different though wouldn't they some of these just a bit 
lighter some would be darker ..some would be grey....yeah
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that’s five...give them six this time..yeah could be. 
couldn't in terms of the numbers in the family..I’ve done it
20 I Ok lets wait for the others
21 P could they have say six or seven couldn’t they
22 I yeah its up to you
23 P it doesn't matter does it
Pete takes the lead at the beginning of the discussion, At (5) the 
conception that he uses is unclear but seems to be based on his 
notion of colour blending. Luke seems keen to agree with Pete and 
at (6) he seems to be monitoring the choices of the group. Simon 
at (8) questions the size of the offspring inferring that they 
should be smaller than the parent mice. Pete’s 'explanation' (11) of 
this does not satisfy Simon but he does not pursue the point. At 
(18) Simon draws attention to Pete’s choices of offspring and their 
sameness. Pete's response (19) to Simon’s observation seems to 
indicate that he would expect there to be some variation in the 
offspring. Peter appears to link this in some way to the numbers 
of mice in the family.
The change in format represented in card 2 was explained to 
the boys before they continued their discussion.
Card 2 (Brown x Black + Brown Offspring)
24 P Ehm.,ehm
25 S look that one looks about half between them
26 P Yeah...get a few of them actually it could, do you think you 
could have one like that there
27 S we’re not doing that one
28 P I know I'm just trying to saying
29 S I think
30 p they could have a black one
31 L how about the
32 S the line
33 L this one this one
34 P what I’ve put that one on already
35 L (inaudible)
36 P must have used a lot of pens doing these
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37 S probably more brown ones
38 P Mmm
39 S dark ones
40 P thats thats that one done
41 S they can' well I think it is what
42 P yeah I suppose thats right yeah..it hasn't got a yellow (ft*)
that,.it doesn’t have to be does it I mean it does have to 
be
43 S do all these have to be the same on each one
44 P no
45 I you decide its up to you they dont have to be the same
you might want to have a word with the others if they are 
not and see what you think
At (25) Simon’s lead seems to indicate that he is using a blending
conception; ’’half between them” perhaps describing the relationship 
between the offspring and the colour of its parents. This blending 
conception is supported by Pete (26) and is used again by Simon at 
(37 and 39). The qualification "dark ones" (39) being perhaps an 
insight into Simon’s conception. Pete at (30) suggests that a black 
offspring is a possibility and he uses his offspring choices from 
card 1 to support this idea. The conception being used by Pete is 
vague and he and Simon seem mare concerned with getting on with 
the task rather than talking about it (40).
Card 3 (Albino x Albino)
46 P let’s try and use up all of them
47 S oh no . well they'll be white
48 P some might not be if they, they might have a few grey ones
because that’s a light colour
49 S No
50 P I'm going to put a few grey ones in
51 S got one with spots on..that are white
52 P I’m having two grey ones ...with pink eyes, which are twins
two grey ones with pink..they have pink eyes you know
53 L does it matter .oh yeah, ehm these are
54 S albinos
55 L yeah
56 P yeah yeah look they’ve got twins here actually there won’t
be many albinos will there
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57 L (inaudible)
58 S I’ve done all white
59 P yeah I think I'll do the rest of them
60 S brown no
61 P thats that one done
62 S (***) them up
63 I yes you decide when you want to go on to the next one
Simon leads at (47) with what seems to be a 'like begets like' 
conception. Peter disagrees with this in part and challenges
Simon’s idea with his conception of variation in the offspring. His
qualification of his choice of grey as possible offspring, "because 
that’s a light colour”, is interesting as it may indicate some limit 
to the amount of variation and a possible overlap with conceptions 
focusing on the sameness of parents and offspring. Simon disagrees 
at (49) but does not pursue the argument. Both boys seem content 
to differ but at (52) Peter restates his idea about grey offspring 
and supports his choice with the idea of them being "twins". The 
implicit idea here seems to be that the twins will be identical and 
that this may justify Peter's choice of two grey mice. Luke seems 
to be aware of the disagreement between the other two and seems to 
be questioning the basis for it (53). Simon’s use of "albinos” may 
be a response to Peter’s challenge by bringing the 'authority' of 
this word to the support of his idea (54), Peter at (56) keeps up 
his challenge by refering to the frequency of albinos; Simon seems 
unmoved by this and restates his position at (58). Perhaps aware 
of relationships, Peter seems to accept that there will be some 
albinos (59) before drawing the discussion to a close by moving on 
(61).
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The disagreement between Peter and Siman, and Peter's 
challenging of Simon’s conception gives an insight into the 
heterogeneity and resilience of Peter’s ecosystem. In spite of this 
interaction Simon’s ideas are not refuted absolutely and he seems 
to be able to stick to his notion of ’like begets like'. Peter’s 
acceptance that there will be some albinos provides the basis of 
some sort of consensus/arbitration.
Card 4 (Black x Brawn)
64 S look that looks like,.yeah this one this one
65 P yeah this one I reckon that one
66 S what
67 P this one
68 S that's a bit (***)
69 P different (***) a bit different from all the
rest
70 S what about that because some of them are exactly the same 
as their
71 P their parents yeah, yeah like that those two 
and those two cos that’s slightly different there
72 L I can show some that are just slightly different
73 P they're by a different parent (laughs)
74 S so that could be darker
75 P where's that grey type
76 L where's one like that
77 S they’ve got spots on
78 P yeah because they’re a cross-breed (laughs)
79 L well could be
80 P they've got seven seven children must have been hard 
(laughs)
81 S turn to the next one
The discussion of this card starts with an episode of competitive 
collaboration between Peter and Simon. Peter at (69) and Simon at 
(70) seem to continue with their respective use of variation and 
'like beget like' conceptions. Peter seems to be able to accommodate 
both conceptions in his choice of offspring (71). At (73) and (78)
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Peter seems to be setting limits to the amount of variation one 
might expect in the offspring when compared to the parental 
phenotype. His inference at (73) seems to be hinting at 'infidelity' 
as one reason for offspring not being similar to the parents, and 
at (78) the use of cross-breed may have similar connotations. It is 
interesting how these notions overlap with his conceptions of 
familial similarity and variation, and how Peter seems to be using 
the analogy of human relationships/families (80). Luke seems to 
accept the plausibility of Peter's cross-breed notion as an 
explanation of offspring/parent differences,
Card 5 (Black x Black + Brown)
82 S have they all got to be the same
83 P yeah...there'd be a black one wouldn’t
84 S yeah
85 P do you think there wouldn’t be any one like that cause
there’s nothing the same about them apart from the ears 
and tail so that there wouldn't be
86 S the same
87 P all these tails are the same
88 S quite dark colours yeah
89 P yeah that’d be ok..isn't it
90 S I don’t think quite like that
91 P Mmm . might have one like that yeah put that one down
no not all of them
92 S most of them will be yeah, take off that then dark colours
. not that its too light
93 L is this ok
94 P hey wait I’ve only done (***)
Peter and Simon agree initially that black offspring are a 
possibility (82-84), perhaps on the basis of their conceptions of 
familial similarity. At (85) Peter invites Simon to comment on the 
anomaly of the brown offspring. He seems to be questioning the 
fact that they have no common coat colour, only the tails and ears
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are the same, and how plausible this situation would be. Peter and 
Simon seem uncertain about this card although they seem to arrive 
at a consensus based on dark coloured offspring (88 and 93). This 
may represent an adaptation of their 'like begets like' conception 
to allow for general colour similarity ie. dark as opposed to black. 
It is interesting that Peter does not use his conception of 
variation in the offspring to 'explain' the anomaly nor does he 
reflect on previous ideas about infidelity or cross-breeds.
Card 6 (Black x Agouti + Agouti)
95 P Mmm that one that kind
96 S Yeah
97 L that one
98 P there’s that one as well
99 S look that’s stupid that's got a white mouse (laughs)
100 P ..maybe one like that
101 S yeah but most of them will be about that
102 P yeah
103 S most dark
104 L its dead
Discussion of card 6 is very tentative, vague and uncertain with 
the boys making choices with little or no explanation. The 
conceptions being used are implicit and under-articulated. It is 
interesting to speculate that this uncertainty may be a consequence 
of their previous experience with card 5 in which some of their 
negotiated ideas were questioned or modified.
At (99) Simon looks ahead to card 7; his reaction seems to be 
a recognition of what for him may be an anomalous situation (white 
offspring from brown parents). In the context of his 'like beget 
like’ conception this situation may indeed be an anomaly:
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interestingly this more overt example seems to be more powerful 
than that shown in card 5 and this may relate to the influence of 
Peter’s notion of offspring variation.
Card 7 (Brown x Brown + Albino)
105 P lift them up at high speed, there's a bit of stupid parents
106 S right that's slightly lighter isn’t it
107 P look they’re all (inaudible)
108 S stop it
109 P there’s white cause
110 S look that’s half between those two
111 P oh yeah
112 S most of them will be dark or light . that colour
113 P dark
114 S no this colour
115 P some of them are going to be like that
116 S no they wont be like that
117 P why have they got one like that
118 S don’t know
119 L they're queer (laughs) because they like each other
120 P what
121 L supposed to be funny
122 S whats that what have you got there
123 L he’s got a disease (laughs)
124 S Peter one two three four five six seven, lets take a few
off..no leave
During the discussion of this card a strong interaction frame 
develops between Simon and Peter. They seem to have difficulty in 
explaining the white offspring. Simon reintroduces his blending 
notion at (110) but he seems to be suggesting that the blend is 
now between parents and the given offspring. Simon and Peter 
competitively collaborate over their choices (114-116) but they 
fail to come up with an explanation for the anomaly of the white 
mouse (117 and 118), At (119) Luke seems to respond to this 
problem by inferring that the white offspring is strange; his use
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of "queer” and its homosexual overtones become part of a joke on 
the word. Luke follows this with another joke based on the idea 
that the white mouse is diseased. The other boys seem to ignore 
him and it gives an insight into Luke’s isolation within the group, 
and perhaps the inhibiting effect of Peter and Simon's 'monopoly’ 
of the task.
Card 8 (Agouti x Agouti + Black)
125 L you’re behind Peter
126 S its in between those two if they’ve got
127 P like that wouldn’t they because thats in between them
128 S yeah.,(**)
colour..(**) black
129 P then take that mouse take away that
mouse you’d get that nothing (laughs)
130 S look those two are nearly the same as their parents but
they've got different
131 P Mmm
132 S and some are exactly the same
133 P one two three four five..put one more..brown ones
134 S which ones
135 P they wouldn’t have any white
136 S No I know
137 P they might
138 S don't put any white ones on then..we need one like that
with a white bit there
139 P Mmm
140 L this one
141 P where did you get that from, upside down
142 L hasn’t got any
143 S can’t see any can’t see any. I’ve got to find one of these
with a white bottom
144 P turn them all up the right way round
145 L don’t be so stupid
146 P I'm not being stupid
147 S there aren't any of those can’t do it. right
148 P right
At (126) Simon again uses what appears to be a blending conception 
as the basis of prediction. Peter seems to share Simon’s frame as 
he echos the idea. Peter tries a mathematical analogy of adding and
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subtracting at (129) but he seems to be less than serious about 
the plausibility of this strategy; "in between" may have 
mathematical connotations for him and. might have acted as a cue.
At (130) Simon completes the frame sharing by using the conception 
of variation in the offspring and this seems to be now linked with 
his 'like beget like' notions (132). Simon seems to be using all 
three conceptions simultaneously, and this may represent a sharing 
of his own ideas and those of Peter and the 'cementing' of their 
consensus/working relationship.
Peter, perhaps influenced by previous cards, denies the 
possibility of a white offspring at (135) then contradicts himself 
at (137). Simon seems keen to avoid this issue and its attendant 
'problems'; he may be aware that they still have not explaianed the 
appearance of white mice from non-albino parents.
Luke remains rather isolated and in response to censure by 
Peter (144) a slightly aggressive episode develops (144-6). It is 
quickly diffused as Simon moves on to the next card.
Card 9 (Grey x Black)
149 S
150 P
151 S
152 L
153 S
154 L
155 S
156 L
157 P
158 S
159 P
that
there there will be some brown ones here wouldn’t there, 
brown because its ..in between 
that's sort of black there
you wouldn't get an in between because the colours wrong 
maybe that colour not brown that colours no where near., 
they're usually dark they're usually 
this one
some like the parents
this one
no not that in between
some like their parents and some in between so thats dark 
grey no that one. I dont think they'd have brown 
yeah they would (***) get brown on this one I could put 
orange with purple spots on (***) (inaudible)
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160 L don't put too many on
161 P I've only got three left
162 L how have you got three left I've got two.,oh you
Peter makes a strong lead at (150) justifying his choice of 
offspring by using Simon's words "in between". Luke disagrees with 
this revealing perhaps that Peter does not share Simon's conception 
and that he does (152). Peter has his own ideas about "in between" 
offspring, but up to this point his acceptance of Simon's viewpoint 
and the vagueness of this idea has allowed Simon’s meaning to be 
developed. Simon supports Luke and gives an exposition of "in 
between” and the blending notion contained within it (153 and 158), 
Again Simon uses familial similarity as the basis for some of his 
choices. Peter does not make his ideas about "in between" explicit 
and although Simon’s disagreement over his choice of brown is not 
dogmatic he responds defensively (159). His defence of his choice 
is vague although he seems to be advocating a much wider degree of 
offspring variation albeit using a rather extreme example.
Card 10 (Black and Tan x Brown and Tan + Black and Tan)
163 L oh yeah definitely have this one
164 P yeah
165 L no
166 P yes they would
(no discussion for 10 seconds)
167 L that's about it
Card 10 produces little discussion amongst the boys. Peter and Luke
compete for the floor with Luke apparently initiating an ’argument’
with Peter. This strong interaction frame leads to a suspension of 
the discussion during which the boys make their own choices. Luke’s
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involvement in the session seems to be increasing and it is he who 
suggests that they move to the next card.
Card 11 (Brown x Brown + Light Brown)
168 S see if there’s a black one what there
169 P take that one ..take that one there would be some black
ones wouldn’t there
170 S no..I don’t think there would be black that's much darker
171 P oh they’d be lighter
172 L there might be some albinos
173 P yeah there would be
174 S just sometimes not lots of them
175 P I’m going to put one on.,,change actually
176 P its like that then look these two here
177 S (inaudible)
178 P actually there would be two like the parents I think
179 S ah yeah
180 P yeah
At (169) Peter’s lead seem to revisit his earlier implicit ideas
about ”in between’1 offspring. Simon disagrees with the choice of 
black (170) as this probably conflicts with his blending 
conception where parental colour determines offspring colour. Peter 
seems to accept this (171) and does not support his choice. The 
’cue’ of "lighter” (171) allows Luke to suggest albino mice as 
offspring possibilities which picks up on a term used earlier by 
Simon. Peter and Simon accept this and the latter qualifies this 
idea with reference to Peter’s earlier ideas of albino frequency
(174). The boys seems to be developing a consensus, and this is 
reinforced by Peter’s use of the ’like begets like’ conception (178) 
which Simon readily accepts (179). This conciliatory and co­
operative episode may give an insight into the boys desire to 
maintain and monitor their interpersonal relationship within the
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task context. This may have a stabilising effect on the conceptions 
that they use.
Card 12 (Agouti x Albino)
181 P there would be some like its parents first..this one
182 S I don’t think they'd be . I dont think they'd be with these
black spots though
183 P (**) one with that yeah...white
184 S one with a white bottom
185 P there aren't any like that
186 S there's none left..grey another grey
187 P yeah there'd be a (***)
188 S I don’t think they’d be like that
189 L there would be
190 P there would be ...there might be..well how do you know you
haven’t been studying mice have you
191 L nor have you
192 P No..there would be some grey ones and thats
193 S and a lot of brown
194 P a bit squishy. seven eight, right finished
Peter leads with his 'like begets like’ conception (181) which in 
previous discussions has been accepted by Simon as a plausible and 
fruitful conception; perhaps to his surprise Simon does not agree 
■with this (182). Simon and Peter present strong interaction frames 
but the basis of their disagreement does not emerge from the weak 
content frames used by the boys. Luke is drawn into the exchange 
at (189) in what seems to be the role of arbiter supporting Peter 
at (189) and Simon at (191). The slightly aggressive overtones of 
Peter's comment to Simon at (190) may again be symptomatic of a 
situation where no agreed viewpoint is reached and no stable set of 
conceptions forms the basis of their offspring choices.
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On completion of this activity the reading task was explained 
to the boys. They read in silence for 5 minutes monitoring each 
other progress through the task visually. The family tree ’problem' 
was then explained to the boys,
195 I this is a skeleton of a family tree..do you know what I
mean by that
196 P yeah
197 S yeah
198 I what sort of family trees have you come across
199 P I've seen ,.my uncles done one we seen that
200 I of the family
201 P yeah our family
202 I yeah that's interesting with all the aunts and uncles
shown on it
203 P yeah
204 I have you seen some
205 L Yeah
206 I what sort have you seen
207 S the royal family
208 I right you see that on all sorts of things well what I
want you to do now is to make a mouse family tree.,I want 
you to work together on this and sort of decide what the 
mouse family tree should look like..there is no right or 
wrong family tree its up to you..there could be hundreds of 
different families....so lets take a look ..lets take any two 
hand me that one and that one..these two would have ..how 
many babies
209 P two
210 L two
211 I and so on two I think you've got the idea
212 P yeah
213 L yeah
214 I right I'll let you get on
215 L (**) one died when it was born
216 P (inaudible)
217 S do you start with two
218 L this one would be . it would be
219 P main genes
220 L no you wouldn't necessarily have two of them
because they might not be
221 P I think it would be an agoati (sic) gene
222 L this one might be lighter
223 P yeah
224 S no
225 P it wouldn’t be lighter or darker than any of its parents
would it
226 L well it will be black then
227 P its darker than both of those two
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228 S (inaudible)
229 P could you...this one
230 L no it doesn't make any difference, they’re the same colour
231 S no I don’t think they will be brown
232 P they’d be ah black
233 S see that one is slightly brown that one .those are
probably completely dark dark brown
Peter at (219) and (221) uses words picked up from the text 
material but this seems to be more of a performance rather than a 
genuine effort to contribute to the discussion. At (225) Peter 
seems to be using a blending conception where the parental colours 
set the limits of offspring coat colour; this may be what he means 
by "in between”. From (229-233) the boys competitively collaborate 
within a strong interaction frame. The conceptions being used are 
vague.
234 L Oh yeah I get it
235 S their babies here
236 P they have that one won’t they
237 S do they they’re both the same
238 P no they’re not
239 L they’d be lighter
240 P that's a bit lighter
241 S no these two are both the same though
242 P yeah
243 L yeah but they might be different
244 P no they’re not that's darker than that one
245 L so
246 P yes
247 L a light gene
248 P this one's lighter than that one
249 S no its not
250 P it is a bit. its about the same
The discussion at this point seems to centre on the notion of 
offspring being similar to the parents and the degrees of colour 
associated with blends of parental colour. The discussion is very
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fragmented with the boys at 'sixes and sevens’; they are uncertain 
and seem reluctant to support their reasoning. They are thinking 
out loud without really’ getting into a collaborative style of work. 
Typical of this style is when Simon draws their attention to the 
two grey parents at [33 (241) and seems to be suggesting that the 
offspring should be the same. Luke disagrees and supports the 
inclusion of another colour on the basis of his concepton of 
offspring variability.
251 P oh yeah lets say its that one
252 S no. I doubt it
253 P no have an albino one we haven’t had one of them
254 S I..do one of them later on
255 L I don't get this oh yes that
256 P they could
257 L can’t get (**) very well
258 S where does it say it in these
259 P it says they could have them I reckon
260 S maybe (**) it says
261 P that just means the average
262 S (inaudible)
263 P it would be this one definitely
264 S wait a minute
265 P wait wait..wait
266 S lets have another dark one
267 P dark one
268 S yeah but you see when .when in this thing you said that
the black ones would be much powerful more than
269 L they could have that
270 P they could have an albino
271 S they’d be darker because they'd be dark colours
272 P yes ah blimey..that goes there then
273 S but eh
274 L no
275 S but both these two would be dark because he’s got really
dark parents and in this it says that
The boys seem uncertain of what they are doing as they compete to 
have their choices accepted. The content frame being used by all 
three is initially very weak and Luke at (255) is unable to follow
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the activities of the others. At (268, 271 and 275) Simon seems to 
be using the authority of the text to support his idea that the 
black mice are likely to have dark offspring because they are more 
'’powerful”. His use of "powerful" may be his translation of the 
dominance/strength idea introduced in the text.
276 P I know it does
277 S the babies would be dark
278 P yeah they are look
279 S but they would be mainly black
280 P yeah all right then put .change that one for that one
281 S they're all black.,right this one
Simon extends his explanation of ’dominance’ in this exchange with 
Peter (276-81). This conception may be different from the blending 
conception used earlier for now black does not darken the 
offspring but makes them "mainly black" (279 and 281). It is 
interesting to speculate on Simon’s assimilation of this notion in 
relation to his existing ideas of like begets like and blending; the 
’dominance’ of black parents may be a plausible synthesis of the 
former conceptions.
282 L would there be this one would you say
283 P no because its darker
284 S too dark..there wouldn’t be another
285 L yeah . darker
286 P there would be another speckled one. shall I get another 
speckled one with a queer bottom
287 L yeah here’s one
288 P no I meant like that
289 S I’ve got one
290 L get a white one he’s nicking yours
291 P there’s two black ones there, now these two
292 L these grey and black
293 S yeah they’d be all black
294 P no they’d be say just one
295 S or a very dark grey
296 P yeah like that that's dark
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All three boys competitively collaborate over the selection of 
offspring, but at C83 with grey and black parents Simon seems to 
be using his conception of ’dominance’ and blending at (293) and 
(295) respectively. The latter conception has utility in the context 
of the ’problem’ but also seems to be a basis for agreement between 
Peter and Simon (283-4) and (293-296).
297 L but thats brown though
298 P but it doesn’t have to it could be..have one grey as well
299 L no have a brown
300 S No
301 P have brown its darker
302 S cos there isn’t any browns in those two though
303 L have that those two ..that's actually more than darker
304 S dont think they'd be any brown in it because there's no
brown in that
305 P have a black one
Luke questions Peter’s choice of a brown offspring at [83 his 
response at (298 and 301) seems uncertain. Simon also disagrees 
with the choice of brown offspring and he supports this by 
refering to the fact that the parents do not have any brown 
colouration (302 and 304). Interestingly he does not consider 
previous generations as a source of 'brown' he is apparently 
concerned with one generation. Peter's suggestion of a black one 
(305) instead of a brown offspring is a tacit acceptance of Simon’s 
viewpoint. Again there is an interesting interrelationship between 
Simon’s ideas about parental input and familial resemblance with 
his conceptions of blending, the 'dominance' of black and familial 
similarity.
306 S ehm..agouti because they’re a mix of different colours
307 L they might have an albino
308 S no
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309 P yeah they could
310 S they could but they are not going to
311 L yes they are
312 P they’ve had one now
313 S have one of those
314 P no they've had an albino now get another of those
315 L eck
316 P no change it far that one
317 L no no that one’s goad ..oh no you wouldn’t have this one
318 P he’s falling off
319 S it doesn't have an albino because
320 P yes you could
321 S because they are both dark colours..why would
it be an albino though
322 P because albinos can happen sort of anytime
323 L it could happen
324 S that makes more sense
At (306) Simon suggests that agouti mice are possible offspring in 
[103. His description of them as "a mix of different colours" may 
be based on his blending conception, this being cued by the 
appearance of the agouti type. Luke suggests an albino and he and 
Peter seems to agree that this is a possiblity (307 and 309). 
Simon's response to this is very dogmatic perhaps he sees this as 
a challenge to his gatekeeping role in recent discussions (310). 
Peter and Simon support one another and place an albino on the 
board. Interestingly Peter seems to be using his conception of 
albino rarity to prevent Luke from choosing another (314). At (319) 
Simon disagrees with the choice of an albino, it seems that he is 
unable to reconcile this with the dark coloured parents and perhaps 
his current conceptions (321). Peter responds by making his 
conception of albino rarity/frequency more explicit (322) and with 
Luke's support this is accepted by Simon as a plausible 
explanation; perhaps because he himself used this notion in an
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earlier discussion and it may be part of his conceptual ecosystem, 
although not active during this particular exchange.
325 P oh no that's not sensible.,I don’t think
326 S it is cos that
327 P that isn’t that isn't
328 L that isn't , that’s not like any of that
329 S yes it is
330 L yeah they wouldn’t have an albino
331 P they would
332 L wouldn’t usually
333 P I’ve finished
334 S and that would be darker
335 P I’ve finished
336 L no it wouldn't
337 S see look look
338 P finished
The debate about the albino continues with Peter and Luke 
apparently uncertain about their decision to have an albino (325 
and 330), Peter and Luke end up disagreeing (330-2) and Simon 
seems to revert to his blending/dominance notions (334). Peter 
seems eager to suspend the discussion between Luke and Simon as he 
declares the task complete (333, 335 and 338). All three boys look 
up from the board inviting the researcher to attend to them.
5.4.1 Summary
In the opening minutes of the discussions the boys orientate 
themselves towards the requirments of the task. The number of 
offspring each family should have is an initial focus for 
discussion. Simon's observations that they have chosen offspring 
which are the same as the parents in card 1, leads to Peter 
challenging this outcome with his conception of offspring
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variability. It would seem that in spite of the parents being the 
same colour he expects their offspring to be a "bit different", "a 
bit lighter some would be darker".
Simon takes the lead in card 2 during which he introduces his 
idea of "in between". This appears to be a blending conception 
where offspring are a blend of parental coat colours and are 
therefore an "in between" colour. Simon also seems to be suggesting 
that some of the offspring will look like the parents but at this 
stage the boys seem more concerned with choosing their own 
offspring and competing with one another to voice their thoughts. 
The boys present strong interaction frames at this time and their 
competitive collaboration is based on weak content frames. This 
may be an effective way for them to ’experiment’ with their ideas 
in an uncertain and novel situation.
In card 3 Simon’s lead seems to be based on his conception of 
’like begets like'. This is challenged by Peter who qualifies his 
disagreement on the basis of his conception of offspring 
variability. The disagreement between these two boys at this point 
gives an insight into the heterogeneity of Peter's conceptual 
ecosystem. In the face of Simon’s intransigence Peter supports his 
choice of grey and his notion of variability with the idea that 
albinos are infrequent in families. Interestingly, this conception 
may have been cued by Simon who initially uses the term albino, 
perhaps by way of giving his choice some authority. Peter affects a 
compromise by accepting that there will be some albinos but 
justifies his choice of two grey offspring by calling them twins. 
This is an interesting compromise which maintains the integrity of
- 256 -
Peter’s conceptions and preserves his relationship with Simon. The 
heterogeneity of Peter’s ecosystem in this episode may thus 
contribute to its resilience.
The discussion of the next card starts with Peter accepting 
Simon's 'like begets like' conception whilst reconciling it with his 
conception of offspring variability. It seems that he is able to 
accommodate both these conceptions within his ecosystem. Luke 
seems happy to facilitate the others activities at this point, and 
by showing Peter card 7 he seems to be questioning the 
plausibility of Peter’s variability conception (ie. albino offspring 
from brown parents). Peter’s response to this is to infer 
'infidelity' and cross-breeding which is the focus for some 
embarrassed laughter amongst the boys. Again the heterogeneity of 
Peter's ecosystem seems to be able to diffuse the potential anomaly 
of the albino mouse and its brown parents whilst 'protecting' the 
plausibility of his conception of variability in the offspring.
The potential anomaly presented by card 5 (black parents + 
brown offspring) seems to register with Peter as he elicits the 
other's opinions. He seems to question whether they might expect 
another brown offspring when it has nothing in common with its 
parents "apart from ears and tail". Simon apparently adapts his 
conception of familial similarity in response to this anomaly, and 
proposes a more general similarity of "dark" offspring from dark 
parents. Simon uses this conception in card 6 but it is noteworthy 
that as he looks ahead to card 7 (brown parents + albino 
offspring) he seems to decide that the situation portrayed in the 
card is "stupid". This may reflect the fact that it cannot be
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explained in terms of familial similarity nor his recent adaptation 
of this conception to accommodate general colouring.
The discussion of card 7 sees Peter and Simon presenting 
strong frames and using their respective conceptions of variability 
and familial similarity. However, they seem unconvinced about their 
theories and eventually admit to one another that they don't know 
why "they have got one like that" ie an albino. It is interesting 
that previous ideas such as infidelity/cross-breed are not used in 
this context, and that these ideas are not simultaneously active 
with other conceptions. The fact that Simon and Peter are stuck for 
an explanation allows Luke to break into their monopoly of the 
conversation with his joke about it being "queer". This is ignored 
by Peter and Simon perhaps exhibiting gatekeeping with regard to 
their control of the discussion.
At card 8 Simon and Peter compete for the floor as they 
'cement' their consensus. Simon uses Peter’s conception of 
variability, Peter uses the phrase "in between" to echo Simon's 
conception. During this episode they remain conscious of the albino 
anomaly from the previous card but the problem remains unresolved. 
The aggressive disagreement between Peter and Luke at the end of 
this episode may reflect Luke's apparent isolation and lack of 
involvement in the discussion.
Peter leads the discussion into card 9. He supports his choice 
of offspring by referring to Simon’s notion of "in between", Luke 
disagrees with this, challenging it on the basis that brown 
offspring are not "in between" grey and black. Simon supports Luke 
and disagrees with Peter suggesting that some offspring will look
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like the parents and some will be "dark grey" and "in between". The 
latter blending conception seems to be different from Peter's 
notion of what "in between" means. His failure to explain to Simon 
and Luke why brawn is "in between" results in Peter taking the 
defensive line that he can choose what he wants.
Perhaps as a result of their 'strained' working relationship 
the discussion of the next card is brief and punctuated by a 10 
second silence before Luke suspends their activities and they move 
on. At card 11 better relationships between the boys emerge as 
they accept each other's ideas and choices in a more conciliatory 
way. Luke's suggestion of choosing an albino offspring is readily 
accepted by Peter in this instance, and interestingly, it is 
supported by Simon who reconciles it with the notion of albino 
rarity/frequency used earlier by Peter. Peter leads with the 
conception of 'like begets like* and its acceptance by Simon seems 
to re-establish their consensus. The ’social stability’ of the group 
may be in part determined by the overlap of their conceptions and 
their interpersonal relations.
The fluidity of their interpersonal interaction again emerges 
in the discussion of the last card. Simon seems to be gatekeeping 
with regard to what are acceptable choices of offspring and a 
cycle of lead/disagreement between Peter and Simon develops. Luke 
gets caught up in this disagreement as he and Peter dispute their 
claims to knowledge, Before the argument develops, Peter suspends 
their activities by declaring the task "finished".
The reading task was conducted in silence in spite of the 
researcher's invitation to talk to each other about the content of
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the books. After five minutes or so the boys indicated that they
were ready to go on.
The family tree format was familiar to the boys although none 
of them had actually made up a tree. They quickly became involved 
in the task. Peter’s use of words such as "agoati” (sic) and "genes" „ 
which he has drawn from the text, seems to be more for effect than 
anything else. They competitively collaborate with one another to 
get their choices on the board but the content frames used are 
initially very weak. It seems that blending, 'like begets like’ and 
variation conceptions are being used by all three boys but these 
are ’submerged’ in a rapid succession of leads, disagreements, 
acceptances and task orientated activities. Simon appears to take 
on a gatekeeping role with regard to those choices which stay on 
the board but his efforts have limited success in stemming the 
tide of activity. By [7] Simon has introduced his conception of 
'dominance' which focuses on the powerfullness of black coat colour. 
The intelligibility and plausibility of this notion, gleaned from 
the text, and Simon's comprehension of it, may be related to his 
current conceptions. Black is seen as a dominant colour which will
make the offspring black, but equally Simon also sees it as having
a darkening effect in the context of his blending conception. The 
other boys seem to accept this as a plausible and fruitful 
strategy.
Before completing this task Peter suggests that an albino 
should appear in the tree, but this is met with disagreement from 
Simon. His challenge is based on the notion that dark parents will 
not have white offspring. Peter's defence of his choice makes
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explicit his conception that albinos "can happen sort of anytime". 
Although this is accepted by Simon as a plausible explanation the 
boys, including Peter, seem to have doubts about the inclusion of 
an albino. The discussion of this matter is suspended as they reach 
the end of the task perhaps reflecting the fact that they have not 
quite explained the appearance of albinos in non-albino families. It 
is interesting to speculate that the assimilation of ’dominance’ and 
its association of colour strength may interact with blending 
conceptions. In this way it may be more difficult and confusing to 
explain albino offspring in the context of dark coloured parents.
5.5 Case Study 5.
This group consisted of two boys and a girl, aged 12 + years. 
All three were classmates. The session took place in the school 
library, in the presence of the 'interviewer', while the rest of the 
class were engaged in normal lessons. Jane, Darren and Andrew sat 
in an open semi-circle facing the camera which was positioned 
about twelve feet away from the group. The researcher sat in view 
of the group monitoring the equipment.
The nature of the session was explained to the group and any 
questions answered, The first task was introduced and the format 
of the cards explained. The group began their discussion,
Card 1 (Grey x Grey)
1 D They wouldn’t be the same colour would they
2 J they might be
3 A yes they would
4 D they might not be
5 J there was that dog on Blue Peter 
different
it turned out the same
6 A its more likely its more likely to be the same 
colour because of the parents
7 D cos dogs aren’t the same as mice are they
8 A that’s what I've done
Darren invites the others to comment on his strong lead that the 
offspring won’t be the same as the parents (1). Jane seems to think 
that they might be the same as the parents, and supports this by 
reference to an anecdote about Blue Peter dogs (5), (Dogs on this 
TV programme and their litters of puppies are canine ’stars’). 
However, in her description of the dogs Jane seems confused
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whether they turned out the same or different (5). Andrew seems 
more confident in this matter (3 and 6) and he suggests that 
offspring will be the same as the parents. Darren questions Jane’s 
anecdote on analogical grounds as he draws her attention to the 
difference between mice and dogs (7). Andrew seems to stick to his 
own ideas and suspends further discussion by moving on (8). Jane 
and Darren follow; the group's respective posit ions/ideas apparently 
intact and their difference of opinion unresolved.
Card 2 (Dark Brown x Light Brown + Dark Brown)
9 A well if the parents are brown
10 J the., multicoloured yeah
that
11 A yeah the other one would be multicoloured
12 D brown and white
13 J that colour
14 A yeah but say they’re three in the litter right so you get
one brown one from the father one sort of browny one from
the mother
15 D and perhaps
16 A then you get the child the same two
colours . a multicoloured one cos its a twin
17 D there wouldn’t be
18 A both of them
19 D probably lets have a look at that, that that
could be it cos...its got pink ears body
20 J they’ve all got pink ears
21 A that’s stupid Darren
22 D no its not no if you've got a dark brown
one with a light bit in..it could be one ..have they got a
multicoloured one
23 J cos look if you mix both of them colours together
24 D no. that's the same colour as that though isn’t it
25 J yeah but that isn’t the same colour
26 A but if you mix both of these colours the darky colour, so
you're more likely to get that sort of colour
27 D yeah you want a more darker colour than that
28 A which are the same..yeah it be that
29 J and that..but you
wouldn’t get them all the same
30 D I can't get a darker one
31 J like that
32 A more darker than that..I say like that..cos that's the
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darker colour so you’re more likely to get that one than
the lighter colour
33 J I'm thinking of half-cast actually
34 A oh right .let's go on to the next one right we’ll go on
now
Andrew and Jane take the lead at the beginning of this discussion. 
Jane introduces the word "multicoloured” at (10) to describe the
agouti pattern. Andrew accepts and echos this idea and goes on to
qualify and justify this choice (11,14 and 16). He seems to be 
using a 'like begets like conception and a blending conception 
'simultaneously; whereby in a litter of three mice one takes after 
each parent and one offspring is a "mix" of both parents. Andrew's 
reference to "twins" is vague but it may be that he is trying to 
denote how the multicoloured offspring are the products (twins) of 
two parents.
Darren competes for the floor with Andrew and he seems to 
disagree with Andrew’s conception (17), At (19) he appears to be 
looking for other traits to base his prediction on, such as "pink 
ears". Andrew and Jane censure this strongly and Darren’s defence 
of his idea is uncertain. Jane tries to explain her conception of 
blending to Darren at (23). Darren disagrees with her idea on the 
basis that the given offspring is dark brown and not a 'mix' of the 
parents (25). Andrew at (26 and 28) supports Jane and adapts his 
blending conception to include the strength of colour . At (32) he 
seems to be suggesting that darker coloured offspring will be more 
likely from crosses involving dark and light coloured parents. Jane 
seems to be challenging Andrew’s conception at (33), her conception 
of blending does not appear to consider strength of colour. Her use
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of the term "half-cast" may describe a more hybrid form of 
offspring where parental colour contributions are equal. Andrew 
appears to acknowledge this, but perhaps by way of gatekeeping, he 
suspends any discussion by suggesting they move to the next card 
(34).
Card 3 (Albino x Albino)
35 D right this is pretty obvious
36 A yeah but is there any white ones
37 D I can't see any white ones oh yes I can
38 J they could be
39 D Yessss
40 J we could get a different coloured one
41 A yeah but it would have to be a light colour
42 J cos no. but if that went back in the family
43 A yeah but if that was a family tree yeah you might but 
it isn’t
44 D but they're both the same colour, they’re not
45 A whats that got to do with this...you don't know
46 D they're both the same 
colour, so ..probably the same colour as the babies
47 J it is ..get white
48 A yeah if they did have babies it would probably be a light 
colour ...next one
At (35) Darren's "pretty obvious” seems to indicate that the 
situation depicted in the card is unambiguous. He and Andrew appear 
to agree that the offspring will be like the parents (35-37). Jane 
offers an alternative suggestion at (38 and 40) that the offspring 
could be coloured. Andrew's reponse to this is interesting in that 
he accepts Jane's idea but his qualification that "they would have 
to be a light colour", may reflect the interaction of this notion 
with his blending and familial similarity conceptions. These 
conceptions may set the limits of offspring variation that Andrew 
sees as being plausible. It is also an insight into Andrew's
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gatekeeping activities with regard to his ’control’ of the group's 
activities.
At (42) Jane disagrees with Andrew and seems to be using a 
conception about grandparental influence an offspring colour.
Andrew challenges her conception by making reference to the nature 
of the task, and perhaps having seen the family tree problem board, 
he seems to be suggesting that her idea is out of context. Darren 
does not seem to follow their argument and restates his ’like 
begets like' conception (44 and 46), referring to the difference 
between this card and card 2 where the parents are a different 
colour. His 'naivety' is censured by Andrew but he and Jane seem to 
accept that there will be white offspring. Perhaps 
characteristically Andrew restates his belief that they would be a 
"light colour" (like the parents but slightly different) implicitly 
challenging Jane’s notion of coloured offspring. Thus he gets the 
last word before he suspends the discussion by moving to the next 
card (48).
Card 4 (Black x Brown)
49 A we’ve come across this one before
50 J Ehm it would be black wouldn’t it 
out
51 D ehh na
52 A its the stronger colour
53 D will I
54 A brown and
55 J yeah
56 D brown sort of brown
57 A yeah brown dark brown
58 D ish
59 J wait a minute they've got a black
60 D yeah but
61 J I reckon they’ll both be black
62 A Mmm
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63 D which is the mother and which is the father
64 J don't know
65 A don’t know ..so
66 D can we just remember he’s given
67 A is there a brown and black
68 D sort of
69 A that'll do I'll put that one on
70 J yeah that’s got grey on it
71 D there’s nothing in the family with
grey
72 A yeah
73 D and its stripes as well that’s not stripes
74 J I think it is this
75 D yeah
76 A yeah could be I’ll put a black one down then..are you ready 
to go to the next one
77 D yeah
At (50) Jane leads with what seems to be a 'dominance' conception.
This is qualified by Andrew at (52). Jane's use of this conception 
may be influenced by the plausibility of this notion and the fact 
that it can be shared with Andrew. Darren’s suggestion of a brown 
offspring is picked up by Andrew who qualifies this with ’’dark 
brown’’ (57). Andrew seems to be using a blending conception at 
this point. This appears to conflict with Jane's expectations and 
her ’dominance' conception; she expects the offspring to be black 
(59 and 61). She seems surprised at Andrew accepting dark brown as 
a possibility, particularly when he was the first to use the idea 
of ’dominance’. Andrew’s response to Jane’s challenge perhaps 
indicating that he is aware of this 'conflict' (62).
Darren seems to be working out some conception related 
paternal gender but he is not given support by the others (63-65) 
and his idea remains latent and under articulated.
Andrew and Jane go on to make some more offspring choices 
accepting each other's selections in a rather passive way (69-70).
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Darren challenges their choices on the basis that the offspring 
have no colours which are derived from the parents, "nothing in the 
family with grey" (71). Jane returns to her original idea of black 
offspring (74) and this is accepted by Darren and Andrew, perhaps 
aware that they can all agree on this selection. Andrew again moves 
them on to the next card.
Card 5 (Black x Black + Brown)
78 J see I told you it could go back in the family again brown 
then
79 A that’s right cos brown..you’re right it could be a 
family tree
80 J I reckon the other two are black
81 D Mmm cos that one’s half cast
82 J how can it be half cast when them two are black
83 A but if it does run back in the family tree
84 D in..in our family
85 J otherwise if it
86 A I think it would be like that colour to that one...its 
sort of similar colour
87 D if the mum is black in our family
88 A I’ll put this one down
89 D the baby will come out black won’t it so its the same, we 
don't know which one
90 J if the husband is white it would be half cast
91 A I’ll put it like that
92 D Yeah it would be chocolate,.black and white
93 A no
94 J ok its that I reckon
95 D I don’t think there should be any yellow in it
96 J nor do I
97 A right go on to the next one
At (78) Jane has her previous conception of grandparental influence 
’confirmed* by card 5. The brown offspring from black parents is 
explained in terms of her nation that earlier generations affect 
the offspring coat colour. Andrew (79) acknowledges and accepts 
this idea and using his description of "family tree" which he used
- 268 -
earlier to dispute Jane's conception. Jane seems to be using a 'like 
begets like* conception to predict the other offspring in the 
family (80).
At (81) Darren uses the term "half-cast”, used earlier by Jane, 
to describe one of his offspring choices. Jane disagrees with this 
description (82) and qualifies her point by referring Darren to the 
parents which are "both black"; half-cast for Jane is the 'blended' 
product of heterozygous parents. Darren seems unsure but at (87 and 
89), using a 'human' example, he appears to be suggesting that 
black mothers give rise to black children. This may relate to his 
earlier and his present desire to know which parent was the male 
or female, and may relate to a gender related conception of ’like 
begetting like’. Jane's interjection at (90) completes Darren’s 
human analogy with her description of half-cast and the need for a 
white parent to go with the black one. The extent of Darren’s 
analogy based on matings of black and white humans is revealed at 
(92) where he makes the implicit connection between the "chocolate" 
skin colour of these human offspring and the brown colour of the 
mouse in card 5; black and white in the context of human skin 
colour make brown babies. It is possible that Darren may see the 
white bellies of the mice contributing to the colour 'equation', or 
he does not seem to see the limitation pointed out by Jane that 
both the parents in card 5 are black.
Throughout Jane and Darren’s discussion Andrew seems content 
to make his offspring choices on the basis of parental similarity. 
Jane’s use of this conception immediately after the vindication of 
her notions about grandparental influence (80), maintains the
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consensus between Andrew and herself. Even more interestingly, 
there is no overt refutation of a conception 'like begets like’ even 
in the face of black parents having brown offspring. Jane’s 
conception of grandparental influence may have limited interaction 
with her conception of familial similarity. It may be possible to 
speculate that in the context of the card problem, not knowing the 
colour of the grandparents, may limit the problem solving utility 
of this conception when compared with the alternatives.
Card 6 (Black x Speckled + Speckled)
98 A Darrens not ready
99 D yes I will, ah spotty
100 J or maybe
101 A I reckon one of each
102 J one of each . what each colour
103 A yeah
104 D say there's a black one there
105 A like that
106 D like if there's a black one there I think that should be
right..but there might not be
107 J I can’t find any of them ones
108 D dark but
109 J no grey but on . yeah there was one back there with that
colour it was that colour and a plain one of these
110 D Mmm
111 J that could have been ..that colour with
112 D Yeah because black spots cos that the that’s the whatever
it is the mummy or daddy
113 J its more likely to be like that than it would have been
114 A just black
115 J yeah
116 D yeah
117 A yeah but you can’t find the ones with white in there all
grey oh here’s one
118 D no they're not
119 J what do you think
120 D Mmm.. yeah probably
121 A I just think you get black
122 J I think black look cos there is black on him and he’s
completely black
123 A yeah apart from the white
124 D no but they've got that baby no haven't they
125 A yeah but
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126 J what baby
127 A yeah but they’re more likely to..they’ve got a bit of black
each so I reckon its black
128 D she hasn’t got one of them
129 J come here..must have fallen off. where is it
130 A I’m putting two blacks down
131 D I'm not
132 J I am
133 A here’s two white
134 J because they’ve both well they’ve both got black on them
135 A next one you’re always last
Jane and Andrew seem to be using their conceptions of familial 
similarity as a basis for their offspring choices (101 and 102). At 
(112) Darren appears to be justifying Andrew and Jane's choices to
himself on the basis of his gender conception of parental
influence. Picking up on Jane’s lead (113) all three seem to reach 
agreement on the likelihood of more black offspring. At (121)
Andrew restates his choice of black and qualifies this using a 
blending conception (127). Although not made explicit it is 
interesting to speculate on the relationship between Andrew's 
conceptions at this point and his earlier notion of 'dominance' 
with regard to black parents, Jane supports Andrew in his choice 
of black offspring (134). Darren does not agree with their 
consensus (131). Andrew in his gatekeeping/chairing role prevents 
any elaboration of this disagreement by moving them to the next 
card and censuring Darren for his tardiness at the same time 
(135),
Card 7 (Brown x Brown + Albino)
136 D oh what..brown one and they’ve got a white one
(all three laugh)
137 J well they have got both got white
138 A yeah (ft**) stomachs..I don't know what they are called
139 D how can a white mouse have a white spot (laughs)
140 J you are funny.,.maybe how about
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141 D how about we say there’s a black
and white spot one like that..cos that is the same colour 
as the mum more or less
142 J they're both the same colour
143 D and the that white spot could mix in and
make a lighter one couldn’t it
144 J and another white spot and that goes all
145 D and that one could be
146 A is there any
147 D that's what I think it should be lighter one
cos the spot mixes in
148 A I’ve just put ..you've just taken that from mine
149 D no I haven’t
150 A oh sorry
151 D I reckon it should be that one and that one and a dark one
that one like that and a dark one like that I reckon it
should be
152 J a dark one . dark yeah
153 A I'm putting one like that
154 J how about that
155 A well if there is
156 D there is no orange there in the family
157 A it might think if there was a white one with a brown
stomach
158 D yeah it
159 J if there was a white one..and it has nothing to do
with white but yet that one came why shouldn’t that one
come
160 D why shouldn't that one come then
161 J it can
162 D I put a spotted one in then
163 A but there’s no black there’s . white and brown that's all
164 D that's what I said it mixes in so
165 A I’m putting mine like that you may not agree but that’s .
oh you have
166 D I agree
167 J that's darker
168 D its the same really
169 J no you’ve got a light brown and a dark one
170 D I know all right
171 A Right next one ..there’s a black
The potential anomaly presented by card 7 appears to be recognised 
by Darren (136) and the group’s laughter may indicate their joint 
awareness of the 'problem' that it presents to their existing 
conceptions and previous strategies. At (137) Jane appears to 
recognise the difference between parents and offspring but that
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there is familial similarity in the colour of their (white) 
stomachs. Darren returns to his consideration of parental gender 
(141) and again it seems to be closely linked to the anlaogy of 
human skin colour and the relationship between black, white and 
brown skin tones, Jane questions this at (142) drawing Darren's 
attention to the two brown parents, and implicitly, the absence of 
any black colour.
At (143 and 147) Darren develops a blending conception with 
the white bellies being the focus rather than the main coat colour. 
This may extend the explanatory adequacy of an existing conception 
in the face of an anomaly. Jane at (144) seems to view this as 
plausible and echos Darren’s idea. All three students present 
strong interaction frames as they compete for the floor and to 
have their ideas accepted. Andrew seems to be competing with 
Darren and there is a reluctance to accept his notion of ’’mixing 
in” the belly colours of the parents. As an alternative, Andrew 
suggests a black and tan offspring at (153), but Darren disagrees 
on the basis that there is no tan colour ("orange”) "in the family” 
(156). Jane supports Andrew by suggesting that there is 
considerable offspring variability and that the albino offspring in 
card 7 is an example of colour variability (159). At (162-66)
Darren and Andrew compete to have their choices accepted.
Eventually Darren appears to accept Andrew’s choice. Jane then 
disagrees with Andrew (167 and 169) over his choice of a dark 
brown offspring which seems to conflict with her expectations. All 
three seem uncertain about their conceptions in the context of card 
7, which in turn seems to increase their dissatisfaction with any
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particular individual explanation. This dissatisfaction may reside 
in their reservations about the explanatory adequacy of each others 
ideas. Andrew suspends the discussion by moving on (171),
Card 8 (Agouti x Agouti + Black)
172 D its done it again
173 J why
174 D like we had before
175 J no but that was look because they had black spots maybe
that was a reason why they got that so I reckon the rest 
might be
176 D I reckon the spots should be black
177 J so do I
178 D cos the spots come after them
179 J yeah they would be black
180 D yeah
181 A there are a few blacks there
182 J if we can find them..one of these., there’s grey here
183 D here’s one look carefully
184 J got any black ones Andy
185 D they’re all at the bottom..there’s one keep looking under
these ones
186 A here’s a black one .two
187 J they black, they’re grey
188 A oh
189 J they’re grey
190 A blacky grey
191 J blacky grey
192 A there’s a black
193 D I’ll stick with these
194 J oh yeah sorry
195 D I think it should be those..four
196 J it can have four can't it
197 D yeah ..I think it should be cos it mixes in with that
brown and makes it dark brown
198 A I'm putting five.,sometimes you must have..what you have
just done a few here
199 D like that yeah
200 A next one..grey and black
At (172 and 174) Darren comments on the similarity between card 8 
and the previous card in which agouti mice appeared. Jane seems to 
see card 8 as a vindication of the blending conception whereby the 
black spots on the agouti parents contribute to the black offspring
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(175). She and Darren appear to agree on this as the basis for 
their choices of offspring (179-80). Andrew at this point seems to 
support this strategy through his involvement in task activities 
(181,186 and 190), At (197) Darren uses his blending conception to 
justify his choice of dark brown which he sees as the product of 
light brown and black. Andrew seems to be competing with Darren at 
(198); choosing five offspring to Darren's four but apparently 
agreeing over the colours chosen. Andrew again moves the group to 
the next card.
Card 9 (Grey x Black)
201 D
202 A
203 J
204 A
205 D
206 J
207 D
208 A
209 J
210 D
211 A
212 J
213 D
214 A
215 D
216 J
217 A
218 J
219 A
220 D
221 A
222 D
223 A
I reckon it should be that colour cos it mixes in don't it 
if you put that in 
yeah
mixes in but its not paint is it
no but no but it mixes in sort of thing..a bit darker than 
that
if you put that colour on to there 
yes but surely black is stranger so they come out black 
well no I reckon it should be like that 
like that
as there are no black we'll have them 
how about a lighter grey for one of them 
oh it don’t matter 
yeah
cos it comes after there right..they could have another 
black cos the mothers 
we don’t know anything about mice really 
we should do shouldn't we
yeah what about one of them colours or would that be more 
brown
look for a black one for Darren 
I just had that...how about that colour 
I’m going to
it doesn't really mix in does it. I reckon it
should be that
I’m sticking like that staying like that 
I’m staying like that I can’t find a black 
next one
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At (201) Darren leads with his blending conception of "mixes in". 
His exclusive use of this conception in recent discussion, may 
indicate that for him it is a very adequate explanation of events 
and a good basis for solving the ’problem’. Jane picks up on 
Darren’s use of "mixes in" and challenges the painting analogy 
which she sees as being the basis for his predictions. Her overt 
reference to this analogy may indicate that she has reservations 
about its applicability in the context of mouse breeding (203). 
Andrew appears to defend the ’paint’ blending conception by echoing 
Darren’s strategy of "mixing in", but Jane’s reference to the 
analogical basis of this conception seems to be largely ignored.
At (206) Jane challenges the blending conception with her 
notion of black 'dominance*. Darren disagrees as he sticks to his 
own conception (207), although he seems to accept Jane’s choice of 
black by justifying it in terms of his own conception of parental 
gender influence (213). This heterogeneity in Darren’s conceptual 
ecosystem also allows him to diffuse the disagreement with Jane 
and maintain their working relationship.
At (214) Andrew appears to be reflecting on his lack of 
knowledge about mice. His recent contributions to the discussion 
or the lack of them, and Jane’s overt reference to the 'paint* 
analogy, may have left him with a feeling of uncertainty. Darren 
seems more positive about what they should and should not know 
(215) and presses on with his use of the blending conception 
(220). Andrew suspends the discussion by moving on (223).
Card 10 (Black and Tan x Brown and Tan + Black and Tan)
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224 D Goodness me
225 J that's quite good they’ve both got orange yet black is the
stranger colour
226 D mix that see if it mixes in it’d make a
227 J if it mixed in it would make a sort of murky colour
228 D yeah murky blackish
229 J like I just picked that
230 D no that’s what we had before and that wasn't the same
whatever it was
231 J how about brown
232 A no its definitely black’s the stronger colour
so its definite going to be more black than there are 
browns
233 D that's the way we started (ft*)
234 A I'm putting three blacks
235 J one of them
236 A that’s it
237 D there’s quite a few of those left and one of them
238 J ready
239 A yip
Jane seems to interpret card 10 as an example of black ’dominance’ 
and perhaps justification of her previous conception (225). Darren’s 
response, perhaps by way of challenging Jane’s notion, is to use 
his blending conception (226). At (227) Jane works out the 
consequence of "mixing in" and may be questioning the plausibility 
of the offspring’s "murky" colour. Darren at (228) seems to be 
striking a compromise with Jane with his "murky blackish” 
description, with Jane pressing home her ’advantage* by restating 
that Darren’s choice was her original selection (229). Darren 
defends his position at (230) perhaps not wanting to be seen to be 
’wrong'.
Jane suggests brown as an alternative offspring colour (231). 
Andrew’s response at (232) describes black as the "stronger" 
colour, as he echos Jane's ’dominance' conception. Andrew seems to 
have incorporated the idea of the frequency of black offspring into 
his earlier conception of ’dominance'; black offspring are now more
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likely than brawn as opposed to black being the only type of 
offspring. Jane indicates the move to the next card (238) with all 
three apparently in agreement over the choice of offspring.
Card 11 (Dark Brown x Dark Brown + Light Brown)
240 A ah this is funny I know
241 D how could it be
242 J cos back in the family there might have been
243 A but its lost the orange
244 D you don’t know that do you ..that’s there’s the same
colours and they’ve come out different weird
245 J cos on Blue Peter they said that all them dogs
246 D but dogs are different from mice aren’t they
247 J why should they be
248 A because the size
249 J why do you say the black mice and the white mice come out
half-cast and you get a black one and a light brown like 
in a half-cast
250 A I think this one should be
251 D if you had a black black man and a white woman you would
both would come out not spotty but (laughs) ..but chocolate
252 A yeah..like half-cast
253 D he's got a black dad and a white mum
Darren is puzzled by the situation depicted in card 11 (241 and 
244). It is passible to speculate that dark brown parents with a 
light brown offspring represents an anomaly in the context of his 
blending conception. Jane's 'explanation' refers to her conception 
of previous generations influencing the colour of offspring, and 
she seems to be supporting this notion with reference to events on 
a popular children's TV programme (Blue Peter) (245). Darren 
disagrees with her on the basis that her example is based on dogs 
and not mice (246), Andrew supports Darrren but seems to miss the 
point with his reference to size (248). Jane defends her dog 
analogy by questioning the half-cast/human exemplars used by
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Darren (249). This challenge leads to Darren qualifying his notion 
of half-cast (251), and perhaps gives an insight into the overlap 
between colour mixing and the social experience of inter-racial 
marriages which make up his blending conception (253).
254 A yeah I reckon it should be brown because its the main 
thing in the parents
255 D yeah cos that one that one’s just an odd one
256 A yeah
257 D that came out odd
258 J it ought to come out like that
259 D that came out odd I reckon
260 A in a litter you’re not likely to get them all the same
261 D no not likely to get them all the same so why can’t you 
have a brown one instead,,not black
262 J I’m putting that I'm happy with that
263 D I reckon it should be that and another brown one however 
the brown is
264 A ah no I’ve put brown
265 D oh there I reckon it should be that
266 A yeah I'm sorry I put in an extra one another brown
267 D that one that one there we are
268 A I reckon its that
269 D you’ve put too many in
270 J why
271 A its more likely to be the parents
272 D yeah
273 A there’s black there its darker . you might get one yeah 
but there’s black there cos that’s a strong colour
274 D dark brown I want there let’s have a couple of them
275 A I’ve got three of those and one of them
276 J two browns one of them a sort of 
mixture between these three
277 A I don't know., yeah you’ve got a point there
278 D yeah like that
279 A Mmm that’s a darker one isn’t it
280 J no not with an orange stomach
281 A that, like that Darren
282 D this one I've got one
283 A yeah like that
284 D that’s what I think it should be
285 A yip
286 D alright happy
287 A I’m happy
Andrew suggests that they should choose brown like the parents on
the basis that it is the "main thing" (colour) (254 and 271).
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Darren agrees with this lead and ’explains’ the lack of similarity 
between offspring and parental coat colour by describing the 
former as an ’’add one’’ (255, 257 and 259). Darren’s use of this 
'explanation' may be based on the nation that "odd” or strange 
offspring can occasionally arise in families. At (258) Jane seems 
to support Darren’s conception whilst agreeing with Andrew's 
initial lead.
Andrew uses his conception of familial variation at (260) 
which seems to support Darren’s nation of the "odd” offspring. 
Darren echos this notion of variation (261) but censures Jane for 
her choice of a black mouse. It seems that at this point Darren 
accepts variation in the offspring that centres on brown variants 
(263). Jane sticks with her choice of black (262) but Andrew using 
Card 10 as an example tries to persuade her that brown offspring 
like the parents are more likely (271 and 273). Jane seems to 
deflect this disagreement by suggesting a blending conception 
involving all three of the 'given' mice on card 11 (276). Jane and 
the boys seem to agree on this conception (277-78) and they 
establish a consensus of opinion.
Card 12 (Agouti x Albino)
288 D is there a white with spots black spots
289 A no,.look perhaps it leaves its spots, its the
290 J yeah..mother.,mother
291 D from the mother there with the white
292 A yeah that brown
293 D perhaps it could be. I reckon we should have one of them
294 J I think it should be that
295 A that's what I’ve got
296 D I reckon
297 J its darker
298 D I reckon that’s
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299 A yeah but that's more that colour isn't it
300 D oh its got grey on
301 J oh yeah I suppose so
302 A I’m putting that one down two of those
303 J I don't I think that, because
304 D yes that’s what I put down
305 J if you have a grey and if you have and 
they mix and they can become brown
black and
306 A I'll still put one of those down
307 D and a white one cos it comes from the family
308 A yip
309 D all happy with that
310 A grey and brown one.
a mixture
cos that's
311 D oh Jane's got different
312 J so
313 A doesn't matter
Darren seems to use a blending conception at (288) with the others 
competitively collaborating to have their ideas accepted. Jane’s 
’cue’ of "mother" allows Darren to introduce his conception of 
parent gender influence (291). On this basis he selects a white 
offspring (like the mother) and it seem that this conception is 
linked to his notion of colour being "from the family" (307).
At (292-304) there is competitive collaboration which seems to 
be based on the student’s interpretations of blending the agouti 
and albino parents. Jane makes explicit the potential for different 
coloured offspring from this mating (305). Andrew uses his 
blending conception to justify his choice of grey and brown mice 
(310). All three agree to differ in their actual choices (306, 311- 
313) in spite of Darren’s gatekeeping (311). Andrew looks up at the 
researcher inviting him to join the group.
After a few minutes the group were introduced to the second 
task.
(Andrew starts to read the text aloud)
- 281 -
314 D genes
315 A I don't know
316 D what do genes mean
317 A is it from its parents
318 J the coat colours come from the genes
(Darren reads the next page aloud)
( Jane reads the next page followed by Andrew)
(Darren reads the next page followed by Jane)
319 D Yeah
320 A we got that
321 D that’s what everyone said
322 A yeah
323 D that's what we mixed in didn’t we
324 A mice with coloured coats
(Andrew reads page 7 aloud)
325 J but if we had had this one wouldn’t if that wouldn’t it
come out a darker colour than we put
326 D well it has hasn't it apart from that one
327 A I didn’t..I put a light one
328 J you didn’t you put light colours
329 A yeah but that’s not exactly that dark
330 D no but you’ve got white colour there
331 A more spots in that one
332 D its dark let’s keep reading
333 A we've done that
(Darren reads aloud)
(Jane reads aloud)
334 A thats . its white white with pink eyes
335 D we’re not finished reading
(Jane reads on)
336 D mice with light coloured coats (reads from text) that's
what I said wasn’t it
337 J dark coloured mice (reads text)
338 D yeah that's right light coloured mice is dark mice and
the darkest is strongest right
(Jane reads aloud followed by Andrew)
339 A look look agouti non agouti that eh you know capital
A and small a bigger A is stronger one so it will be
agouti
340 D which is that
341 J is that agouti
342 A that's agouti
343 J oh I see
344 A finished
The group take it in turns to read each page of the text aloud.
This seems to be the way they read in public during class 
activities. From (319-23) Darren and Andrew 'confirm' from the text 
that their blending strategy is 'correct'. Jane challenges this,
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(325) and seems to be using the text information to support the 
idea that dark colours will be ’dominant' over light colours, At 
(326-30) they refer back to their previous selections with the bays 
defending their choices in a rather vague way. Darren suspends this 
debate by suggesting that they read on (332). By (336 and 338) 
Darren has used the text to confirm his blending conception and 
seems to accept the ’dominance* of dark colours. Andrew seems to 
have developed an understanding of the geneticsymbolism used in 
the text (339).
The group were introduced to the final task. They were familiar 
with the family tree format, referring to Royal Family trees and a 
TV game show they had watched recently.
345 D right let’s go ..dark colour
346 A let's say
347 J any colour
347 D let's say
348 J any two right, no pick two simple colours to start with
349 D yeah
350 A yeah well they're dark ..you might that’s the
351 J one without an orange bit
352 A yeah that'll do...right get one a dark colour
353 J you got to get two here there
354 D yeah that seems about right mixed in
355 A yeah
356 J not mixed in
357 D it could be
358 A you’ll get that sort
359 J that's the more dominant colour
360 D yeah
361 J on that one you'd get
362 D perhaps perhaps that one could be
363 J black with brown with grey
364 D how about that one. what if those spots had mixed in like 
that
365 A yeah grey sort of belly
366 J you never know
367 A yeah you're likely to
368 D eh
369 A one of each
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The group begin task 3 competitively collaborating over the choice 
of offspring. Jane seems to have some task awareness (348) as they 
decide on the matings in Cl]. Darren seems to be gatekeeping and 
'justifies' their choice of offspring in Cl] with his blending 
conception (354). Andrew accepts this but Jane again challenges 
Darren's conception with her own notion of 'dominance'. Darren 
appears to accept the selection of a dark mouse but holds out for 
a product of blending at (364). They seem to reach a compromise 
over the choices (365-7) with Andrew's suggestion of "one of each" 
(369) and its implicit reference to familial similarity. This 
conception seems to be acceptable to both Darren and Jane and 
diffuses their disagreement.
370 J right these two mate and have
371 A cos that's the darker colour, so
372 D so these two are mating right so they are going to get 
babies so you want to get a grey
373 A a grey
374 D it would mix in
375 A we just read in the book
376 J these two
377 A the darker colour dominates the lighter colour., so the 
brown
378 D so you want to do . these two have babies
379 A that one to mate with
380 J no you don't
381 D no you don't
382 A but yeah there’s something there..cos that one’s got a 
mate with that something like that and make that one to 
get those
383 J yeah but hold on a minute
At ■(371) Andrew seems to pick up on Jane's conception of
'dominance'. Darren again challenges this conception and puts
forward his own blending notion (372 and 374). Andrew is puzzled 
by Darren's choice of grey (373) for C4] involving as it does the
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mating of a dark brown with a light brown mouse. Andrew appears to 
justify his disagreement with Darren by referring to the text 
(375). Interestingly he uses the present tense "dominates", as 
opposed to the word dominance used in the text, to describe the 
effect of dark colours on matings (377). Andrew is successful in 
getting two dark brown offspring on the board at L4L Darren moves 
to [33 without further consideration of this choice (378),
384 A we’ve got to put something there
385 D let’s put say that to mate with that
386 A that grey yeah that would be a good
387 J so these two
388 A it doesn’t matter cos its not connected to the others
389 J no you don’t I thought you had one from there and one on
there and then so those two
390 A mate yeah
391 J and they would get what colour
392 D ehm
393 A I reckon they’d
394 J grey with a grey belly but
395 D grey with a grey belly
396 J why have you got three mice on there
397 A I just put it on cos I thought it would be that one
398 J yeah
399 D let's have
400 J no put that back
401 D you can’t have three parents can you
402 J could
403 D funny funnee (sic)
404 J I reckon it would be that one
405 D let’s have another one let’s say what mixes in cos its the
darker colours that go
The group seem tentative and uncertain about their choice of 
offspring for [31. Having chosen a slate grey parent to go with the 
agouti parent they appear reluctant to commit themselves beyond 
making 'experimental choices' (394 and 404). At (405) Darren takes 
the lead and qualifies his choice with reference to his blending 
conception. Interestingly, he seems to have adapted this to include
the notion of ’dominance* by dark colours. He is perhaps aware of 
the previous challenges to his "mixing in" notion and the need to 
accommodate the ideas of the others and of the text.
406 A right now. those two put together make a dark brown
407 D those two mate right.,dark colour
408 A dark brown
409 D just a minute
410 A look just see..the black and brown and grey is more like a
dark brown
411 D yeah
412 A I’ll do dark brown then
413 D let’s go over here now
414 J I don't I don’t think it would be dark brown because what
is the stronger colour of them two
415 A grey
416 J grey but that's got black on it and grey
417 A well that’s got black on it and grey
418 J that's what I mean black on it and grey
419 A that's right that’s got to be grey then
420 D you’re probably wrong
421 A dark grey
422 J yeah
423 A don’t you agree
424 J yeah yeah I do
The debate about choices for C3] goes on with Andrew and Darren 
apparently agreeing to have a dark brown mouse and sharing a 
conception of ’dominance’ (406-13). Darren tries to suspend the 
debate at (413) but Jane disagrees with the boys’ choice of brown. 
She seems to be questioning which colour is the darkest in the 
parents and which colour should be ’dominant’ (414). She draws the 
boys’ attention to the black spots on the agouti parent (416) as 
being the darkest. At (418) she seems to be using a blending 
conception which accommodates the strength of colour. Andrew on 
the other hand appears to be working on the assumption that the 
darkest parent determines the colour of the offspring. Darren
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supports Jane’s disagreement (420) and Andrew seems to compromise 
with his suggestion of dark grey (421) which seems to satisfy Jane 
(424). This compromise is in effect Andrew's original choice of 
grey blended/darkened by the black spats of the agouti parent and 
represents a synthesis of 'dominance' and blending conceptions.
425 D right these two are having babies now right
426 J ah
427 D these two are having babies ok so
428 J then brown is the stronger colour
429 A yeah but its got black there as well..you might get that
say that
430 D I’d say
431 J I don’t think so I'd think black
432 A oh well alright black get one then
433 J no I don’t ...I think dark grey
434 D yeah dark grey like that can we use the ones on the card
435 J no you don't have to have them the same
436 D (**) mixed
437 A I think black black have a black one. plain black
438 D we’ll put that one there let's sort this one out
439 J that one’s the stronger colour
440 D colour so it will stay
brown
441 J a murky brown
442 D yeah cos it mixes in ...let's have a darker one and a
lighter one like that
443 A I reckon
444 J hold on a minute I was going to say one of these could
turn out the colour of one of these back here
The group turn their attention to [53. Jane decides that the brown 
(parent) is the stronger colour (428). Andrew, using the same 
argument as Jane used against him in the previous episode, draws 
her attention to the black spots of the other (agouti) parent 
(429). Andrew suggests a dark grey colour, perhaps aware that this 
blending/dominance conception was the basis of agreement in the 
previous discussion. In response, Jane seems to be using a 
conception of black 'dominance* and not blending (431). Faced with
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this apparent contrariness Andrew seems to accept this suggestion 
(432) only to have Jane change her mind again to his original 
choice (433). Jane uses her conception of familial variation at 
(435) and this appears to give Darren scope to apply his own 
particular colour choices and conceptions. Jane sticks with the 
notion of stranger colours, and Darren uses his blending conception 
(442). Jane justifies the range of offspring that result, and her 
earlier idea of offspring variation by referring to previous 
generation (444).
445 A anyway while we’re talking about that his bound to be an 
albino cos look he's got to be one ..just a minute
446 D runs in the family so look brown
447 J but look at this
448 D yeah its running in the family . brown brown
449 A it goes brown brown brown, but look, so browns are the 
stronger colour
450 D it seems to be going darker
451 A so you could get
452 D perhaps its a connection... right these are having babies
453 A black is the dominant colour so
454 D right they are having babies
455 J whats that
456 A that's the colour between them
457 J I think one of them
458 A emmm
459 J I wish we had one of them back up there then that would 
have been cross-breed
460 A yeah its too late now. have two of those
461 D yeah
At (446) Darren is aware of the number of brown mice on the board, 
and he describes this as "runs in the family". Andrew connects this 
with brown being the stronger colour and seems to be explaining 
Darren’s observation in terms of his ’dominance’ conception (449, 
450 and 453). This notion seems to exist side by side with 
Andrew's blending conception (456). Jane refers back to the notion
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of "cross-breeds” at (459), which in previous discussions 
overlapped with her blending conception and gave rise to offspring 
that were an obvious blend of both parents ie. no allowance was 
made for strength of colour.
462 A or like that dark brown dark brown
463 D yeah I think cos its the same cos running in the
family again
464 A yeah dark brawns all up there
465 J yeah
466 D right these are having babies again
467 J and one of them
468 A I think we’ve got to find a mate
469 J I think its one of them
470 A well you pick one
471 D you can’t
472 A you can’t put one there he’s mating with him
473 J with his sister
474 D he’s mating with him
475 J you just said
476 D he’s mating with her so he wants four babies come on
477 J I reckon that one of them really
478 A I’ve got one which it says in the thing
479 J its got to have a grey one somewhere because if you go
back
480 D it runs in the family..no we should have one like that
481 J I reckon we should take this one away
482 A no black is the stronger colour
483 J then you’ve got a lot of white
484 A his father is black as well
485 D perhaps we should have a grey
Darren and Andrew return to their description of family 
resemblance and the frequency of brown mice in the tree (462-4). 
Darren, ’chairing’ the discussion moves them to the next branch of 
the tree [81 (466). Andrew and Darren's 'chauvinism' is exposed at 
(472 and 474) as they seem to be suggesting that two male mice 
mate. Jane’s response is interesting in that she corrects this 
'mistake' without actually making the error explicit (473 and 475).
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They competitively collaborate over offspring choices using 
blending (Darren 485), 'dominance' (Andrew 482) and family 
resemblance (Jane and Darren 479-80) conceptions. All of these 
notions seems to be simultaneously active.
486 D right let's move over we’ve got another one there
487 J oh we just had that last time I think some should suddenly
turn out white
488 D yeah runs in the family
489 J its only got one white in the whale of the family
490 D I think we should have a white cos he could have a baby
and it could come out white
491 A look read the book again, the dominant colour
492 J is
stronger
493 A yeah
494 D yeah but it might came out add you don’t know that
495 A well but brown white brown white.my names Irish but I'm
not Irish
496 J you're names Irish
497 A no. yes Kelly that's ages ago yet I’m still not Irish don't
sound like Irish
498 D my name's Irish mine’s I don't know what mine is I’m half
Irish
499 J but it could go right the way back to there its possible
(bell for morning break sounds)
Jane seems to be aware of the similarities in the offspring chosen 
by the group and advocates that by way of a change they might 
have an albino. Her use of "suddenly” may indicate she is using her 
notion of albino frequency, their unpredictability and comparative 
rarity (487), Darren sees albinos as running in the family, but his 
use of this idea to justify the choice of an albino is challenged 
by Jane (489). Darren tries again at (490) and justifies the albino 
choice in the face of Andrew's challenge (491) by referring to the 
occurrence of "odd" mice (494). Andrew challenges the albino choice 
and supports this by referring to the 'authority' of the text on
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'dominance’. He sees brown as dominant over the white in [93(495) 
and simultaneously he contests the notion of "in the family" with 
an analogy involving his own ancestry (495 and 497). Darren 
comments on his "half-Irish" name; perhaps an interesting insight 
into another aspect of his conceptual ecosystem relating to 
inheritance. At (499) Jane seems to be suggesting that the albino 
at Cl] is still a possible way of explaining the appearance of 
another at [93.
5.5.1 Summary.
Darren leads the discussion with the idea of colour variation 
amongst the offspring, to which the others agree readily. Perhaps 
aware of this ready consensus, Darren questions his own initial 
suggestion which invites the others to comment. Jane uses the 'Blue 
Peter’ dogs as an example of breeding animals, but seems confused 
about which viewpoint this supports. She is perhaps more concerned 
to agree with Darren than to be accurate in her description. Andrew 
also seems to follow Darren’s lead by revising his support for 
variable offspring and qualifies this by suggesting that offspring 
are more "likely" to be the same as the parents. Darren appears to 
be 'experimenting' with his ideas perhaps trying to pick up the 
direction from which the others will approach this task. Andrew 
and Jane seem to be similarly disposed but prepared to follow 
Darren’s lead at this point.
In their discussion of card 2, Andrew and Jane seem to agree 
on a blending conception which results in "multicoloured" offspring.
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In qualifying this notion Andrew and Jane use "mix" and "mixing" to 
describe how each parent contributes to the appearance of the 
offspring. Darren challenges this conception using Andrew's 
previous idea that the offspring should look like the parents.
Andrew's response to this is to further elaborate his blending
conception, which encapsulates a notion of colour strength and the
effects of dark colours on the "mix" of parental coat colours. It is
possible that Andrew's conception of 'like begets like’ used in card 
1, where the parents are the same colour, can also be ’explained' in 
terms of a "mix" of the same colours. Andrew's blending and 'like 
begets like’ conceptions may in this way be interrelated and not in 
conflict. During this episode Darren’s continued ’experimentation’ 
with alternative ways of looking at the problem are censured and 
challenged by the others. Jane appears to accepts Andrew's 
blending ideas and interrelates this with her notion of offspring 
variability/ colour variation used initially by Darren.
Interestingly, Jane's conception of blending seems to be less 
influenced by Andrew’s notion of colour strength. In her challenge 
to his preference for dark coloured offspring in card 2, she makes 
explicit her notion of blending which she relates to being "half- 
cast". This may provide an interesting insight into the interaction 
between a lay scientific idea and Jane's conception of blending. It 
is possible to speculate that her nation of offspring as being a 
’true’ blend of parental colours may be influenced by her experience 
of half-casts intermediate between parental phenotypes. Andrew on 
the other hand may not be 'constrained' by this type of interaction 
as he extends the paint mixing analogy to take account of colour
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strength. He suspends any discussion of what Jane may mean by 
"half-cast" by moving on to the next card and suspending the 
discussion.
Darren interprets card 3 (albino x albino) as being "pretty 
obvious" and leads strongly with his conception of familial 
similarity. Jane suggestion that some of the offspring could be 
coloured is partially accepted by Andrew with the proviso that they 
are "light coloured". Implicitly this qualification of Jane’s idea 
may relate to his blending conception. Jane disagrees with this 
constraint on offspring colour and uses her conception of genealogy 
and previous generations to explain how coloured offspring might 
come about. Andrew contests the relevance of this notion in the 
context of the problem format, and reiterates his own ideas 
apparently trying to take on the role of gatekeeper as to what is 
an ’acceptable’ idea. Darren seems puzzled by the anomaly of white 
parents having coloured offspring. He tries to make Andrew aware 
of the conflict between coloured offspring and the conception of 
’like begets like’ but he is censured and his ’reservations’ are 
ignored by Andrew. Andrew moves them on to the next card with 
Darren's questions unresolved.
Perhaps aware of their differing viewpoints, in the next card 
the group seem to establish a consensus of opinion about offspring 
choices on the basis of a shared conception of blending and colour 
strength. Darren seems to be developing his awn conception of 
parental gender influences at this time and is concerned with 
discriminating between the mother and the father.
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Card 5 (Black x Black + Brown) is 'explained' by Jane's 
conception of genealogical influences and she stresses how this 
card vindicates her earlier suggestion that this was a possibility 
in determining offspring colour. Andrew accepts this and 
acknowledges that Jane was 'right'. Darren again tries to pick up 
on previous ideas by using the phrase half-cast to describe the 
brown offspring. Jane challenges his use of this nation indicating 
that her conception of half-cast may be strongly related to human, 
black and white, interracial matings and their progeny. Jane 
explains to Darren that both parents on the card are black and 
therefore they cannot have half-casts. Darren perseveres with his 
notion of gender influence, indicating that if the mother is black 
the children will be black. In spite of Jane’s explanation Darren 
also seems to persevere with his notion of half-cast as an 
explanation of the brown mouse in card 5.
The next card sees the group develop a vague consensus about 
offspring choice. They appear to compromise by having a selection 
of offspring some of which are like the parents, some which are a 
blend, and others which are the result of black being a strong 
colour. They appear to be tolerant of a range of conceptions as 
they competitively collaborate with one another to make their 
offspring choices. Andrew and Jane in particular seem confident 
about being able to justify their choice, Darren less so.
Card 7 (Brown X Brown + Albino) is met with some surprised 
laughter. There is a good bit of competition for the floor as each 
of the students put forward their ideas for offspring choices. They 
seem uncertain about their explanations and the adequacy of their
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blending conceptions in particular. Darren seems to be adapting 
existing notions of blending to include offspring and parents to 
arrive at his choice of offspring, while Jane interprets the card 
as being indicative of the unpredictability and variability of 
offspring. All three students appear to be aware of the anomalous 
nature of this card in the context of their respective blending 
conceptions, but seem to persevere with this conception 
nonetheless. Each student makes their choices of offspring but as 
Andrew moves on to the next card their ideas about why there 
should be an albino are apparently inconclusive.
In their discussion of the next card a consensus develops 
based on their conceptions of blending. All three seem happy to 
accept each others choices as plausible and there is considerable 
task co-operation and collaboration. It is interesting to speculate 
that this behaviour may result from the uncertainty experienced in 
the previous discussion and the need to re-establish their 
confidence and their working relationship.
Darren leads their discussion of card 9 with his conception of 
blending. At this point Jane, perhaps sensitive to Darren’s 
continual use of the phrase "mix in", makes explicit the painting 
analogy which she perceives as underpinning his ideas, and 
challenges its plausibility in the context of the problem. She is 
apparently ignored, and she does not pursue the matter. Indeed she 
seems happy to use the notion of black 'dominance' in blending 
immediately after her challenge. Interestingly, shortly after this, 
Andrew states that they don’t really know anything about mice to 
which Darren responds that they should.
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In their discussion of the next card all three seem to use 
blending as the basis of their choices. Andrew makes explicit his 
ideas about the 'dominance’ of black in determining offspring 
colour. Jane at this point appears to be using a blending 
conception which does not consider colour strength. Her challenge 
to Andrew that there may be alternatives to black offspring is met 
with a further qualification of his conception. This considers the 
frequency of black offspring and the fact that there will be more 
offspring of this strong colour than any other. This 
interrelationship between strength of colour and frequency of 
offspring may be an interesting extension and adaptation of 
Andrew's conceptions relating to 'strength* in a social context as 
well as those relating to dark colours. It may also be an insight 
into the continuous qualitative changes that conceptions undergo.
Card 11 (Dark Brown x Dark Brown + Light Brown) revisits the 
potential anomaly of card 7. Darren and Andrew seem to perceive 
the anomaly of this situation immediately. Jane, perhaps having 
thought it through since their previous encounter, suggests that it 
can be 'explained' by her conception of the influence of previous 
generations. Again she uses the example of the dogs on Blue Peter 
to support this idea, and again this is challenged by the boys on 
the grounds that mice are not the same as dogs. Jane defends her 
example by asking Darren why he uses the example of half-casts. 
The implication being that he is using human exemplars . Darren 
qualifies his blending notion in relation to this challenge and 
perhaps reveals the relationship between blending and his 
experience of the "chocolate" children of black and white men and
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women. Half-casts seem to enhance the plausibility of Darren’s 
blending conception. As for the anomaly of card 11 Darren seems to 
explain the light brown offspring as an ’’odd” one and that 
subsequent offspring should be more like their parents. Andrew 
accepts Darren’s suggestion and the two boys develop a consensus 
around their respective blending conceptions and that there will be 
a degree of variation in the colour of the offspring. The latter 
conception may also allow the group to accept variations in each 
others offspring selections and thus maintains their working 
relationships. The final card sees the three students choosing 
their own offspring with some certainty, It may be that offspring 
selections can now be explained by one conception or another in 
ways that are at least plausible to the others. Blending being the 
most acceptable, apparently fruitful and adequate explanation of 
the problem.
The reading task was carried out in what seemed to be a 
classroom style of taking it in turns to read aloud a page at a 
time. Their comprehension of the text seemed to be largely in terms 
of their existing ideas about blending and colour strength. The 
text 'confirmed' these ideas and was seen as reinforcement of the 
latter conceptions. The text information was apparently 'all things 
to all men’ (and woman).
The family tree task began with Jane challenging Darren's 
blending conception with her conception of 'dominance*. She 
disagrees with Darren’s strategy of "mixes in" and advocates 
offspring choices based on what she describes as "the more 
dominant colour". Darren and Jane fail to agree on their offspring
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choices for [1] and it is at this point that Andrew acting in the 
fashion of an honest broker suggests that they have offspring 
which take after each of the parents. This is tacitly accepted by 
Darren and Jane and is an interesting insight into how 
disagreement and challenge can be diffused by conceptual 
heterogeneity and the actions of a third party.
As they move to another area of the board C33 Jane and Andrew 
appear to be using their conceptions of 'dominance' to make their 
offspring selections. Darren perhaps aware of the challenges to his 
blending conception seems to be adapting this to take account of 
colour strength. All three compete to have their offspring choices 
accepted but there is some uncertainty about the 'dominant' colour 
and the appearance of the offspring. At [5] the discussion again 
centres on the ’dominant’ colour and the colour of the offspring. 
Perhaps aware of the disagreements arising from trying to decide 
on the outcome of 'dominance', Jane and Andrew seem to compromise 
by using their blending conceptions to choose offspring 'in 
between’ the parental colours. As they move on Andrew and Darren 
seem to agree on their blending conceptions as the basis for 
offspring choices. Jane on the other hand seems to be acting in a 
contrary fashion by using her conceptions of 'dominance', offspring 
variability and the influence of previous generations to compete 
with the boys’ ideas. Darren seems to pick up on the latter nation 
and suggests that the progressive darkening of the colours in the 
family tree and the frequency of the brown colour, are evidence of 
brown "running in the family”. Darren’s efforts to apply this 
notion to the problem of predicting offspring is challenged by
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Andrew who uses his Irish decent as an analogy of how things do 
not run in the family. Jane suggests that the family might have 
some albinos and implicit in this idea is that the incidence of 
these white mice will be unpredictable. Darren observes that an 
albino appears at [2] and that this colour will also run in the 
family. Andrew challenges this idea on the grounds of the 
'dominance* of dark colours and refers to the text as authority for 
this view. Andrew's response is to justify the albino as being an 
"odd” one with the implication that they can occur by chance and 
outside the normal 'rules’ of inheritance.
In these latter stages of task 3 a very fluid situation exists 
between the students. A number of conceptions are being used 
simultaneously and there is considerable competition between 
individuals and their ideas. However, the level of interaction 
between conceptions seems to be limited. Strang interaction frames 
are presented by all three students but the content frame being 
used is weak. Ideas remain largely implicit with the students 
apparently 'experimenting' and testing the worth of their 
respective notions without making an absolute commitment to them.
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From the previous case studies a number of significant results 
begin to emerge in relation to children’s conceptual ecosystems.
Children possess a variety of existing conceptions about 
inheritance phenomena. These are frequently expressed in a vague 
and indeterminate way and are deployed with little apparent 
commitment. Conceptions are often introduced into social discourse 
in an experimental, speculative and competitive way, Students 
deploy their intuitive theories in a serial or simultaneous fashion 
and although contradiction between these conceptions often emerge 
during discussion, conflict and disagreements are rarely 
experienced. Explanations offered in response to inheritance 
problems are frequently selected on the basis of their social and 
interpersonal worth rather than on their problem solving utility.
Conceptual change within this social and personal dynamic 
seems to be more a case of selecting from a range of heterogeneous 
ideas rather than actually swapping or discarding one idea for 
another,
In Chapters 6 and 7 I will develop an ecosystemic perspective 
on these research findings based on my research model, The aim of 
this activity is to provide a descriptive framework which will 
allow me to develop an understanding of how these components of 
ecosystems might influence the nature of conceptual processes and 
conceptual change.
Chapter 6
An Ecosystemic Perspective on Research Outcomes
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6.1 Colonizing Conceptual Ecosystems,
The research model described in Chapter 2, communicated the 
notion that ecosystems are constructed from individual conceptual 
ecologies. These provide the learner with a background of existing 
conceptions and experiences against which currently unsolved 
problems can be ‘understood*. Case study analysis has revealed a 
pool of conceptions which are commonly used by students to 
construct conceptual ecosystems of inheritance. The problem context 
can be seen to exert a selective influence on the ideas which the 
student brings to bear on the situation; the student speculating 
with ideas from her conceptual ecology as she constructs an 
ecosystem relating to the inheritance ‘problem*.
A conception which emerges readily from conceptual ecologies, 
and which is a vigourous ’colonizer* of individual ecosystems, is 
the notion that mouse offspring are a blend or a ’mixture’ of the 
parental coat colours. The foundations of this conception for many 
students would seem to be their experiences of colour mixing when 
painting or drawing, coupled with the notion of reproduction and 
parental contribution. The children's choice of offspring on the 
basis of a parental colour blend, seems to be a relatively 
spontaneous response to the problem of dissimilar parents and 
their progeny.
In problem situations where the parent mice were identical, an 
intuitive response by many students was to predict the colour of 
the offspring on the basis that they would look like their parents.
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From the learner’s viewpoint, children ’take after' their parents - 
"white parents have white children" and ’like begets like*.
In the context of the problem tasks presented to the students, 
both of these conceptions represent a fruitful way of predicting 
the outcomes of parental matings, and provide a ’solution’ to the 
problem (many a pre-Mendelian biologist would have thought so 
anyway). However, these conceptions were not the only colonizers of 
individual ecosystems and it was common for a number of other 
ideas to be elicited by the group’s activities. Conceptions of 
familial variation were often interwoven with conceptions of 
familial similarity; the limits of colour variation (shades) within 
families sometimes being determined by the parental inputs or what 
colours were seen as being ’in the family’. Describing this latter 
conception of familial variation as being interwoven with the idea 
that offspring look like their parents seems to provoke, in the 
observer's mind at least, the view that these notions are 
incompatible and inconsistent within a single ecosystem. However, 
it seems very much in the nature of children’s conceptual systems 
that these ideas can interact and co-exist without mutual 
interference or conflict.
Other conceptions used in the colonization of ecosystems 
related to the notion of sibling similarity, half-cast or crossbred 
offspring, the 'chance' occurrence of albinos and the possibility of 
infidelity between parents. These conceptions were common in many 
but not all ecosystems.
The prevailing impression is that conceptual ecosystems are 
not colonized by one or even two ideas but a number of conceptions
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which are not co-active but do co-exist. These conceptions 
fluctuate in their use within localised domains of problem solving 
utility and areselected by the task context and the group dynamic. 
Conceptions of blending inheritance co-exist with notions of 
familial similarity, these conceptions being used simultaneously or 
in turn (not simultaneously active) to predict the colour of 
offspring. In such an ecosystem it is also possible for the 
student’s conception of ’dominance’ to conflict or not to conflict 
with existing conceptions of family variation or blending. In the 
former case if the student has found some problem solving utility 
in his notion of blending, then a conception of ’dominance’ (the 
dominance of one colour, usually black) can challenge this idea. 
However, equally likely is the adaptation of the blending 
conception to incorporate the notion of ’dominance’ and interpret it 
as being related to colour strength. For example, a cross between a 
dark brown and a white parent no longer results in ’chocolate’ 
offspring but gives rise to dark brown ones, because that "is the 
stronger colour’. Blending conceptions in particular seem to be 
very "permeable" to a range of experiences eg. half-cast children 
are a blend of black and white parents: interestingly this 
rationale often leads to a prediction of grey mice in spite of the 
children’s awareness that it gives brown skin colour to h u m a n  
half-cast offspring. Equally the conception that like begets like 
can be explained as a blend of the same coat colours.
It would seem that individual ecosystems can maintain a 
number of interrelated conceptions in a relatively autonomous and 
independent way. Ecosystems are capable of great conceptual
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heterogeneity and appears to be able to maintain that heterogeneity 
through what appear to be almost transient phases of integration 
and conceptual overlap. Watts and Pope (1985) draw attention to 
Kelly's (1970) emphasis on serial inconsistencies and his 
observation that during debate or in the course of problem solving, 
people are often aware of inconsistencies in their own conceptual 
systems and in those of others. Kelly was particularly interested 
in fragmentation as it applied to children’s thought and the 
creative potential afforded the individual by stepping outside the 
'straight jacket’ of consistency to find out what might happen.
The nice thing about hypotheses is that you don’t have to 
believe them. This, I think, is a key to the genius of 
scientific method. It permits you to be inconsistent with what 
you know long enough to see what will happen. Children do that. 
What is wonderful about the language of hypothesis is its 
refreshing ability to free the scientist from the entangling 
consistencies of adulthood. For a few precarious moments he 
can think again like a child, and, like a child, learn from his 
experience,. (Kelly,1970)
6.2 Interactions between Conceptions.
The nature of the overlap and interdependencies between 
student’s conceptions of inheritance seem to vary considerably. 
Experiences of mixing colours overlap with the conception that 
offspring are a mixture of parental characteristics; ” I get my 
good looks from my mother but my temper from my father”. 
Alternatively a statement such as, ” mast of the mice will take 
after their parents but there might be the occasional odd one 
(albino)”, might acknowledge some overlap between the frequency of
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albino mice and notions of familial similarity. Claxton (1984) in 
his description of the overlap between "gut” and "lay" science 
comments on how these two domains of understanding can provide 
explanations of the same phenomena yet be unconnected and 
uncorrelated, Gut science may conflict with lay science mini­
theories, but because of the lack of integration between the two, no 
conflict is experienced by the learner. Claxton (1984) describes 
the latter type of interaction between mini-theories as being 
"laminated" whereas in situations where gut and lay science have 
been reconciled, they are seen as being "integrated". The analysis 
of children's conceptual ecosystems relating to inheritance, and the 
identification of interactive but non-integrated conceptions within 
ecosystems lends support to the view that conceptions can be 
’organized’ in this way.
6.3 The Mature of Conceptions within Ecosystems.
The conceptions which colonize ecosystems, often seem from the 
observer’s viewpoint, indeterminate and indefinite meaning 
structures. Each member of the group interprets what the other is 
saying in terms of their own ecosystem, and on ref .lection, 
constructs his or her own interpretation of what has been said and 
meant. ’Vague’ conceptions, under-articulated ideas, and 
indeterminate meanings are very much the stuff of group 
interaction. The researcher, in the privileged position of being 
able to revisit the dialogue of the group time and again, is not in 
the same position as the participants. Whilst the
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researcher/observer wrestles with ambiguity and meaning, the 
conversation in real life has moved on and so have the 
participant’s understandings of what has been said and meant. In 
spite of the fact that this may be a limiting factor in group 
’efficiency’ and ’productivity’, the indefiniteness of conceptions 
within ecosystems allows each student a considerable degree of 
flexibility in constructing and adapting his own conceptual 
ecosystem.
In an ecosystem where blending and familial similarity have 
been used as a basis for offspring prediction, the conception of 
dominance could be seen as presenting a potential conflict to these 
conceptions (eg, all of the offspring might now have to be dark or 
perhaps black). However, given the apparent indeterminate nature of 
these conceptions in the minds of the students and their lack of 
commitment to one hard and fast idea, ’dominance’ can be 
interpreted as colour strength which in turn is assimilated into 
the blending conception. In such cases the ’’range of convenience” 
of existing ideas can be extended without anyone being seen to 
'have been wrong1. More or less knowing what you mean and what 
others mean, whilst not making one’s conceptions too explicit or 
too determinate, may be from the learner's viewpoint a very 
desirable characteristic of conceptual ecosystems. In this state, 
one’s options are kept open and flexible. The learner does not make 
his conceptions immune to change and adaptation nor does he have 
to discard existing conceptions in the face of 'new' experiences.
A fluctuating ecosystem, driven by the heterogeneity and 
flexibility of conceptions within it, allows ideas to come and go
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depending on their utility and fruitfulness in problem solving 
contexts. Conceptions can be insulated from refutation by moving in 
and out of the ’action’ depending on the cues and triggers 
presented by other students or task situations. This in turn 
preserves the viability of a number of conceptions whilst 
maintaining the heterogeneity of the ecosystem as a whole.
Given the ’fragmented’ nature of conceptual organization, it 
would seem desirable that the learning process should encourage the 
child to test his conceptions and to reconcile existing notions 
with one another and with new ideas. In situations where multiple 
conceptions of the same phenomena exist within ecosystems, perhaps 
the ideal response would be for the learner to combine this 
compendium of experiences in one or two overarching conceptions. 
This process would be unique to the individual and would require 
the learner to test, experiment and evaluate the explanatory 
adequacy of his conceptions with other ideas. This individual 
Initiative may result in the integration of conceptions, but before 
they become acceptable to the learner they often have to be tested 
in a communal setting. Conceptions which reconcile conflict between 
existing experiences and ideas can for example be tried out on 
others as a possib;.le solution to a communal problem. Matching a 
conception with someone sharing the same problem as yourself, is 
an effective test of a conception’s worth at a collective and 
personal level. The character of this negotiation of knowledge is 
discussed in the fallowing sections,
6.4 Consensus.
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A common pattern of interaction between group members was to 
seldom express disagreement with each other's point of view. In 
situations where there seemed to be apposing personal viewpoints 
and conflicting conceptions, the need to maintain smooth 
interpersonal relationships often diffused such situations. In this 
context, disagreement between individuals and challenges to their 
conceptions were rarely allowed to 'develop' sufficiently to the 
point where the tension between conflicting ideas were brought out 
into the open and actually experienced by the learners. In many 
instances one group member would accept unquestioningly the 
indeterminate conception of another without any attempt to ask for 
qualification or clarification of the idea. Often, in the face of 
anomalies, the apparent need for consensus between group members 
would damp out the variety and the intensity of ideas put forward 
as passible solutions. In some cases, if the individual ’gets his 
conception in first’ then there is every chance of the others 
accepting it in spite of their own reservations. Thus, the 
opportunity for debate and discussion is diminished and the 
testing of conceptions within the group forum is made more 
difficult.
Patterns of consensus behaviour have definite effects on the 
number and quality of the opportunities for individuals to come to 
terms with their own conceptions in a social context. However,
’going along with an idea' even though you may not agree with it, 
does allow the proposer of that conception to travel with it and to 
test its explanatory potential. In what might be seen as following 
a ’garden path', a conception can develop positively or can run into
- 308 -
difficulties, depending on the circumstances which unfold within 
the problem context. A conception can be killed at birth by 
disagreement and conflict; equally it may be allowed to live out 
its life and to test its potential in resolving personal and 
communal problems.
An interesting adjunct to group consensus behaviour is the way 
that individuals within the group often collaborate in determining 
the pace with which they move through the tasks. While working on 
Task 1 (IAI type cards), the verbal or non-verbal cues given by a 
group member to move to the next card in the series are often 
accepted by the others. The signal to move on can be at the 
culmination of the group’s activities on a particular card, but 
often it is used to diffuse disagreement or difficulties associated 
with a set of ideas or particular offspring choices. Individual 
group members can affect the quality and the quantity of 
discussion, agreement, disagreement and debate within the group by 
controlling the pace of the groups activities. Where the 
maintenance of good relationships seems to be important, 
interpersonal conflict based on differing viewpoints can be 
effectively damped out by ’simply* suggesting that the group move 
to the next card, page, or part of the family tree.
6.5 Disagreement and Challenge.
When one group member disagrees with another it can be a case
of Andrew - ”we should have a black mouse there”
Ben - ”no we shouldn’t”
Andrew - "yes we should”
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or a more elaborate exchange where conceptions are presented by 
one participant only to have it questioned by another on the 
grounds of logic, applicability or utility. A challenge to the 
notion that all offspring will be black if one of the parents is 
black (’dominance*) by a child who holds the idea that offspring 
are a blend of parental colours, is one such case. The outcomes of 
these disagreements and challenges are varied. In the latter 
example a typical response is for the proposer of the ’dominance* 
conception not to defend her idea but to use another conception eg. 
the notion that parental gender is the determinant of offspring 
coat colour. In many cases this type of interaction results in the 
introduction of 'new* conceptions and may increase the 
heterogeneity of individual ecosystems. The activity of a group 
member prepared to play the honest broker by balancing the pros 
and cons of conceptions can have a very positive effect on this 
sort of outcome. In some cases a compromise conception is reached 
where for example, blending and 'dominance* conceptions are united 
in the notion of colour strength. This scenario also has the effect 
of smoothing interpersonal relationships and diffusing 
disagreements.
Challenges to conceptions and interpersonal disagreement often 
results in conceptions becoming more explict as one child tries to 
explain what he means to another. In defence of an idea, anecdotes 
and personal experiences are often brought to bear on the debate 
with a range of examples such as pet mice, Blue Peter dogs, the boy 
down the road whose mum is white but his dad is black, ape-men 
etc. being used. Individual learners engaged in this process often
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seem to raise their own conceptual awareness as well as that of 
the other group members.
In some groups one often gets the impression that disagreement 
and the challenging of someone’s conception (s) becomes part of a 
ritual with a strong performance element. The audience for this 
being other group members, the video camera and the observer. 
However, one should not dismiss this type of interaction as simply 
’being put on’ for it may serve to mimic the problems associated 
with particular conceptions and the limits of their explanatory 
adequacy, In many groups competitive collaboration seemed to be a 
low cost way for individuals to get involved in the milieu of 
agreement/disagreement. In these situations, individuals seemed to 
experiment with their ideas by thinking out loud in the hope that 
they would resonate with another group member’s conceptions. 
Conceptions were rarely made explicit in these exchanges and were 
therefore protected from public refutation, although they may have 
been put to the test privately. Competitive collaboration may 
insulate conceptions from communal testing while maintaining the 
conceptual heterogeneity and viability of individual ecosystems.
Lastly, it must be noted that there is another outcome of 
disagreement between individuals. That is, when it reaches a 
certain level the talking stops! When a student is censured by his 
peers or when he is accused of "being a wally” or ’’being stupid" 
relationships are strained, In these situations it is not uncommon 
for the conception (s) at the focus of the disagreement to disappear 
from the learner’s public repertoire. If children are going to take
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a 'risk* by making their ideas explicit, a supportive social 
environment may be a necessary prerequisite,
The interaction between individuals allows the observer to 
describe a number of interesting features which seem to be present 
within ecosystems. In the following section a number of these 
features which emerge from personal and communal group activities 
will be described.
6.6 Anonalies
Part of the design of the research instrument was to confront 
individual students with potential anomalies. In the first task 
students were confronted with mouse families in which the 
offspring were a different colour from the parents. In the case of 
black parents with a brown offspring, it was interesting that this 
was often not preceived as an anomaly in spite of prevailing 
conceptions of colour blending and like begets like. In this 
situation the heterogeneity of individual ecosystems appeared to 
diffuse the potential challenge to existing ideas by 'explaining ’ 
the anomaly in terms of another conception. For example, the brown 
mouse "comes from the grandparents" or "brown is nearly black and 
you always get some variations in families". In this way anomalies 
can stimulate the heterogeneity of ecosystems without threatening 
or eradicating existing conceptions.
In terms of providing an effective challenge to existing ideas, 
the presence of a white offspring with brown parents seemed to 
have the greatest potential. In the face of this problem, which
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blending and ’like begets like* conceptions found difficult to 
'explain', the utility and plausibility of these conceptions were 
often publicly and privately tested. However, the pressure on 
theseconceptions was often relieved by the heterogeneity of the 
learner's ecosystem which provided a number of alternative 
conceptions such as the notion that albinos occur by chance and 
can "turn up" in families on rare occasions. Thus the effectiveness 
of this anomaly, in terms of questioning existing conceptions, 
often seemed to be reduced.
Anomalous situations often raised the students awareness of 
their current conceptions and in many cases caused them to support 
these ideas with examples and anecdotes. In this way anomalies can 
form a locus of debate and discussion about the fruitfulness of 
current conceptions. However, they also result in uncertainty and 
anxiety about existing theories, and in some cases caused the group 
to stop talking. Confronted by a situation where the existing pool 
of conceptions seems to be 'wrong', the response is sometimes not 
to reconcile the problem but to keep ones ideas to oneself and to 
carry on with existing ideas privately. In such contexts indefinite, 
under-articulated conceptions are insulated from this type of 
'error', indeed indeterminateness may be one outcome; of previously 
experiencing effective anomalies.
Effective anomalies can induce failure in existing conceptions 
and cause individual students to review the plausibility of their 
conceptions. The student who affirms that "you don’t get black 
babies from white parents" in defence of her blending or ’like 
begets like’ conceptions is perturbed by the presence of albino
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offspring in brown families. Nevertheless, the response to what is 
for her an effective anomaly, may not require that she review the 
adequacy of existing ideas; there are a number of reasonable 
alternatives open to her, She may acknowledge but ignore the 
problem, explain it by using an alternative conception derived from 
her own ecosystem or that of another student. An important feature 
of small groups is that collective ecosystems provide a supply of 
conceptions that individual students may not prisess. Looking at a 
problem from someone else's viewpoint may allow the individual to 
refine his own conceptions. Echoing another’s conception may be a 
passive act but it may also provide the missing element in the 
formulation of a personal theory. In addition, it is interesting to 
speculate that if a learner ’borrows' an idea from the communal 
pool of conceptions, selection pressures acting against it 
(anomalies, challenges) may be directed toward the group rather 
than threatening individual conceptions,
6.7 Analogies.
As similarities between conceptions, analogies are often 
extended during the construction of ecosystems. The most common 
analogy used in the construction of inheritance ecosystems was the 
similarity between painting (mixing colours) and the way parental 
contributions are blended in the offspring. This analogy was rarely 
referred to explicitly by group members but did seem to underpin 
their blending conceptions. In situations where it was made 
explicit, ’’this is just like painting” or ’’its not like painting you
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know", individuals using the blending conception seemed uncertain 
and uncomfortable when their tacit strategy was ‘revealed*. 
Accompanying this response, there was often a reduction in the 
amount of subsequent discussion.
It is possible that the 'paint box' analogy is extended as a 
way of dealing with a novel problem. Its over-extension and the 
limits of its plausibility are balanced against its fruitfulness in 
providing a basis for offspring prediction. A number of factors are 
operating within this equation. Over-extension of the 'paint 
box'/blending analogy may result in conflict or the reduction of 
its plausibility, but this can be diffused by the heterogeneity of THa-. 
ecosystem. Using a painting analogy may have personal utility 
within an individual ecosystem, in spite of the learner's awareness 
that it is. only an analogy. However, when the 'paint box’ analogy is 
made explicit in a communal context, the worth of the blending 
conception is tested in public. The plausibility of mouse 
inheritance being like 'mixing paints’ is questioned and 
subsequently the explanatory adequacy of the blending conception is 
challenged. In these circumstances the group could talk about the 
nature of the relationship between painting and their conceptions 
of inheritance, but more often than not the issue is ignored and 
allowed to disappear from the public repertoire. Conceptions may 
have considerable personal worth within ecosystems, but it seems 
likely that they have increased value to the individual if they 
pass the test of public scrutiny. This communal testing of 
conceptions takes considerable confidence and courage on the part 
of the individual. Keeping the idea to oneself or tacitly
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acknowledging the analogical underpinnings of a conception, may 
offer a path of less resistance.
Before leaving analogies and their role in conceptual systems, 
it is interesting to observe the effects of the reading task on the 
children’s conceptions. Although this activity was planned as a 
’break’ in problem solving activity, the word ’dominance’ was often 
incorporated into subsequent discussions. The resonance between 
blending conceptions and the idea of strong colours (’dominance’) 
was an insight into conceptual organisation which the text 
admirably highlighted. However, in some cases the textual authority 
accorded the word dominance often ’swamped’ discussions by 
reifying the blending/dominance notion. The effect of the text is 
initially at a verbal level but ’dominance' was rapidly incorporated 
into the paint-box analogy at an experiential level. The selection 
of textual information by students was determined by their 
individual states of awareness and their active conceptions. What 
was extracted from the text was either used to support a 
previously used conception or alternatively as a problem salving 
'ready reckoner'. Whatever the effect, the text was used, selectively 
and for a purpose by the students; the effect of the content on 
their subsequent problem salving was transient except in cases 
where they perceived the words to have some bearing on their prior 
conceptions, ie. it was not what was said but the words that were 
used. This observation must have considerable bearing an the 
vocabulary of science and the words with which we describe 
scientific concepts to children.
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Chapter 7 
A Theory of Conceptual Change
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7.1 Introductian
In Chapters 5 and 6 an ecosys’temic model of children’s 
conceptions was used to interpret the cognitive and social 
interactions when a group of children try to solve a problem. This 
model provided a way of thinking about conceptions and about those 
aggregates of ideas, analogies, metaphors and anomalies which make 
up the the learners’ conceptual ecosystems. This ecosystemic 
perspective has given an insight into the behaviour of children's 
conceptions and in particular allows an hypothesis to be put 
forward about the nature of conceptual change. In the following 
chapter this hypothesis will be described along with the evidence 
which supports this view of conceptual change.
7.2 Characteristics of Conceptual Ecosystems,
Confronted by a novel situation, that of predicting the coat 
colours which offspring inherit from their parents, learners bring 
existing conceptions to bear an the problem. This ’colonization’ of 
the problem niche by the student, leads to the construction of a 
unique conceptual ecosystem. The conceptions which children use to 
colonize their ecosystems are made up of a family of ideas, brought 
to mind by a specific set of context related cues which the learner 
perceives as being related to the problem situation. Existing 
conceptions which have analagous or metaphorical relationships 
with the problem context are one source of conceptions, as are 
ideas drawn directly from previous experiences and similar
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problems. In this way ecosystems are populated by a range of 
conceptions drawn from a pool of experiences which I have called 
the child's conceptual ecology. The diversity of this ecology 
results in the construction of an ecosystem which has a 
heterogeneous population of conceptions. This heterogeneity may be 
a manifestation of the context bound nature of children’s 
conceptions, and when this is transposed into a particular 
ecosystem it takes the form of a mixture of loosely inter-related 
ideas which seem to overlap but in the process do not lose their 
individual integrity. Instead of a stable web of inter-related 
conceptions formulated into one coherent, integrated whole, 
children’s conceptions appear to preserve an 'optimal distance’ 
from one another: close enough to acknowledge a relationship and 
lend occasional support, but not close enough to be come a set of 
overarch ing conceptions.
Conceptual heterogeneity is a very characteristic feature of 
children’s conceptual ecosystems. Indeed heterogeneity and the 
conceptual flexibility with which it is associated, are fundamental 
to the learner’s ability to construct an ecosystem and to 
subsequently use it to make sense of an unpredictable world. The 
ability to cope with the unknown is part of the 'skill' of learning 
and this in turn depends on the 'creative' use of existing 
conceptions. These qualities are conferred on the learner by a 
heterogeneous and flexibly 'organized' conceptual ecosystem. Thus 
the maintenance of conceptual heterogeneity and flexibility is an 
inherent characteristic of conceptual ecosystems.
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Children’s conceptions are rarely refuted or discredited 
absolutely, even in the face of difficulties associated with their 
explanatory adequacy, they are often put to one side rather than 
being dismantled, and their place is taken by another conception 
which provides an ’alternative’ explanation. Children in this 
research study had little difficulty in calling up a conception to 
take the place of one which had been temporarily discredited by 
cognitive and/or social events. This is one way in which the 
heterogeneity of the ecosystem is preserved. Heterogeneity over 
time is another facet of this behaviour. This is reflected in the 
way students use one conception in a particular context and yet 
another in the same or a similar context which they experience 
later on in the problem. By fluctuating in this way a number of 
conceptions can be maintained within the ecosystem in spite of the 
fact that they seem to be competing for the same sort of 
conceptual niche.
The fluctuating, flexible and heterogeneous ’organization’ of a 
conceptual ecosystem gives the learner the ability to 'get a handle 
on1 any problem that may confront him. Perceiving the problems in 
this study to be like mixing paints and then relating this to a 
blending notion of inheritance, gives an insight into the sorts of 
transpositions or metatransitions that heterogeneous and flexible 
systems make possible. It is from this base that the learner 
begins to develop his understanding and to test the plausibility 
and the utility of existing ideas. This in turn may lead to the 
adaptation of existing conceptions. However, this adaptation may 
not proceed with perfect freedom, for a consequence of conceptual
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flexibility and heterogeneity is that it makes the ecosystem highly 
resilient. Resilience is a product of conceptual ’organization’ and 
it confers on ecosystems the ability to maintain their existing 
conceptual relationships and to absorb change.
The resilience of conceptual ecosystems is most clearly shown 
in the way that challenges to existing ideas are diffused by the 
system. When a conception is challenged by another idea or when 
its inadequacies are exposed by a perceived anomaly, the emerging 
conflict is damped out by the use of an alternative conception 
drawn from the ecosystemic pool. Existing conceptions which are 
'put on the spot' are not eradicated from the ecosystem but 
'retired' and replaced by conceptions which are unaffected by the 
conflict. These replacement conceptions may be closely related to 
discredited ideas but in an ecosystemic context they will always be 
distant enough not to be affected by the same conflicts. In 
situations where the learner is confronted by challenges which 
threaten existing ideas the resilience of conceptual ecosystems 
damps out these effects.
The double-edged character of conceptual ecosystems allows 
conceptions to adapt and transform well and to resist change at 
the same time, This complementarity is reflected in the negotiation 
of knowledge which takes place between learners. In the previous 
chapter I have described how disagreement between students can 
lead to a situation where conceptions become more explicit and as 
aresult become more open to testing and adaptation. However, it is 
equally likely that this same situation can lead to the cessation 
of discourse and the decay of the interpersonal interactions which
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can result in conceptual adaptation. Similarly, consensus within the 
group may allow an idea to ’live out its life* and subsequently 
become adapted by experience, whilst on the other hand the same 
consensus may keep conceptions vague, under-articulated, implicit 
and insulated from change. These ’social manifestations’ of 
resilience and adaptiveness are a feature of conceptual ecosystems 
and they reflect the heterogeneous and flexible character of these 
systems,
A paradox seems to pose itself here, for conceptual ecosystems 
seem to be organized in such a way that the same features which 
confer resilience on the system also enable it to bring about 
change within that ecosystem. However, in the next section this 
apparent paradox will be resolved by describing the nature of 
conceptual change within ecosystems,
7,3 Change within Ecosystems.
Two fundamental points need to be made about conceptual change 
within ecosystems. Firstly, change originates from within 
ecosystems and is the personal responsibility of the active 
learner. Conceptual change cannot be forced upon the individual, 
because the conditions which bring it about are not found in the 
logic of scientific ideas or in the ’rightness’ of their 
explanations, but in the characteristics of the learner's ecosystem. 
Conceptual change is about the conditions which prevail within 
ecosystems and the ways in which conceptions interact with 
learning environments.
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One condition for conceptual change to occur would be the 
necessity for children to act on what they know. Awareness raising 
helps make conceptions explicit because ideas have to coine out into 
the open if they are to be affected by new experiences. Once 
conceptions became active in the ecosystem they have to be 
maintained in this condition; held at the front of the learner’s 
mind and part of the current pool of communal ideas being 
discussed and tested. As with the children in this study, 
conceptions can generate considerable interpersonal activity in the 
form of discussion, conflict, agreement and disagreement, It is 
essential for conceptual change that this milieu be maintained and 
amplified by individuals in the face of strategies which may reduce 
the ecosystem’s potential to bring about conceptual change. It is 
not being suggested that children be encouraged to disagree and 
fight out conceptual battles, we have seen how this often results 
in a situation where the talking stops: and given the primacy of 
communication in bringing about change this would be equivalent to 
cutting off the energy flow into conceptual systems. The notion 
being advanced is that given learning tasks which engage students 
in debate and discussion; given an environment where the learner’s 
own conceptions can be actively tested by anomalies, metaphors and 
the critical but non-threatening appraisal of peers; given that 
conceptions remain co-active and interactive within ecosystems, 
then these 'amplifications' will bring about change from within the 
system.
In this research study there was no evidence of conceptual 
change involving the rejection of a specific conception. However,
this is not to say that change did not occur, indeed the impression 
is that where children’s ecosystems are active they are in a state 
of continual change. The rate of conceptual change has often been 
determined by the time taken for alternative conceptions to become 
’scientific’. In an ecosystemic context, it is inappropriate to mark 
off such a course, Vhat one has to be prepared to do is to accept 
that change within conceptual ecosystems may be a series of near 
continuous qualitative modifications to a set of existing 
conceptions, In an unknown world, where the learner finds herself 
within a turbulent ecosystem of new ideas, conflicts and challenges 
to existing conceptions, the place to be is in a position close to 
the boundaries of conceptual stability. In this position one can 
more easily make the transition to a new level of understanding, 
although metaphorically speaking, this may be achieved rapidly by 
jumping over the cliff or more slowly, by sliding down the rock 
face. This metaphor illustrates what is a fundamental issue in many 
theories of conceptual change. One the one hand there are models of 
change which emphasise the importance of conceptual conflict and 
relate this to situations where the learner can no longer tolerate 
the inadequacies of his existing ideas and subsequently makes the 
conceptual 'leap* to the scientific view. Alternatively, other 
conceptual change theories describe a series of 'small scale’ 
adaptations whereby existing ideas are used to assimilate new 
experiences which in turn leads to the transformation of the 
original notion. The model of change which emerges from this study 
proposes that 'radical' and adaptive change are part of the same 
dynamic.
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In this thesis conceptual ecosystems have been described as 
unstable environments where conceptions are always close to 
stability boundaries, in other words ecosystems are flexible, 
heterogeneous and fluctuating systems. If change occurs within 
ecosystems it has to happen against a background of resilience, I 
have described how resilience tends to damp out change, but it can 
also be seen as a way of ’inviting* more powerful conflicts and 
challenges to act on existing conceptions, Over a period of time 
the resilience of the learner’s ecosystem is able to absorb the 
effects of anomalies and searching discussion up to the point 
where perhaps a single experience or a word from a fellow student 
brings about a ’crisis' for a particular conception. The limits of 
resilience are exceeded and the only way for the student to remove 
the 'threat* of the new idea is to discard his existing conception. 
This situation may occur within conceptual ecosystems and indeed 
may explain the Eureka effect of sudden conceptual enlightenment. 
However, I would suggest that as teachers, the focus of our 
attention should be placed not upon the 'catastrophic event' which 
results in this dramatic farm of conceptual change but on the 
series of metatransitions which conceptions undergo and which are 
part of the same process of change. I would suggest that these 
adaptations of existing ideas are what can be observed and 
facilitated by teachers and researchers. In this study it has been 
possible to describe subtle conceptual adaptations where for 
example, a conception of blending inheritance is modified to take 
account of 'dominance' or where it is adapted to take account of 
phenotypic variation. These adaptations are as much a part of
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conceptual change as the more obvious 'radical* events described 
above.
Without the effects of resilience conceptual change might occur 
in a very direct fashion every time a new set of experiences 
resonate or come into conflict with the learner’s ecosystem. If 
this were the case, the child would be continuously thrown into 
crisis situations where existing conceptions failed to explain new 
experiences, However, if we consider resilience to be part of a 
change equation then what we may have is an ecosystem which can 
affect a ’dynamic balance1 between change and persistence. In such 
a system perturbations are diffused and not allowed to assume 
threatening proportions, but at the same time there is a near 
continuous qualitative change affecting conceptions within the 
ecosystem. As long as the child's ecosystem interacts with the 
learning environment, existing conceptions are progressively and 
unavoidably modified by experience. Change within such a system 
can be seen as a set of balanced conceptual transformations set in 
a background of apparent permanence. Change in this context is a 
series of metatransitions involving the subtle and gradual 
refinement of personal theories.
Describing the 'displacement of concepts’ Schon (1963) 
comments that it "tends to go unnoticed because of its long time 
span, and it tends to have so long a time span because it goes 
unnoticed". It is likely that conceptual change within ecosystems 
also goes on largely unnoticed because of the nature of the subtle 
transitions affected by the learner. This may seem to suggest that
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as teachers we may have to improve the resolution of the ways in 
which we assess and manage the process of conceptual change.
I
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Chapter 8
The Management of Conceptual Ecosystems
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8.1 Introduction
Resilience and conceptual change are opposite sides of the 
same coin. The ability to absorb change and to have one's 
conceptions persist goes hand in hand with the processes involved 
in conceptual change. This relationship between resilience and 
change will have a significant influence on the outcomes of 
teaching and learning in science. Consequently, an ecosystemic 
perspective should figure largely in the ways that we reconcile the 
student’s existing conceptions with the received scientific view of 
natural phenomena. The management of this situation from a 
teaching and learning perspective is the main concern of this 
chapter.
8.2 Learning about Ecosystems.
The management of conceptual ecosystems begins with learning 
as much as possible about the nature of these systems and how to 
facilitate change in the form of ’metatransitions' carried out by 
active learners operating in a self-organizing way.
An objective of science teaching is to help students integrate 
their everyday experiences of life with scientific explanations of 
the same phenomena. If these viewpoints are to be reconciled, 
teachers and pupils have to be able to stimulate, encourage, 
amplify and facilitate the processes of conceptual change which 
originate from within ecosystems. These activities should not be 
seen as the equivalent of shaking nuts and bolts in a dustbin and
- 329-
hoping to get a bicycle, nor for that matter the derivation of 
Mendel's Laws from the learner's intuitive theories about 
inheritance. What it does do is to place an emphasis on the 
learner’s existing conceptions and their ’organization’ and ways of 
making these ideas interact with scientific conceptions. Teaching 
strategies sympathetic to an ecosystemic view of children’s 
conceptions and conceptual change would tend to focus on the 
following pedagogic practices,
8,3 Identifying Children's Conceptions.
Until recently identifying children’s science has been an 
activity carried out by researchers. With the development of 
programmes such as the Learning in Science Project (LISP), the 
Children’s Learning in Science Project (CLISP) and the Secondary 
Science Curriculum Review, a more collaborative approach to 
children’s scientific ideas, involving both teachers and 
researchers, is emerging. It is unlikely that busy teachers will 
regularly find the time to explore every aspect of children’s 
understanding of scientific concepts. In this respect researchers 
can still help fill in the many gaps which exist in our 
understanding of the range of children's alternative conceptions. 
However, the advantage of the above curriculum initiatives is that 
they increase the relevance of this research to the class teacher 
and underline the problems facing the teacher when she takes 
alternative conceptions into account, Research surveys of a 
particular topic area alert teachers to the sorts of ideas children
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are likely to bring to their learning activities. As teacher 
involvement increases in this field there may be a transition 
toward ’research methods' which are even more firmly rooted in the 
everyday activities of teachers and students. The research 
instrument used in this study was designed with this principle in 
mind. Offspring prediction and family trees are strongly associated 
with traditional teaching strategies in genetics, but as 
demonstrated in this study, they can also be used as an effective 
elicitation procedure for gaining insights into children’s 
conceptions of inheritance.
Identifying and taking children's conceptions into account is 
not an esoteric research activity but fundamental to a conceptual 
change view of learning. Before the teacher can become a 
'conceptual ecologist’ he has to be able to identify the conceptions 
and the behaviours associated with ecosystems, There has to be an 
awareness of the learner’s perspective so that when scientific 
ideas are introduced it is done in such a way that they become 
active within the student’s conceptual ecosystem. Planning a 
teaching strategy or designing a learning sequence cannot hope to 
be effective in bringing about change if it fails to consider 
alternative conceptions in an ecosystemic context. Hewson (1981) 
comments
”,.it is instructive to examine some common teaching practices. 
In these the ideal is to present the desired material in a 
logical sequence, bolstered by suitable experiences of which 
appropriate explanations are provided. No alternative 
conceptions are considered - after all why consider something 
which has not been taught explicitly? In terms of the model, 
there is every reason to expect that a presentation of this 
nature might be intelligible to the student. But if he or she 
holds a plausible alternative conception which contradicts that
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which is presented, the model indicates that the new material 
cannot he meaningfully incorporated because it is not 
plausible. What is more, the student is given no planned 
assistance in identifying the cause of the problem and how to 
overcame it. Of course some students will do that for 
themselves, but experience shows that the majority do not.”
Teachers of science need to address their students' alternative 
conceptions as a first step in facilitating conceptual change. 
Research projects such as CLISP lend considerable support to 
teachers by providing information on common conceptions in 
specific topic areas. However, if these are placed in an 
ecosystemic context then more than ever we are dealing with a 
unique and idiosync. ratic form of conceptual 'organization' where 
universals do not apply. In these circumstances teachers must be 
sensitive to the multiple conceptions of individual students and 
not just those that can be easily spotted because of their 
relationship with known 'misconceptions’. Consequently, the teaching 
focus is shifted away from situations where individual conceptions 
are identified and engaged by learning activities, to one where 
multiple, interactive conceptions are encouraged to become 
cognitively active within the student's conceptual ecosystem. This 
strategy allows teachers to observe conceptions against a 
background of their ecosystemic relationships.
8.4 Syllabus Content and Lesson Design.
The learner’s viewpoint is the starting point of lesson design. 
The content of the lesson must relate to the child's conceptual
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ecosystem in order that the scientific view can at least begin to 
communicate with this environment. The model of conceptual change 
proposed by the Cornell Group (Posner et al. 1982) suggests that 
dissatisfaction with an existing conception and the plausibility of 
an alternative (scientific) concept begins the communication 
process between the received view and the learner's ecosystem. At 
this point it is suggested that the learner may find the new idea a 
fruitful way of solving current problems and this subsequently 
leads to conceptual change. This description is broadly consistent 
with an ecosystemic view of change, but needs to be qualified in 
the light of what actually goes on within ecosystems.
The intelligibility of a scientific concept can be seen as its 
ability to get inside the child's ecosystem of existing ideas;
Hewson (1981) refers to this as "conceptual capture". For this to 
happen it has to resonate, at least initially, with a conception 
within the ecosystem. For example, dominance in strict Mendelian 
terms seems to resonate with many children's blending conceptions 
of inheritance. Put another way dominance is 'understood* in terms 
of colour strength and gains access to the ecosystem in this way. 
This ’misconception’ is a long way from the biological notion of 
dominance but what it does represent is the beginning of a process 
which allows the learner to develop and test his conception of 
’dominance’ within his own ecosystem. By understanding dominance in 
this way existing ideas interact with new experiences. The quality 
of this interaction allows the learner to go an testing this 
conception against subsequent experiences, which in turn may allow 
him to make the transition to the scientific viewpoint. The role of
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the teacher in this situation is to encourage the learner's 
continued engagement with the 'problem' to the point where he can 
test the alignment of his conceptions with the scientific view.
Resonance between existing conceptions and scientific concepts 
is not difficult to achieve given the diversity and heterogeneity 
of children's ideas. Conceptual ecosystems have a great number of 
'hooks’ on which to hang new ideas. Indeed a major aim of the 
teacher should be to develop, foster and reward conceptual 
heterogeneity.
Dissatisfaction with existing conceptions is often seen to run 
parallel with the intelligibility of new concepts. Indeed, in many 
teaching schemes designed to bring about conceptual change, 
dissatisfaction, conflict, or cognitive dissonance are used early on 
in the teaching sequence (Nussbaum and Novick, 1981) or after a 
period of initial awareness raising (Rowell and Dawson, 1984). It 
is interesting that many of these strategies have been subsequently 
refined in order to overcome the 'problem' of children hybridising 
old and new ideas. However, I believe that this only serves to 
reinforce the contention that new ideas have to resonate with the 
old before they begin to interact with the child’s conceptual 
ecosystem. Dissatisfaction with existing ideas is a desirable goal 
for the teacher interested in bringing about conceptual change but 
it has to be generated from within conceptual ecosystems, not 
orchestrated and imposed on the system as if it were part of 
curricular theory.
In the history of science there are many examples of 
dissatisfaction leading to conceptual change. These models of
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change are perceived by the expert scientist as having the same 
sort of influence on the learner. However, confronting the ’naive' 
learner with new conceptions in the hope that he sees the conflict 
and shares the dissatisfaction of those who have already made the 
ideas part of their ecosystem, remains a very different matter.
"The theory of conceptual change (as articulated by Posner et 
al.) holds that the state of readiness for conceptual change 
ought best to arise from the learner’s own attempts to make 
sense of experience..,Yet a troublesome aspect of the way in 
which their work has been transformed into an instructional 
method is that the topics addressed arise from the wisdom of 
the curricularists, not the curiosity of the learner. The 
teacher is asked to rush students to readiness by posing a 
question ...that probably never occurred to the students, and 
then induce dissatisfaction with their own explanations by 
confrontation.. The result is a kind of "cognitive assault" in 
which students are forced to confront and abandon a part of 
self that has been, and is, serving them reasonably well."
(Clark. In Watts and Pope, 1985)
The power of interactive metaphors (Petrie, 1974), anomalies or 
analogies have to be measured in these same terms; unless they 
mean something to the learner and arise from within his ecosystem 
they are unlikely to have any impact on conceptual change. New 
ideas can be made to resonate with existing conceptions if children 
are given the opportunities to incorporate them into their 
ecosystems. If this happpens the plausibility and fruitfulness of 
conceptions may be put to the test. No matter how effective the 
anomaly or the metaphor is in terms of interacting with existing 
conceptions it cannot be expected to 'work' if it is not part of a 
more general effort by teacher and student to exceed the boundaries 
of conceptual stability. It is often suggested that this effort 
should be orientated towards enfeebling existing ideas. The notion
being that anomalies and metaphors result in a level of 
dissatisfaction which reduces the status of conceptions within the 
child's ecosystem and strengthens the case far change. However, 
given the resilient character of ecosystems, it may be essential 
for teachers first to facilitate the amplification of these 
conceptions in order to make them explicit and co-active with ’new' 
ideas. If existing notions are to have their explanatory adequacy 
tested and measured against scientific theories, then they must be 
allowed to 'live out their lives’ to the fullest extent. If the 
learner is to test his conceptions against experiences, no single 
factor such as conflict or anomalies will cause this to happen.
What is required is the convergence of learning strategies to 
produce a learning environment which promotes and sustains the 
activities of student’s conceptual ecosystems.
8.5 Teaching Styles and Strategies.
Teaching that is designed to facilitate change within 
conceptual ecosystems requires students to be aware of their 
existing conceptions. This also means that learners must exhibit a 
willingness to articulate and explore their conceptions. Learning 
environments which provide this sort of opportunity for reflective 
and reflexive thought take many forms.
Small problem solving groups seem to have the potential to 
nourish students’ awareness of their own conceptions. Group work 
increases the opportunities for verbal involvement and interaction 
as well as opening up feedback channels originating from within
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the peer group. Small group work means that individual children
take responsibility for their own learning but also that of their
peers. The helping behaviour that is commonly observed when
children work together involves the 'helpers* in the explanation
and the articulation of conceptions. In these circumstances it is
not easy to decide who gets the most out of these exchanges, the
helper or the helped.
Sawada and Caley (1985) describe how group work may
contribute to conceptual change.
"This far-from-equilibrium environment was facilitated by 
focusing on open-ended projects in which children had 
extensive free choice in identifying and pursuing interests 
usually with the aid of a computer using LOGO. The child, as a 
"pursuer of projects" was not so much a "pursuer of learning" 
(Being) as he/she was a "pursuer of knowing" (Becoming). The 
child was a knower or better still, an epistemologist in the 
sense of Papert (1980); it is the "child as epistemologist" 
that consciously propels the child toward new realms of 
Becoming. Freedom to pursue is thus the first guideline towards 
knowing/Becoming. Sensitivity on the part of the teachers and 
students is the prime consideration when children as 
epistemologists extend themselves into an actualization of the 
unknown by choosing one path of pursuit over another thus 
opening more domains of Being through Becoming at each 
decision point,"
Certainly problem solving groups have considerable potential in 
bringing about conceptual change in the individual. In the past 
there has been a tendency to make group work the ultimate form of 
constructivist learning strategy (usually by non-constructivists) 
however, a much more fundamental issue is not so much the specific 
strategy used but the general learning climate created by the 
students and teachers,
Whether in the context of a class discussion, or an 
experimental project, teaching and learning should make it possible
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for students to experience the sorts of conditions which are likely 
to promote conceptual change. Teaching strategies which encourage 
active learning and student participation, will be more effective in 
this respect, than the teacher dominated, ’knowledge transmission’ 
type of lesson. In this respect the most critical factor in 
creating a learning environment capable of facilitating change is 
not the particular strategy used, but the development of a 
supportive climate in which conceptual ecosystems can mature and 
grow. If children are to be encouraged to make their conceptions 
explicit, and if these ideas in turn will be subjected to private 
and public scrutiny, only a supportive classroom environment will 
make this a positive learning experience for the student. The 
creation of an environment where learners can feel confident that 
their ideas will be respected and valued by teachers (and fellow 
students) can help promote conceptual change. Watts and Bentley 
(1986) have considered the role of non-verbal communication in the 
creation of non-threatening learning environments. The implications 
of this work is that teachers may have to be more aware of their 
own actions before expecting children to engage in the activities 
which may lead to conceptual change.
"From our evidence it would seem that youngsters are highly 
attentive and sophisticated interpreters of teacher behaviour. 
Within a supportive atmosphere they are looking for high 
levels of trust, warmth and enthusiasm. They know they have 
found such attitudes when teachers engage in frequent eye 
contact, are alert, with quick body movements, listen carefully 
to youngsters criticisms, and act on them. Such teachers laugh, 
with others and at themselves, stand close, touch from time to 
time, and use quick, bright voice tones that convey warmth and 
above all, respect for their co-learners."
(Watts and Bentley, 1986)
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Given the prevailing social climate in some classrooms, these 
observations highlight how the metatransitions of the conceptual 
change process may be all too easily disrupted by dominant forces 
which interact with children’s ecosystems. These forces may well 
take the form of restrictive interpersonal relationships in which 
the teacher or a fellow student is interested only in imposing 
their ideas (overtly or covertly) on others. In these circumstances 
individual ecosystems may be denied the opportunity to develop 
the level of openness (heterogeneity, flexibility and engagement) 
which results in conceptual change. The image of the dictatorial 
teacher or the ’know all’ student may spring to mind in this 
context, but the real problem associated with promoting conceptual 
change is not so easily identified or remedied.
The imposition of scientific ’fact1 lies heavily over most 
classrooms. Curricular science gives teachers and students little 
in the way of freedom to develop their intuitive conceptions, and 
what little that they have is often controlled by examination 
requirements and the expectations of parents, students and society. 
The learner is so busy with the agenda of curricular science there 
is little time for the sort of personal exploration which results 
in conceptual change. Equally the teacher is concerned to develop 
the potential of her students to the full, but there isn’t time to 
allow ecosystemic processes to bring about change and therefore 
change is imposed (often unsuccessfully). Caught between what seems 
to be two extremes, the teacher tries to provide a rich, supportive 
learning environment on the one hand but cannot afford the ’luxury' 
of giving her students absolute freedom to develop their own ideas
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in their own time. Student’s are encouraged to ’discover’ and to 
make sense of their world, but all the time their activities are 
being guided by the template of curricular science. Teachers and 
students are caught in a viscious circle of cultural forces which 
act in such a way as to inhibit conceptual change.
At another level, the teacher who is committed to a 
constructivist view of learning and seeks to facilitate the 
conceptual change process, is also caught up in the dilemma of how 
to teach in such a way as to help and not enfeeble the activities 
of the learner, Such teachers have no desire to be neutrals when it 
comes to their students’ learning activities. However, they may have 
become aware that in order to give students the freedom to change 
their conceptions, they must first not deny them that freedom. By 
determining the direction and the route that conceptual change 
should follow we may preclude the very possibility of change. If 
children are to be given the opportunity to change their ideas then 
teachers and fellow students need to ensure that their actions are 
'ecosystemically friendly’, ie. they resonate with the learner's 
existing ideas and that they increase rather than decrease the 
creative potential of the learner's ecosystem. Metaphorically 
speaking, science teaching becomes not the exploitation and 
organization of children’s ideas in order to align them with 
scientific views, but the conservation of ecosystems of conceptions 
which have an inherent potential to change and to assimilate new 
ideas and experiences.
8.6 Conceptual Change In the Classroom.— An\ Overview.
Having described the wider issues of how conceptual change 
might be facilitated in classrooms, it would seem appropriate at 
this point to consider the specific strategies used in teaching 
inheritance and to compare these with the model of conceptual 
change developed in this thesis. If we consider the methods used by 
teachers to introduce students to inheritance concepts, then it Is 
possible to build up a general picture of classroom practice,
The first formal contact that many students have with 
inheritance concepts is when they are asked to think about the 
observable traits and characteristics of 'classical' genetics 
organisms such as mice, fruit flies, pea plants or fungi. In the 
light of my researches it would seem highly desirable that this 
list of organisms be extended to include a greater number of 
familiar organisms such as domestic cats, dogs and Homo sapiens. 
Classic genetics organisms are not chosen on the basis of their 
familiarity to students but on the basis of biological criteria 
such as high fecundity, short generation times and ease of 
experimental manipulation. These latter characteristics may be 
extremely important to research geneticists, however, many of these 
convenient organisms are unfamiliar to students. This makes it 
difficult for the student to reconcile existing conceptions of 
inheritance, which may be bound to specific everyday examples, with 
’school genetics’. The use of more familiar organisms such as mice 
or cats might overcome this problem. Another advantage of 
extending the range of exemplar organisms is that it would make it
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possible for teacher and student to move away more easily from the 
'black and white* world of Mendelian genetics. For example, domestic 
cats exhibit all the classic Mendelian characteristics but also 
show polymorphism, multiple allele effects and co-dominance. The 
considerable variation to be seen in cat phenotypes would allow 
students and teachers to discuss and debate existing notions of 
"mixed breeds", "half-casts", and "blends". These effects are often 
thought to be too difficult as they involve complex gene 
combinations, but at a descriptive level they have considerable 
potential in allowing students to make the connection between their 
everyday experiences of inheritance and school genetics. Examples 
drawn from human inheritance patterns would also have the same 
potential to generate anecdotes, analogies, metaphors and anomalies 
from within Individual ecosystems. On this basis learners can 
actively engage with inheritance phenomena and begin to test their 
intuitive ideas,
A classic strategy associated with genetics teaching is the use 
of problem solving activities. Children are introduced to the 
genotypic underpinnings of inheritance through problems which 
require the student to predict offspring and parental 
phenotypes/genotypes. The 'Punnett Square’ typifies this form of 
problem solving. Problem solving is. an ideal way of facilitating 
conceptual change. This thesis has described how problem situations 
provide a focus for student discussion, raise conceptual awareness 
and give learners the opportunity to test their conceptions 
privately and publicly. Unfortunately, genetics problems do not 
tend to encourage these behaviours, for they rapidly develop into
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pseudo-mathematical exercises where the student is encouraged to 
get the ’right' answer by following a problem salving algorithm. 
Many students find genetics problems straight forward but in the 
majority of cases this is achieved by ’ritualising’ the content of 
the problem and separating it from real world inheritance 
phenomena that they have experienced. If problem salving in 
genetics is to have any impact on the reconciliation of existing 
ideas with genetics concepts, then there is a need to delay the 
introduction of Mendelian explanations until students have had a 
chance to try out their own predictive theories. Failure to do this 
means that problem salving is confined to school based genetics 
which may have little to say about why ’’the cat next door had 
three brown kittens and one white one".
This thesis has indicated that many 12 year old children have 
thoughts about inheritance and can construct conceptual ecosystems 
which allow them to theorize about inheritance phenomena. It is 
unfortunate that these children will have to wait several years 
before any of these ideas might be used again. Traditionally, 
genetics is a topic which is taught to senior students (a Piagetian 
scar on the syllabus?). However, if conceptual change involves a 
series of metatransitions based on the learners growing awareness 
of the relationship between existing conceptions and new ideas, 
then it may be advantageous that he is given time to make these 
adaptations. It would seem more desirable in this respect that 
rather than squeeze genetics into two weeks of teaching and 
learning, children might be given the opportunity to make the links
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between existing conceptions and new ideas over a longer period of 
time.
8.7 Future Research and Development of an Ecosystemic Model of 
Conceptual Change.
To enlarge our understanding of conceptual change it would 
seem profitable to develop the small group setting as a focus for 
research. Teacher less groups provide a fruitful model system for 
observing theories in action. Indeed in the light of what I have 
said above about non-threatening environments, they may be one of 
the best contexts in which to observe active conceptual ecosystems. 
Much research remains if we are to find out more about how to 
maximise the benefits of group work far the individual. The 
combination of boy/girl ratios, group size, age, status, and 
friendship characterisitcs, which yield the greatest benefits for 
individuals is a research question that remains open. In this study 
it was observed that where one student is in the minority by sex 
or by their level of engagement, this student can become isolated 
and detached from the group’s activities. We need to know more 
about the personal and interpersonal reasons far this behaviour.
The technique of video-recording group activities would seem to 
be a particularly fruitful research technique. Not only does it 
afford the opportunity to analyse cognitive and interpersonal 
activities, but given considerable resources of time and equipment, 
it could also be used to analyse the effects of non-verbal 
communication within the group and give cognitive and social
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analyses another dimension. Video recordings of group activities 
can provide a multidisciplinary focus for researchers interested in 
conceptual change.
Future research efforts might also examine the generalisability 
of the ecological framework to other content areas within science 
curricula. The influence of social settings, different problem 
salving tasks and various sex/age combinations might be examined.
In the context of this research it is acknowledged that the design 
of the inheritance problem is specific to this biological topic. 
However, at a more fundamental level it is not difficult to imagine 
the same sorts of problem solving activities taking place in a 
sixth form physics laboratory or in a primary school playground. 
Certainly the boys and girls involved in this study cannot be seen 
as being representitive of every social class or family background, 
school system or ethnic group. Future research might continue 
tolook at the effects of these variables on the origins and the use 
of children’s intuitive beliefs. It is possible to speculate that 
although one might expect these factors to have significant effects 
on children’s conceptualising, there will be many more instances of 
commonality and similarity between groups of children. Whether this 
would be a reflection of common cultures, common languages or 
fundamental cognitive processes, the representitiveness of student’s 
involved in research is probably a more salient issue when 
researchers try to utilise educational resources in order to 
implement ’solutions’ to learning problems in the classroom.
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Ill addition we need to know more about the response of 
teachers and students to learning environments which encourage 
variability, uncertainty and disturbance within conceptual systems. 
In a rapidly changing world where unknown experiences seem to be 
around every corner, is it more likely that learners will ultimately 
seek out or insist on conceptual stability rather than look for 
ways of maintaining their openness to change. The consequences of 
such a response may have a very considerable effects on the ways 
that students reconcile existing ideas with scientific conceptions. 
Equally, can teachers accept that their role in bringing about 
conceptual change may not be one of ’inducing conflict’ in the 
minds of their students but facilitating and supporting children in 
their conceptual activities. This research has highlighted the 
problems of generating conceptual conflict and change in group 
settings. The lack of effectiveness of cognitive conflict strategies 
has considerable bearing on the productivity of group discussions 
and teacher-pupil interactions. What role does the teacher perform 
if his challenges, disagreements and arguments carried out in the 
best Socratic fashion fail to have an impact on his student’s 
conceptual ecosystems? ’Deliberate’ attempts to bring about 
conceptual change may have to take the form of preparing learning 
environments, illuminating and eliciting conceptions and fostering 
the growth and maturation of each student’s alternative 
conceptions,
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Appendix I 
Inheritance Cards
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Appendix II 
Comprehension Task: Text Content
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Page 1
The coat colour of a mouse depends on the genes* that it 
receives from each of its parents,
* Genes are bits of biological information which control the way 
the mouse looks, eg. the colour of its coat, the length of its 
tail etc.
Page 2
The colour of a mouse's coat is determined by pairs of genes. The 
mouse receives one gene from the father and one from the mother, to 
make up a pair of genes.
Page 3
There are a number of pairs of genes which control the colour of 
a mouse's coat
Page 4
Black Mice
The gene B controls the development of the black coat colour in 
mice. If a mouse receives a black gene B from each parent, the 
mouse will have a black coat.
Page 5
Brown Mice
The gene which produces black coat colour can occur in another 
form called the brown gene b.
A mouse which receives a brown gene b from each parent will have 
a brown coat.
Page 6
Black Mice/Brown Mice
If a mouse receives on black gene B fromone of its parents, and 
a brown gene b from the other parent, the mouse will have a 
black coat.
This is because the the black gene is dominant over the brown 
gene.
Page 7
Mice with Coloured Coats
The colour gene C is the gene which decides whether a mouse will 
have a coloured coat .
If a mouse receives a colour gene C from each parent, the mouse 
will have a coloured coat.
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Page 8
Albino Mice
The colour gene C can occur in another form called the albino 
gene c. A mouse which receives an albino gene from one parent 
and another albino gene from the other parent, will have no 
colour at all in its coat.
Albino mice are pure white and have pink eyes.
Page 9
Coloured Mice/Albino Mice
If a mouse receives the colour gene C from one parent and the 
albino gene c from the other parent, the mouse will have a 
coloured coat.
This is because the colour gene C is stronger than the albino 
gene, (The colour gene is said to be dominant over the albino 
gene)
Page 10
Mice with Dark Coloured Coats
The gene L has the effect of making the colour of a mouses coat 
darker.
If for example, a brown mouse receives an L gene from each of 
its parents, its coat will be a dark chocolate colour.
Page 11
Mice with Light Coloured Coats
The gene L can occur in another form called 1. The gene 1 has the 
affect of making the coat colour lighter.
If far example, a brown mouse receives an 1 gene from each 
parent, its coat colour will be a milk chocolate colour.
Page 12
Light Coloured Mice/ Dark Coloured Mice
If a mouse receives an L gene from one of its parents, and an 1 
gene from the other parent, the mouse will have a dark coat 
colour. This is because the gene for darker colours is stronger 
than the gene for lighter colours (L is dominant over 1).
Page 13 
Agouti Mice
Agouti mice have grey coloured bellies and a coat made up of two 
colours. This gives the coat of an agouti a speckled look. For 
example, agouti mice can have a mixture of black and brown in 
their coat.
The agoutigene A produces the agouti pattern in the mouse’s coat. 
If a mouse receives an agouti gene from each parent the mouse 
will also have an agouti pattern.
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Page 14
Non-Agouti Mice
Non-agouti mice have coats of only one colour, eg. solid black. 
The non-agouti gene a is another form of the agouti gene A.
If a mouse receives a non-agouti gene from each parent the mouse 
will have a coat made up of only one colour.
Sometimes mice can hve the gene a1- which gives non-agouti mice 
tan bellies.
Page 15
Agouti Mice/Non-Agouti Mice
If a mouse receives an agouti gene A from one parent and a non­
agouti gene a from the other parent, the mouse will have the 
agouti pattern.
This is because the agouti gene is dominant over the non-agouti 
gene. (A is stranger than a).
Appendix III 
Family Tree Problem
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Summary Diagrams of each Group's Family Trees
Appendix IV
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Symbol Key
<t> Tan
(d) Dark
(m> Medium
(1) Light
Symbol Phenotype
B1 Black
Br Brown
Ag Agouti
Gr Grey
Al Albino
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Appendix V 
Videotape Recording Equipment
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Appendix VI 
Shorthand Summaries of Case Studies
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Symbol Key
O  Like Begets Like
A  Variation in the Offspring
□ Blending (Sue and Tracey)
•  Sibling Similarity
■ Blending
'Dom inance * /Blending
$  Albino Frequency
^  Grandparental Influence 
^  Random Offspring (Odd Ones)
<3D Gender Based Like Begets Like
A  Mixtures (Tracey)
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